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I. INTRODUCTION
October 10, 1985, was the one hundredth anniversary of the
admission to the bar of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City of
EverettJ. Waring, the first black lawyer admitted to practice before
the state courts in Maryland. Waring's admission was both a begin-
ning and an ending; it was the culmination of a prolonged struggle
by blacks for the right to practice law in the state and the beginning
of black lawyers' participation in the struggle to establish political
and civil rights. The centennial of his admission seems an appropri-
ate time to reflect on the events that led to the opening of the bar to
blacks.
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Two years before Waring's birth, at least one black man in
Maryland had demonstrated the knowledge and capacity to become
a lawyer. In 1857 Edward G. Draper was certified by a judge of the
Superior Court of Baltimore as fully qualified (except for his race) to
practice law. Draper did not ask to be admitted to practice in the
state courts because he knew such a request would be futile. Later,
however, other blacks before Waring unsuccessfully sought admis-
sion. In 1877 the Court of Appeals of Maryland, acting on purely
racial grounds despite the adoption of the fourteenth amendment,
denied the application for admission of Charles Taylor. Eight years
after the Taylor decision, the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City held
that the statutory racial exclusion violated the fourteenth amend-
ment. Within a few months the Supreme Bench admitted Everett
Waring.
These landmarks on the road to the creation of a black bar in
Maryland raise a host of questions. Why did Draper study for a pro-
fession from which he was barred by the law of his home state? Why
did the Court of Appeals reject Taylor's challenge to that law after
passage of the fourteenth amendment? Why did a lower court in
Maryland admit Waring in contravention of the Court of Appeals'
earlier decision in Taylor? Complete answers to these questions
would require a book on the social, political, legal, and economic
history of the period. This article is only a partial response, focus-
ing on legal issues and examining familiar territory-the Dred Scott
decision, the adoption of the Civil War Amendments to the Consti-
tution, the Slaughterhouse Cases, the first Supreme Court decision on
racial exclusion from juries, and the subsequent decision of Plessy v.
Ferguson. Reflecting on the relationship of these legal landmarks to
the efforts of blacks to become lawyers in Maryland helps illuminate
the creation and transformation of the fourteenth amendment dur-
ing the nineteenth century.
Draper's decision to study law was part of his decision to emi-
grate from Maryland to Liberia. That decision arose from his per-
ception that a black could never be a citizen of the United States.
Thus, Draper's behavior highlights the portion of Chief Justice Ta-
ney's opinion in Dred Scott holding that free Negroes were not citi-
zens of the United States. Taney's critics before the Civil War
focused their attack on the portion of his opinion that invalidated
the Missouri Compromise.' The later repudiation of Taney's views
on black citizenship was largely a product of the Civil War, which
1. See 1). FEHRENBACIER, TliE DRED SCm-- CASE 417-448 (1979).
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began as a struggle to preserve the union and ended in a crusade
against slavery.' Most modern critics deplore Taney's decision on
black citizenship, but they pay little attention to Taney's view of the
significance of citizenship.3 Draper's life focuses attention on that
important, but neglected, aspect of our legal history.
Although Taney's opinion in Dred Scott demonstrated how natu-
ral law arguments may be appropriated by both sides in a contro-
versy, his view that citizenship carried with it important rights
derived from natural law was shared by the framers of the four-
teenth amendment. They attempted to secure those rights for
blacks through the privileges and immunities clause of that amend-
ment. But a broad construction of the clause based on natural law
principles, in conjunction with the amendment's enforcement
clause, would have resulted in a broad grant of power to Congress-
a result which many of the amendment's framers did not intend or
desire. Later the Court sought to avoid this impact on the federal
system by transforming the focus of the interpretation of the four-
teenth amendment from the privileges and immunities clause to the
equal protection clause.
The transformation began with the Court's narrow construction
of the amendment's privileges and immunities clause. As the ex-
perience of Charles Taylor reveals, this construction hindered the
extension of civil rights to blacks. Taylor's decision to seek admis-
sion to the bar in Maryland was based on his belief that the four-
teenth amendment removed racial barriers to the practice of law.
The Maryland Court of Appeals denied his application, however, re-
lying on the Slaughterhouse Cases for the proposition that the privi-
leges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment did not
apply to bar admission. Although the Supreme Court in Slaughter-
house had specifically said that the equal protection clause was di-
rected at laws that discriminated against Negroes as a class, the
Maryland court did not even mention the equal protection clause.
2. See J. MCPHERSON, l'nE STrUGL;tE FOR EQ.UAI.ITY (1964).
3. See W. EIIRI.tCt, TIEY HAVE No RiGli-S 137-149 (1979); FEIIRENBACIIER, Supra
note i, at 335-64; Burt, What I1av 11'roog with Dred Scott. What's Right lbout Brown. 42
WASn. & LEE L. REV. I (1985); Tcachout, The Heart ofra Lawyers Craft, 42 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 39 (1985). Scholars recognize that Tancy used the privileges and immunities
clause and the parade of horribles that he predicted would result if blacks enjoyed those
privileges and immunities to support his decision on citizenship, but they rarely pause to
note that Fancy's position on the impact of that clause was questionable and contrasted
sharply with Justice Curtis' view. Consequently, they do not emphasize the relationship
of Taney's views on citizenship in Dred Scott to the interpretation of its meaning held by
the framers of the fourteenth amendment.
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Why did the court in Taylor read that case to destroy rather than
affirm Taylor's right to practice law? The inquiry prompted by Tay-
lor leads to an examination of the debates on the fourteenth amend-
ment, which reveals the central importance of the privileges and
immunities clause to the framers. More important, it leads to the
discovery of the relationship between the opinion ofJustice Miller in
the Slaughterhouse Cases and the contemporaneous debates in Con-
gress on proposals for civil rights legislation. Several commentators
have suggested that the absence of racial issues in the Slaughterhouse
Cases affected the Supreme Court's refusal to give significant content
to the privileges and immunities clause,4 but the investigation of the
historical context sparked by the Taylor case undercuts this notion.
The Maryland court understood Slaughterhouse to limit black claims
for equal treatment because the state court recognized that the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the privileges and immunities
clause was a response to, and a rejection of, congressional claims of
power to prohibit racial discrimination.
The second step in the amendment's transformation occurred
with the Court's broad interpretation of the word "protection" in
the equal protection clause. Waring's admission before the Balti-
more Supreme Bench despite the Taylor precedent was based on
reasoning derived from the Supreme Court's decision in Strauder v.
West Virginia. There the Supreme Court had held that racial exclu-
sion from jury service violated the fourteenth amendment's guaran-
tee of equal protection. Waring's admission underscores the role of
Strauder in severing the equal protection clause from its connection
to the privileges and immunities clause. But his subsequent career
and the decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, handed down a decade after his
admission, show that racial prejudice continued to flourish. The
transformation of the amendment still required the Court to find
meaning for "equality" in values not expressly stated in the docu-
ment. The Court's vision was bound to its time and place, and natu-
ral law arguments once more were used to preserve existing wrongs
rather than transcend them. The Court's interpretation of the equal
protection clause, independent of the rest of the amendment, fo-
cused attention on the meaning of "equality" amid a culture laden
with racial prejudice in contexts not fully considered by the drafters.
The evolution of the interpretation of the fourteenth amend-
ment continues to this day. A century after Waring's admission, the
4. See A. BICKEL, IEI MORALITY OF CONSENT 42-46 (1975); C. FAIRMAN, RECON-
STRUCTION ANI REUNION 1864-88, pt. 1, at 1318-21, in 6 TIlE OIIVER WENDEILL HOLMES
DEVISE: HISTORY OF TIlE SUPREME COURT OF TIE UNITED STATES (P. Freund ed. 1971).
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equal protection clause has become a central feature of constitu-
tional litigation. The efforts of the black lawyers who came after
Waring, and who benefited from the broad reading of the "protec-
tion" of the fourteenth amendment, have themselves contributed to
the evolving understanding of "equality."
Although the perspectives on historical events taken by this ar-
ticle were prompted by looking backward from the events in Mary-
land in an effort to try to understand how they occurred, the article
itself will recount in chronological order some of the events that
transformed the interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. It
does not propose answers to modern problems of constitutional in-
terpretation. It is intended, more modestly, to provide new histori-
cal perspectives to enrich the reader's own reflections on the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment and the process of constitu-
tional interpretation.
II. CITIZENSHIP AND BLACKS IN THE ANTEBELLUM ERA:
DRED SCOTT 1. SANI'FORD
-[T]hey are not included, and were not intended to be included,
under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution. -5
A. The Significance of Citizenship in Dred Scott: An Overview
Citizens, said Chief Justice Roger Taney, are members of the
political body "who hold the power and conduct the Government
through their representatives."" Citizenship does not turn on the
ability to vote, but upon a recognition by those who have political
power that the individual is a member of the community on whose
behalf the power is exercised.7 Legal distinctions between the rights.
of citizens and those of noncitizens are merely one manifestation of
the political, social, and psychological effects of inclusion or exclu-
sion in the society. Recognition by the legislature that individuals
are members of the community whose interests ought to be consid-
ered produces laws more favorable to them than if the legislature
did not regard them as citizens. For both pragmatic and humanita-
rian reasons, government should treat noncitizens fairly; but a soci-
ety regards its government's primary obligation to be to that
5. i)red Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1856).
6. Id.
7. Thus, women, minors, and persons not meeting property qualifications may be
unable to vote, yet are citizens. Id. at 422.
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society's members. The proper extent of a government's obliga-
tions to its citizens, however, is open to question. Understanding
Taney's expansive view of these obligations is a key to understand-
ing the significance of his denial of citizenship to blacks in the Dred
Scott decision.
Blacks were subjected to discrimination in antebellum America
in all but a tiny number of northern states.' Neither Chief Justice
Taney's opinion for the Court in Dred Scott, which denied citizenship
to blacks, nor Justice Benjamin Curtis' dissent, which argued that
blacks could be citizens, was intended to extend significant rights
and privileges to blacks. The nature of the reasoning used by each
Justice illuminates how article IV, section 2-the privileges and im-
munities clause-was to become the theoretical battleground for
black equality and, in the short term, the theoretical burial ground
for visions of that equality.
In Dred Scott v. Sandford, Chief Justice Taney took a broad view
of the obligations of government. He insisted that citizenship nec-
essarily involved the possession of important rights; for that reason,
he denied that blacks could be citizens of the United States. Every
citizen had a fundamental right to the protection of government, to
life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness. Taney acknowl-
edged the power of a state to deny any of these rights to its residents,
and that the Constitution provided no remedy for this denial. Such
a denial in his eyes demonstrated that the state did not regard such
individuals as its citizens. But the Constitution did cast its protection
over citizens of the United States when they traveled to other states.
Since article IV, section 2 gave citizens of one state the privileges
and immunities of citizenship in every other state, Taney reasoned
that they were entitled to the fundamental rights of citizens in every
state to which they traveled, regardless of the rights which that state
granted its own residents. Taney believed it inconceivable that the
Constitution conferred such valuable rights on blacks, and therefore
he argued that blacks could not be citizens.
Justice Curtis, dissenting in Dred Scott, took a narrow view of the
obligations of government to its citizens under the Constitution.
Curtis said that a black man could be a citizen of the United States,
but, under his interpretation of the Constitution, citizenship con-
tained few rights of importance. Citizens could invoke federal court
8. See generally L. LITWACK, NORTll OF SLAVERY: TIHE NEGRO IN TUlE FREE STATES,
1790-1860 (1961).
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jurisdiction under article III by demonstrating diversity of citizen-
ship, but their rights in the federal forum were limited to those a
state was willing to give its own citizens. According to the reasoning
ofJustice Curtis, if a state chose to deny the right to own property to
any group of its citizens, property ownership in that state was not a
privilege or immunity of citizenship to which citizens of other states
were entitled under article IV. It was merely a right of nonmembers
of the specified group. The privileges and immunities of citizenship
secured to citizens of other states by article IV, section 2 were lim-
ited to those rights which a state granted to all of its citizens, and the
obligations of government to its own citizens were only those which
the government voluntarily assumed. Thus, as Curtis constructed
his dissenting opinion, blacks could be citizens because citizenship
itself was of limited significance. It offered protection against preju-
dice based on residence, but not against prejudice based on race.
Although Justice Curtis' interpretation of the privileges and im-
munities clause of article IV is closer to that embodied in current
decisions of the Supreme Court," Taney's views are more significant
to understanding both the impact of his opinion at the time of the
Civil War Amendments and in the context of thought of the fram-
ers. Dred Scott was a controversial decision when rendered because it
denied federal power to abolish slavery in the territories."' The
holding that Dred Scott and other free blacks were not citizens for
purposes of the jurisdictional provision of article III was less contro-
versial. Nevertheless, an emotional response to Taney's opinion on
citizenship of blacks was touched off-not by his holding as such,
9. Curtis was also the author ofConnor v. Elliott, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591 (1856), in
which he noted, with respect to the privileges and immunities clause. "It is safer, and
more in accordance with the duty of a judicial tribunal, to leave its meaning to be deter-
mined, in each case, upon a view of the particular rights asserted or denied therein." Id.
at 593. In Connor he held that the Louisiana law, which provided that persons married in
Louisiana or who resided in L.ouisiana after being married elsewhere acquired property
in Louisiana as community property, was not a privilege or immunity of citizenship. He
reasoned that such rights were based on the place of contract and not on the citizenship
of the parties to the contract. Curtis resigned from the Court after Dred Scott and had no
further opportunity to elaborate on the meaning of article IV. section 2. His opinions in
Dred Scott and Connor demonstrate that he regarded the clause solely as a protection for
nonresidents against discrimination, but they offer little help in defining which rights
should be considered privileges or immunities. The view that the privileges and immuni-
ties clause protects only against discrimination based on residence has been accepted by
the present Court. See Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 105 S.Ct. 1272
(1985); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); Toomer v. Whitsell, 334 U.S. 385
(1948).
10. See FEIIRENBACIIER, supra note I.
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but by his language and by the implications that Taney himself at-
tached to citizenship. If citizenship meant no more than Justice
Curtis said it did, the exclusion of blacks would not have raised such
alarm. Indeed, Abraham Lincoln did not challenge this aspect of
the decision in his famous debates with Stephen Douglas."' Taney,
however, equated the rights of a citizen with the fundamental rights
of man. Though couched in legal terms, his Dred Scott opinion con-
tained a moral dimension that repudiated society's responsibility for
the civil rights of blacks. The opinion, therefore, became a symbol
of shame. At the same time, Taney provided a touchstone for future
attempts to improve the status of blacks. Under Taney's view of the
rights belonging to United States citizens, the extension of citizen-
ship to blacks would have had tremendous consequences. In a gen-
eral sense, the framers of the Civil War Amendments shared
Taney's view and thus sought to effectuate a broad spectrum of
rights when they guaranteed the privileges and immunities of citi-
zenship to blacks. A precise delineation of the proper consequences
of citizenship, however, was missing. The development of the con-
cept of the rights of citizens blended positive law with appeals to
natural law in a manner that could only lead to confusion.
B. Early Concepts of the Rights of Citizens
Natural law may be defined as a set of general moral stan-
dards," in contrast to the existing positive law of statutes, codes,
and decisions of the legal institutions. Normally there is a consen-
sus on the substantive content of positive law, or at least on the au-
thoritative source for determining it. No such consensus exists
respecting natural law. Every person may entertain his or her own
idiosyncratic view of its content. Nevertheless, in a practical sense,
natural law reasoning plays an important role in the perception of a
government's obligation toward its citizens. Those who make the
law insist that their decisions are in conformity with natural law
(even if those of earlier decisionmakers were not) and that natural
law will govern future decisons as well. Only critics of the status
quo deny the coincidence of natural law and positive law. Despite
the clear theoretical distinction between the two, the ideology of
those holding power in a society tends to deny that there is a differ-
ence in practice." Thus, the line between the rights that citizens of
I1. THE LINCOI.N-DOUGLAS )EBATES OF 1858, at 302 (R. Johannsen ed. 1965).
12. SeeJ. FINNiS, NATURAL IAW AN) NATIRAl. Ricir's 23 (1980).
13. In this article "natural law" refers to a set of basic principles that ought to guide
society. These principles are derived both from reason and the nature of man and are
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a nation ought to have and those that they do have becomes
blurred. The evolution of the concept of the rights of citizens in
England and America up to the time of the Dred Scott decision illus-
trates this point.
In Calvin's Case in 1608 Lord Coke said, "For as the subject
oweth to the king his true and faithful ligeance and obedience, so
the sovereign is to govern and protect his subjects.. . ."" In Coke's
scheme, the obligations of king and subject were independent.
Thus, the king had a moral obligation to protect the life, liberty, and
property of his subjects, but his failure to do so did not relieve his
subject of the obligations of allegiance and obedience. The protec-
tion owed by the sovereign to his subjects was left vague.
Practically, the rights of citizens were simply those legal protec-
tions available only to citizens. English law did not fully catalog the
rights of subjects; instead it specified certain disabilities imposed on
noncitizens. Most litigation over citizenship, like Calvin's Case, in-
volved issues of inheritance. Aliens were barred from owning land
and, consequently, from suits at law over real property and from
franchises and offices requiring property holding. All the powers
granted an alien-acquisition of personal property, use of real prop-
erty, protection of his person, and the ability to reside in the na-
tion-were merely concessions that could be withdrawn, especially
applicable to all societies. The rules that govern a particular society (positive law) may
violate these principles, but, at least theoretically, such a violation will produce dissatis-
faction. Natural law cannot serve as a complete legal system because it does not pro-
duce a single set of governing rules for all situations. For example, it may be a natural
law principle that life be protected, so that a legal system failing to impose sanctions on
murder could be said to violate natural law. Positive law, however, could protect life and
thus conform to this principle of natural law in a variety of ways. Sanctions for taking
life might range from compensation to the kin of the deceased to life imprisonment (or
arguably capital punishment), while the procedures for dealing with the offender could
range from self-help to a trial by jury. The avowed aim of law is normally to do justice,
and those who create the rules attempt to justify these positive laws by reference to
abstract ideas of justice, or natural law. To some extent ideas of justice may be influ-
enced in turn by positive law. If an existing rule is found to be useful and convenient by
society's members, they may generalize from its value or usefulness to a principle of
justice (although persons who agree upon the value of a rule may nevertheless disagree
on the principle which justifies the rule). It is also possible to reason from a principle of
justice abstracted from one part of positive law that another aspect of positive law is
unjust. Finally, in the process of making positive law, judges often turn to natural law to
interpret statutes or to decide cases not covered by statutes. Indeed, early judges in-
sisted they did not "make" law, but rather "discovered" the law which was immanent in
principles drawn from nature.
14. 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 382 (1607), Calvin's Case, 7 Co. Rep. ia, 4b (1608).
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if war turned a friendly nation into an enemy.' 5 The perception that
alienage was a justification for withholding rights or making them
subject to withdrawal, however, was accompanied by the developing
belief that there were rights to which citizens, in contrast to aliens,
were entitled.
In the thought of men like John Locke, conceptions of govern-
ment based upon a natural order of obligation and right, such as
Lord Coke's, evolved into the notion of government grounded in a
contractual relationship."' In America, the Declaration of Indepen-
dence asserted a contractual relationship between the governors
and the governed. It stated that the purpose of establishing a gov-
ernment is to secure to the people inalienable rights, including "life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness."' 7 The Declaration then listed
ways in which the king denied these rights. Thus on the eve of the
American Revolution, the colonists claimed a right to dissolve their
ties to Great Britain because that government had failed in its obli-
gations to them."
Under the Declaration of Independence, the concept of "ina-
lienable rights" contained reference to natural and positive law.
Rights were asserted as universal principles of natural law. The fun-
damental rights of colonists included not only the negative rights to
be free of government invasion of personal security, liberty, or
property, but also the affirmative rights to the protection by govern-
ment of personal security, liberty, and property. While natural law
could be invoked to uphold the status quo," ' the colonists could and
did invoke natural law to overturn their government. When en-
forcement of rights grounded in natural law became impossible
15. J. KETrNER, THE 1)FVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 6
(1978).
16. Id. at 44-61.
17. The Declaration of Independence, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
18. "[Wihenever any government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right
of the people to alter or to abolish it." Id.
19. It is no accident that Robert Filmer's De Pariarcha, arguing for monarchy on the
basis of natural law theory, was published in 1680 during the Restoration, or that
Locke's Two Treatises on Goverzrnent, replying to Filmer, came out in 1698 after the "6lori-
ous Revolution." The task of government is eased if the governed accept its authority
and laws as legitimate. Thus, the argument that positive law (what is) coincides with
natural law (what ought to be) is a useful tool to maintain the status quo. But as the
revolutionary rhetoric demonstrates, natural rights theory may be appropriated effec-
tively by opponents with a different vision of the society. The malleability of natural law
produces the ambiguity of "privileges and immunities"--the existing status of citizens is
justified by reference to natural law which can then be appropriated by advocates of
change.
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within the existing legal system, they resorted to revolution. Never-
theless, "inalienable rights" also had a positive law aspect, for their
content in specific applications was derived from colonial versions
of the rights of Englishmen in England. 20 Furthermore, the form
that the protection of citizens' security, liberty, and property took
was that of existing positive law. 2' The concept of property, for ex-
ample, involves a bundle of rights to some tangible or intangible
thing. These rights may be asserted against the government or
against third parties. The content of these rights in any particular
case, however, is largely determined by the law of the land. Thus,
any claim by a citizen of a fundamental right carried with it both a
natural law reference and a reference to existing positive law.
C. Privileges and Immunities-Initial Interpretation
The Articles of Confederation in 1781 recognized that each state
afforded to its citizens rights that were defined by that state's laws.
The Articles provided that
the free inhabitants of each of these States (paupers,
vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted) shall be en-
titled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the
several States; and the people of each State shall have free
ingress and egress to and from any other State, and shall
enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, sub-
ject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the
inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such restric-
tion shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of
property imported into any State, to any other State, of
which the Owner is an inhabitant.
Under the Articles of Confederation, each state remained sovereign.
20. See E. MORGAN, "HE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC 6, 73-75, 88 (1967); B. BAILYN, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 175-198 (1967); see also JOHN AD-
AMS, LIFE AND WORKS 440 (C.F. Adams ed. 1851); E. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER lAw" BACK-
GROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL. .AW 24 (1955). Until the eve of the Revolution,
American colonists claimed the rights of Englishmen. The separation produced a
broader justification-the rights of man. If the monarchy did not respond to grievances,
monarchy itself was wrong. Thus, an early task of American law and lawyers was to
distinguish between English common law principles that derived from the law of nature
and should therefore be maintained and those principles corrupted by the English sys-
tem of feudal monarchy. See N. CIIIPMAN, SKETCIIES OF THE PRINCIPI.ES OF GOVERNMENT
(1793), excerpted in P. MI.LLER, THE LEGAl. MINI) IN AMERICA 21-30 (1962).
21. Blackstone classified the fundamental rights of citizens as "the right of personal
security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of private property." But, at bottom,
Blackstone's discussion of the rights of mankind resolved into a discussion of the state of
English law in 1765. 1 W. BIACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES "129, 134, 138.
22. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, article IV.
950 [VOL. 44:939
1985] TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
There was no thought of affecting the way a state treated its own
citizens or of obtaining for nonresidents any rights beyond those a
state afforded its own citizens, and there was no effective mechanism
for enforcing even the limited rights stated in the Articles.23 Thus,
there was no definitive judicial definition of privileges and immuni-
ties under the Articles.
The privileges and immunities clause of the Articles of Confed-
eration was imported into the Constitution as the first sentence of
article IV, section 2: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States. "24
Alexander Hamilton called this clause "the basis of the Union. ' 2 5
In both documents, the function of the privileges and immunities
clause was not to enable any institution of the federal government to
impose its theory of fundamental rights upon the states, but rather
to prevent the separate states from treating citizens of other states
as aliens, entitled to no rights. The "Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens" were to be no greater than the existing rights that a state
from time to time afforded its own citizens. In focusing on the elim-
ination of discrimination, however, the drafters and later interpret-
ers paid little attention to the specific content of privileges and
immunities. This enabled later generations to invest the phrase
with natural law overtones in the very process of limiting its
application.
The zealous concern for state sovereignty manifested in the Ar-
ticles of Confederation, and the continuing anxiety over the inde-
pendence of the states under the Constitution, made it unlikely that
the privileges and immunities clause was intended to destroy all dis-
tinctions between citizens of a state and citizens of other states; but
the debates of the constitutional convention offered no details as to
which rights must be the same. The courts were left to hammer out
a definition of privileges and immunities that would preserve the
union without encroaching on state sovereignty. Judicial decisions
23. SeeJ. GOEBEL, JR., ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 172-95, in I THE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF TIlE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES (P. Freund ed. 197 1).
24. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. The clauses from the Articles of Confederation on "free
ingress and egress" and "privileges of trade and commerce" were understood to be part
of the privileges and immunities of citizens. The change from "free inhabitants" to "cit-
izens of each state" was commented on in Dred Scoll. Both Justices Curtis and Taney
agreed that the change was intended to render the document more precise, that free
inhabitant was understood to be the same as citizen, but the new wording made it clear
that aliens would not be entitled to such rights. The change underscored the natural
right notion that privileges and immunities were linked to the concept of citizenship.
25. ThE FEDERAIIST No. 80, at 238 (A. Hamilton) (R. Fairfield ed. 1981).
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generally upheld state laws against challenges based on the privi-
leges and immunities clause of article IV, yet they failed to settle the
meaning of the phrase.26 State court decisions were inconsistent and
federal courts, with one exception,2 7 avoided broad definitions by
confining their decisions to the facts of particular cases. However,
at least one line of cases identified the privileges and immunities of
citizens with fundamental rights derived from natural law, and thus
opened the way for the natural law arguments that culminated in
Taney's Dred Scott opinion.
One of the earliest decisions interpreting the privileges and im-
munities clause of article IV arose in Maryland. A state statute per-
mitted attachment of real property in the state in order to compel
the appearance of a defendant. In 1797 in Campbell v. Morris,28 the
defendant argued that the statute was invalid because it did not al-
low attachment of the property of a citizen of Maryland who re-
mained within the state. 21' The Maryland courts upheld the statute,
noting that attachment was not necessary to compel attendance of
Maryland residents and therefore that the statute merely produced
an equality between citizens and noncitizens in amenability to suit.3
In the course of the decision of the General Court, Judge Jeremiah
Townley Chase narrowly defined the concept of privileges and
immunities:
It seems agreed, from the manner of expounding, or
defining the words immunities and privileges, by the coun-
sel on both sides, that a particular and limited operation is
to be given to these words, and not a full and comprehen-
sive one. It is agreed it does not mean the right of election,
the right of holding offices, the right of being elected. The
Court are of opinion it means that the citizens of all the
States shall have the peculiar advantage of acquiring and
holding real as well as personal property, and that such
property shall be protected and secured by the laws of the
26. This discussion of the article IV privileges and immunities cases is based on gen-
erally available reported decisions, usually of appellate courts. The topic could be the
subject of fruitful further research into the lower court decisions of the states, and some
reader may be encouraged to give the matter the serious attention it deserves.
27. Corfield v. (oryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). For discussion
see infra text accompanying notes 33-39.
28. 3 H. & McH. 535 (Md. 1797). The defendant, Robert Morris of Philadelphia,
achieved lasting fame as the financier of the American Revolution. After the war he was
deeply in debt, and the first two cases under the privileges and immunities clause in-
volved his financial difficulties.
29. Id. at 538.
30. Id. at 555.
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State, in the same manner as the property of the citizens of
the State is protected. It means, such property shall not be
liable to any taxes, or burdens which the property of the
citizens is not subject to. It may also mean, that as credi-
tors, they shall be on the same footing with the State credi-
tor, in the payment of the debts of a deceased debtor. It
secures and protects personal rights.3'
Chase's definition of privileges and immunities focused on
property rights and excluded political rights. It was universally con-
ceded that nonresidents could be excluded from the franchise.
Chase correctly perceived that restrictions on property ownership
historically had been a major characteristic distinguishing aliens
from citizens and that "one of the great objects [of article IV, sec-
tion 2] . . .was the enabling the citizens of the several states to ac-
quire and hold real property in any of the states .... 3' Chase's
opinion confined the operation of article IV to the prevention of
discrimination in rights that were defined by history and by the
needs of the union. Chase offered no hint of natural law reasoning.
His privileges and immunities were not the rights of citizenship
claimed in the Declaration of Independence.
In 1823Justice Bushrod Washington, in his capacity as a federal
circuit court judge in Corfield v. Coryell,'33 described the privileges and
immunities of citizens in much broader terms, reminiscent of the
Declaration of Independence:
We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to
31. Id. at 554. Chase and Duvall held in the decision of the General Court that Mor-
ris did not have an estate in the lands attached sufficient to permit his creditor Campbell
to have judgment of condemnation. Id. at 557. The Court of Appeals reversed on this
issue without a reported opinion. 3 H. & McH. 302 (1800). In a related case, Ward,
another of Morris' creditors, attempted to attach property in the District of Columbia
that Morris had sold to Henry Pratt of Pennsylvania. Ward claimed the transfer was
ineffective because Pratt failed to post the bond required of persons acquiring assets in
Maryland from a nonresident. The court held that the law did not apply and that the
deed to Pratt was valid. Chief Judge Chase in the General Court cited his opinion in
Campbell on privileges and immunities for the proposition that the privilege of conveying
lands is secured to all citizens of the United States in the same manner as to a citizen of
the state where the land lies. The statement was dicta, for Chase determined that the
statute in question applied only to persons from out-of-state who had been declared
bankrupt in their home state, and the plaintiff did not state that Morris had gone into
bankruptcy prior to the conveyance. Ward v. Morris, 4 H. & McH. 330 (Md. 1799).
32. Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. at 553-54.
33. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.I). Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). In 1823 the circuit courts of the
United States consisted of a federal district court judge sitting with a Justice of the
Supreme Court. Thus, although Bushrod Washington was a Justice of the Supreme
Court, his famous opinion was delivered in his role as a judge of the circuit court.
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those privileges and immunities which are in their nature,
fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all
free Governments; and which have, at all times, been en-
joyed by the citizens of the several states which compose
this Union, from the time of their becoming free, in-
dependent and sovereign. What these fundamental princi-
ples are, it would perhaps, be more tedious than difficult to
enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended
under the following general heads: Protection by the gov-
ernment; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to
acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue
and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to
such restraints as the Government may justly prescribe for
the general good of the whole.3 4
Washington enumerated specific rights included in the general con-
cept of privileges and immunities:
The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to
reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture,
professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of
the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of
any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose
of property, either real or personal; and an exemption
from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other
citizens of the state; may be mentioned as some of the par-
ticular privileges and immunities of citizens, which are
clearly embraced by the general description of privileges
deemed to be fundamental: to which may be added the
elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws
or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised.
These, and many others which might be mentioned, are,
strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and the enjoy-
ment of them by the citizens of each state, in every other
state, was manifestly calculated (to use the expressions of
the preamble of the corresponding provision in the old ar-
ticles of confederation) "the better to secure and perpetu-
ate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of
the different states of the Union.'":5
Although he defined privileges and immunities to include the pro-
tection of government, the enjoyment of life and liberty, the right to
34. Id. at 551-52.
35. d. at 552.
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acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and ob-
tain happiness and safety, Justice Washington found that the privi-
leges and immunities clause did not require the extension to
nonresidents of the rights of citizens of a state to the common prop-
erty of the state-in this case rights to dredge for oysters. s6
On its face, Washington's general description of the privileges
and immunities of citizens was as sweeping as the description in the
Declaration of Independence of the purpose of government. His
references to "fundamental principles" and to "privileges and im-
munities" that "belong, of right, to the citizens of all free govern-
ments" suggest that his conception was grounded in natural law.3 7
At the same time, he acknowledged that all such privileges are sub-
ject "to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for
the general good of the whole. ' 3 8  Every state had always offered
some degree of protection for the life, liberty, and property of its
citizens through its laws as well as through state constitutional guar-
antees. Washington said that the privileges and immunities of arti-
cle IV "have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several
36. Justice Washington held that New Jersey could exclude nonresidents from
dredging for oysters in New Jersey waters. Oysters in state waters, Washington said, are
the common property of the citizens of the state, and "it would, in our opinion, be going
quite too far to construe the grant of privileges and immunities of citizens, as amounting
to a grant of a cotenancy in the common property of the state to the citizens of all the
other states." Id. The opinion was not a model of clarity. Washington appears to have
analyzed the common ownership of natural resources in the state in terms of the propri-
etary rights of individuals when he argued that the privileges and immunities clause
could not be used to diminish the rights of citizens of the state. He did not make clear
whether this was true because rights to common property were not privileges and immu-
nities or because this particular privilege, like the electoral franchise, was appropriately
defined solely in terms of citizens who are residents of the state. Under the latter inter-
pretation of Washington's delphic opinion, certain privileges of citizenship would neces-
sarily be attached to residence. Extending to nonresidents the right to public goods or
to the electoral franchise dilutes and thus diminishes the share of residents. The princi-
ple would affect the nonresident, for his share in the public goods and the electoral
franchise of his home state would be subject to a similar diminution. Thus, denial by
state Y of these privileges to a citizen of state X would not violate article IV because the
citizen of state X would retain the equivalent privileges in state X while traveling in state
Y, i.e., he would retain in this respect the privileges and immunities of a citizen. On the
other hand, ownership of private property would not be a privilege or immunity of citi-
zenship dependent on residence. Permitting a citizen of state X to own property in state
Y does not dilute the property interests of citizens of state Y, for they had none in the
specific property unless they were the sellers. Similarly, the principle that nonresidents
may own property does not dilute the interests of the citizen of state X in any specific
property he may own in his home state.
Later courts tended to view Corfield as deciding that rights to public goods were not
"privileges and immunities." See infra note 43.
37. 6 F. Cas. at 551.
38. Id. at 552.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
states. ' 39
On a theoretical level, Campbell and Corfield were poles apart.
Chase's opinion in Campbell sounded a positive law note, focusing on
equality of treatment. Washington's opinion in Corfield pointed to
natural law and did not address the issue of the rights of nonresi-
dents to fundamental rights denied citizens of the state. Neverthe-
less, for the purposes of litigation these differences were
insignificant. In this context, Justice Washington's "fundamental
rights" extended no further than the existing laws of a state. His
recognition that fundamental rights were "subject to such restraints
as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the
whole" tied privileges and immunities to the specific laws enacted in
each state. Although Washington's "fundamental rights" definition
of "privileges and immunities" leads to the conclusion that article
IV, section 2 implies the existence of a theoretical obligation of a
state government to afford its own citizens the privileges and immu-
nities of citizenship, on its face the constitutional provision only
prohibited the denial of privileges and immunities to citizens of
other states.4 ° The framers of article IV seem to have assumed that
states would secure fundamental rights to their own citizens. Justice
Washington in Corfield asserted that the states had in fact done so.
Any claim that states denied their own citizens fundamental rights
would have been foolhardy. It would have been an extraordinary
step for a court to find that a state violated the fundamental princi-
ples of government under article IV by a law that did not discrimi-
nate against nonresidents and conformed to all other federal and
state constitutional provisions.4" Thus, Washington's fundamental
rights definition of privileges and immunities did not help a litigant
39. Id. at 551.
40. An individual could not claim that the laws of her home state abridge her privi-
leges and immunities under article IV. In Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242
(1833), the Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states. As
ChiefJustice John Marshall wrote, "Had Congress engaged in the extraordinary occupa-
tion of improving the constitutions of the several states, by affording the people addi-
tional protection from the exercise of power by their own governments, in matters which
concerned themselves alone, they would have declared this purpose in plain and intelli-
gible language." Id. at 249. As applied to article IV, this reasoning led to a determina-
tion that the clause only protected citizens of other states. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
at 422-23. Thus, the citizen of a state had only state remedies to pursue.
41. Further, even if a state totally failed in its obligation to protect property, a court
would necessarily be reluctant to supply the missing protection. Without some positive
law protecting the property of some group, a court would have no basis for determining
what specific protection would be appropriate.
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to get any rights that did not already exist under positive law for the
citizen of a state.
The opinions in Campbell and Corfield also contained similarities
that enabled later courts to rely upon them without recognizing the
differences in approach. In both Corfield and Campbell the courts
used "privileges and immunities" as a term of art, which limited the
scope of claims that a nonresident could assert. Not every state law
conferred a privilege and immunity of citizenship. Moreover, even
if a state law did confer a privilege and immunity of citizenship, a
different law for nonresidents could be justified under article IV if,
in effect, it merely established an equality of rights between citizens
and nonresidents. The nonresident could be denied participation in
government, including common ownership of the property of state
government, because he retained such rights in his home state. He
could not be denied the right to own property in a state (a property
right or fundamental right), but his property rights could be subject
to special rules (e.g., attachment) when the rules produced effective
equality with the state's own citizens (e.g., amenability to suit).
Thus, "privileges and immunities" included a concept of equality in
rights rather than identity in rights.
Although orators and courts spoke of the importance of article
IV in creating a national identity, it was rarely used successfully to
invalidate differential treatment between citizens of a state and citi-
zens of other states. Some distinctions, like that in Campbell, were
justified as producing equality of results in view of the different cir-
cumstances of the nonresident.42 Others, like that in Corfield, were
upheld on the grounds that they did not involve privileges and
immunities .4  As sources for judicial protection of an economic
42. Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535 (Md. 1797); see also Haney v. Marshall. 9
Md. 194 (1856); Duer v. Small, 17 How. Pr. 201 (N.Y. 1859); Kincaid v. Francis, 3 Tenn.
(Cooke) 49 (1812). Some justifications based on equal treatment grounds appear ques-
tionable. See Redd v. St. Francis County, 17 Ark. 416 (1856); People v. Coleman, 4 Cal.
46 (1854); City of Mount Pleasant v. Clutch, 6 Iowa 546 (1858).
43. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.I). Pa.) (No. 3230) (oyster dredging); see
also Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855) (oyster dredging challenged primar-
ily under commerce clause); Bennett v. Boggs, 3 F. Cas. 221 (C.C.I).N.:. 1830) (No.
1, 319) (dicta as to fishing rights); I)unham v. L.amphere, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 268 (1855)
(dicta as to fishing rights); State v. Medbury, 3 R.I. 138 (1855) (oysters and shellfish): Cf.
)ouglass' Administrator v. Stevens, 2 Del. Cas. 489 (1819) (holding right to recover
debt from decedent's estate is not privilege and immunity because that clause primarily
concerned acquisition and ownership of real property). l)istinctions between domestic
and out-of-state corporations were upheld by denying that corporations were citizens
for purposes of article IV. See Commonwealth v. Milton, 51 Ky. (12 B. Mon.) 212
(1851); Tatem v. Wright, 23 N.J.L. 429 (1852); Fire Dept. of N.Y. v. Noble. 3 E. 1). Smith
440 (N.Y.C.P. 1854) (evasive opinion did not rely on this distinction although should
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common market, the commerce clause4 4 and the prohibition against
taxing imports or exports45 were far more important than article
IV. 4
6
Roughly a quarter of all privileges and immunities decisions in
appellate courts prior to the Civil War involved issues of slavery.
The law of many northern states declared that slaves who came
there with their masters were entitled to freedom. Slaveowners con-
fronted with these laws in northern courts employed two arguments
based on article IV to attack this result. First, they argued that they
were entitled to the privileges of the law of their home state when
traveling into another state. These arguments were uniformly re-
jected.47 Second, slave owners seized on the opening provided by
the fundamental rights reference in Corfield. They argued that, since
slaves were property under the laws of their home states, northern
laws depriving slaveholders of that property when they traveled in
northern states failed to protect property rights. Although residents
have); Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. 292, 13 Gratt. 767 (1856). Durational resi-
dency requirements were upheld as distinguishing between citizens and thus not based
on any distinction between citizens and noncitizens of a state. See Austin v. State, 5 Mo.
591 (1847) (2-year residency requirement for obtaining liquor license); Frost v. Brisbin,
19 Wend. II (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837) (exclusion from imprisonment for debt of persons
who had been residents of state for at least one month-might also be justified by the
necessity of preventing flight by nonresident debtor); see also Abbot v. Bayley, 23 Mass.
(6 Pick.) 89 (1827) (dicta).
44. U.S. CoNST., art. I, § 8. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299
(1851) (upholding local pilot laws in opinion distinguishing types of state regulations
affecting interstate commerce which are permissible from those forbidden); Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (invalidating steamship monopoly granted bv state).
45. U.S. CONST., art. 1, §§ 9,10. See Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1871);
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827) (invalidating tax on imported goods
still in original package).
46. Nevertheless, article IV may have prevented state legislatures from considering
some forms of discrimination against citizens of other states. There were some deci-
sions that did strike down state laws as violations of article IV privileges. See, e.g.. Wiley
v. Parmer, 14 Ala. 627 (1848) (voiding law taxing slaves of nonresidents more than
slaves of residents); see also Ward v. Morris, 4 H. & McH. 330, 340-41 (Md. 1799) (privi-
leges and immunities clause used as an aid to construe a state statute). It is impossible
to know the extent to which the existence of the clause simply prevented state legislative
consideration of particular parochial proposals.
47. See, e.g., Allen v. Negro Sarah, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 434 (1838) (upholding against
nonresident's challenge a law freeing any Negro exported out of the state by owner);
People v. Lemmon, 7 N.Y. Super. Ct. (5 Sandf.) 681 (1852). ajfd. 26 Barb. 270 (1857).
The argument that rights from the party's home state are article IV privileges was re-
jected in other types of cases as well. See. e.g., Reynolds v. Geary, 26 Conn. 179 (1857).
There was a period when northern states permitted southern citizens to take their slaves
with them when visiting the north without proclaiming their freedom. This had changed
by the middle of the century to virtually unanimous determinations of freedom. See gen-
erally M. TUSIINE'r, Time AMERICAN LAW OF SIAVERY (1981).
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of the northern states could not claim article IV protection in their
home states, the nonresident slaveowner claimed that the failure to
recognize his property rights in the slave constituted a denial of the
privileges and immunities of citizens in the northern state. Not sur-
prisingly, no northern court would recognize property ownership in
slaves as a privilege or immunity of citizenship.4"
Southern laws posed a different problem. Fearful of free blacks
as agents of slave insurrections, many slave states (as well as a
number of free states) either prohibited the immigration of free
blacks or discriminated against them. These laws were challenged
as barriers to commerce and as abridgments of the privileges and
immunities of citizenship. The state courts sustained such laws
against commerce clause contentions as exercises of the police
power.4 9 They likewise upheld such laws against article IV argu-
ments by holding that free Negroes were not citizens and thus were
not entitled to the protections of article IV.5 0
48. Northern courts took their cue from Chief Justice Shaw's opinion in Common-
wealth v. Ayes, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193, 217 (1836), in which he said, "Though by the
laws of a foreign state . . . a person may acquire property in a slave, such acquisition,
being contrary to natural right, and effected by the local law, is dependent upon such
local law for its existence and efficacy, and being contrary to the fundamental laws of this
State, such general right of property cannot be exercised or recognized here." See, e.g.,
People v. Lemmon, 7 N.Y. Super. Ct. (5 Sandf.) 681 (1852), affd, 26 Barb. 270 (1857).
Counsel on appeal in Letnrnon relied on Taney's Dred Scott opinion. Lemmon v. People,
26 Barb. at 277-82.
49. In the Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849), Justice Wayne for the ma-
jority struck down statutes of New York and Boston that imposed fees or inspection
rules restricting landing of immigrants, but he specifically noted in dicta that states re-
tained their police powers to turn away persons who threatened the state: "[T]he States
where slaves are have a constitutional right to exclude all such as are, from a common
ancestry and country, of the same class of men." Id. at 426.
50. See Pendleton v. State, 6 Ark. 509 (1846); State v. Claiborne, 19 Tenn. (Meigs)
331 (1838). But see State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 114 (1838) (upholding
state law providing for collection of fines imposed on Negroes by hiring them out, but
finding free Negroes entitled to the rights of citizens of the state and suggesting that
they are also citizens of the United States). But in State v. Newsome, 27 N.C. 181, 5
lred. 250 (1844), the same court, upholding restrictions on the rights of free Negroes to
carry firearms, said it is a
principle settled by the highest authority, the organic law of the country, that
the free people of color cannot be considered as citizens in the largest sense of
the term, or, if they are, they occupy such a position in society as justifies the
Legislature in adopting a course of policy in its acts peculiar to them, so that
they do not violate those great principles ofjustice which ought to be the foun-
dation of all laws.
27 N.C. at 184-85, 5 Ired. 250; cf. Ely v. Thompson, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh.) 70 (1820) in
which a statute forbidding a Negro from striking a white was struck down as a violation
of the state constitution, the court noting that the provision of the constitution in ques-
tion applied to all men whether aliens, free persons of color, or citizens. Id. at 75. But see
Amy v. Smith, II Ky. (I Litt.) 326 (1822) applying a statute of limitations specifically
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 44:939
Most litigation raising article IV claims occurred in state
courts.5' For the most part, these courts did not distinguish be-
tween the reasoning of Campbell and Corfield. It would have been
necessary to reject Corfield's language only if the state court were to
find that the state's domestic legislation was valid under the state
constitution, yet violated the fundamental rights of citizens. State
courts were understandably reluctant to find either that their state
constitutions failed to protect fundamental rights or that their state
governments had denied anyone a fundamental right. Because fun-
damental rights refer to a natural law moral concept as well as to a
potentially enforceable legal right, disclaiming legal effect for funda-
mental rights would not, of course, avoid the moral responsibility to
afford such rights. But state courts had little incentive to announce
that the state was not legally bound to afford citizens the fundamen-
tal rights of citizenship, when it was so easy simply to assert that the
state did not violate these rights. In any event, state court decisions
could not conclusively determine the meaning of article IV, and the
designed for claims of allegedly free slaves to bar a suit for trespass, i.e., freedom. The
court said there was a presumption that no state has made Negroes citizens, based on
the federal naturalization law that applied for whites only. Id. at 334. Even assuming
that she was a citizen of another state, the plaintiff could not claim rights greater than
those granted by Kentucky to its citizens, so domestic law should prevail.
51. Corfield was a federal case. There were very few others, and no federal decision
shed any more light on the meaning of article IV, § 2 than Corfield. In Smith v. Maryland,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855) and Kearney v. Taylor, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 493 (1853), the
Court upheld state laws without clearly dealing with the privileges and immunities
claims raised by the parties. In Bennett v. Boggs, 3 F. Cas. 221 (C.C.D.N.J. 1830) (No.
1319), the parties did not raise the issue, but the court pointed out that Coifield would
have caused the clause to be inapplicable in any event. In Connor v. Elliott, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 591 (1856) a Mississippi citizen claimed an interest in her late husband's land in
Louisiana. Under Louisiana law, Louisiana residents or couples married in Louisiana
held land as partners. The petitioner argued that as a citizen of another state, she was
entitled to the same privilege joint tenancy) as a Louisiana citizen. Justice Curtis said
the right was based on place of contract regardless of the citizenship of the parties.Therefore, the right was not a privilege of citizenship. Finally, ip The Cynosure, 6 F.
Cas. 1102 (1). Mass. 1844) (No. 3529), the court held that a Louisiana law prohibiting
free persons of color from entering its ports was an unconstitutional interference with
interstate commerce and intimated that it also violated article IV, § 2. The context of
the case was unusual-a ship's master sought to deduct his costs in paying the expenses
of imprisonment from the seaman's wages. Thus, the validity of the southern law was
tested in a northern court, which held for the seaman. The only test of such a law in the
south (other than JusticeJohnson's opinion based on the commerce clause in Elkison v.
De Liesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (C.C.I).S.C. 1823) (No. 4366)), was Roberts v. Yates. 20 F.
Cas. 937 (C.C.I).S.C. 1853) (No. I 1,919), which upheld the local law. No successful
direct challenge was ever made. Spe C. SwistER, 1I"Il'ANEY PERIOD. 1836-64, at 394. in
5 THE OLIVER WENDEI.I. HoIMES DEvIsE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COuRT OF THE
UNITED STATES (P. Freund ed. 1974).
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few federal decisions on privileges and immunities were inconclu-
sive as well. These early decisions of state and federal courts often
took the form of a reference to Campbell or Corfield (if any precedent
was discussed) for a description of "privileges and immunities," fol-
lowed by a few words exalting the importance of these rights, and
finally by a decision that the state law in question was valid.
The failure of the courts to articulate a clear theory of the arti-
cle IV privileges and immunities left the door open to arguments
that the clause embodied natural law principles of fundamental
rights. This potential argument was buttressed by the general will-
ingness of courts to use language of natural law. Natural law has
been a theme of constitutional law since its inception.5" Judges in
the post-revolutionary period often referred to natural law in sup-
port of opinions that could have rested on particular clauses of the
Constitution." The context of these cases, however, meant that the
Court never accepted natural law as a principle of decision apart
from its coincidence with specific provisions of the Constitution. Ju-
dicial dicta on natural law together with Justice Washington's rec-
ognition of fundamental rights in his interpretation of article IV
mutually reinforced the proposition that the Constitution in some
fashion incorporated natural law principles. Judicial decisions
under the privileges and immunities clause did not foreclose that
result. As explained above, however, natural law had virtually no
force as a litigation strategy. Its greatest use was in political
rhetoric.
The political forum produced a varied rhetoric on the obliga-
tions of government to protect its citizens. As the Civil War neared,
issues surrounding the enforcement of the fugitive slave clause 4
and the possible extension of slavery to the territories sparked most
of the discussion. Southern speakers insisted on the government's
obligation under the Constitution to protect the institution of slav-
ery. Their arguments relied primarily on the fugitive slave clause in
52. In C alder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), Justice Samuel Chase asserted that
the people did not give their state or federal government power to violate natural law.
Justice Iredell replied:
The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and
the purest men have differed upon the subject; and all that the Court could
properly say, in such an event, would be, that the Legislature (possessed of an
equal right of opinion) had passed an act which, in the opinion of the judges.
was inconsistent with the abstract principles of natural justice.
Id. at 399 (Iredell, J., concurring).
53. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (Marshall invoked natural law
in case resting on the contract clause).
54. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
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conjunction with policy considerations and appeals to a fundamen-
tal right of "self-determination" for the territories.5 5  Some
southerners even pointed to the due process clause and the just
compensation clause to deny the federal government any power to
eliminate slavery in areas under its control.-" Most northerners, de-
spite significant racial prejudice, believed slavery immoral and
found these arguments preposterous. Nevertheless, many were will-
ing to compromise if necessary to preserve the Union. And while
they resented southern suppression of abolitionist speech, many
also disapproved of the abolitionists' agitation.5 7
Abolitionists could be divided into three groups, each with dif-
ferent views on the obligations of government. One group agreed
that the Constitution, especially the fugitive slave clause, required
the protection of slavery. They therefore denounced the Constitu-
tion. The best known spokesman for this group was William Lloyd
Garrison, who characterized the Constitution as a pact with the devil
that violated natural law.5" A larger group agreed that, although
slavery was contrary to natural law, principles of federalism embed-
ded in the Constitution precluded interference with slavery within
the southern states. This group still embraced the Constitution,
however, claiming that it was a source of power for isolating the
hated institution and ultimately choking it to extinction. They
55. The shape of southern argument depended on the issue being discussed. The
fugitive slave clause was crucial to the protection of southern property in slaves and was
relied on by judges and legislators to combat abolitionist efforts to protect fugitive
slaves. Arguments based on the principle of popular sovereignty had natural law over-
tones and were used throughout the nation as ajustification for permitting slavery in the
territories. The Compromise of 1850 reflected these arguments, providing for a more
effective fugitive slave law and "popular sovereignty" for territories acquired fromn Mex-
ico. But southern leaders following Calhoun argued that Congress had the duty to pro-
tect slavery in the territories while northerners resisted both the ftigitive slave law and
the extension of slavery. See L. ToDD & M. CURTri, RIs: oF riiE AMERICAN NATION 355-60
(2d ed. 1966); see a o H. HAMIIrON, PROI.OGUE "1-0 CoNFlICT: lHE CRISIS AND COMPRO-
MISE OF 1850 (1964).
56. See 36 ANNALS OF CON;. 1521 (statement of Rep. Scott) (Feb. 1820). cited in W.
WIECEK, lHE SOURCES oF ANTISlAVERY CONsrrtrrIONALISM IN AMERICA 1760-1848, at
116 (1977); see also Pickens" congressional speech injanuary 1836 and Pinknev's commit-
tee report in May 1836, riled in .J. TENBROEK, EQttAI. tNDER lsaw 42 (1965).
57. On reaction to southern suppression of abolitionist speech, see G. BARNES, IIIE
ANTI-SIAVERV IMPULSE 1830-1844, at 109-114 (1933) and R. Nv:, FTIEREn FREE)DOM:
CIVIi. LIBER'TIES AND THIE SIAViRY CONROVERSY 1830-1860, al 25, 32 (1963). On north-
ern distaste fur abolitionists, see L. RICIIARDS. (;ENTILEMEN OF PROPERTY AND STANDING
(1970) and M. l)tDts:RMAN, The ANorhmeni Response to Slavery, in imH ANTI-SlAVERY VAN-
GtARt) 394-413 (1965).
58. W. WIECEK, supra note 56, at 228-48.
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found federal power to abolish the interstate slave trade in the com-
merce clause, and to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia and
the territories in congressional power over those lands.59
While virtually every abolitionist agreed that slavery violated
natural law, n0 often citing the Declaration of Independence in their
arguments, only a handful contended that natural law was legally
binding. This third group of abolitionists, the "antislavery constitu-
tionalists," was important despite its small size. The group's ideas
bore a direct, if contrary, relationship to Taney's opinion in Dred
Scott and influenced the framing of the fourteenth amendment.
Theodore Weld, Elizur Wright, and Alvin Stewart argued that the
due process clause of the fifth amendment had a substantive dimen-
sion that precluded Congress from taking from any man his prop-
erty in himself. Stewart also argued that the fifth amendment was
binding on the states.6 ' In a more sweeping argument, Joel Tiffany
and Lysander Spooner insisted that all persons born in the United
States were citizens of the United States. Tiffany and Spooner said
that citizens were entitled to fundamental rights by virtue of their
citizenship, relying on the Preamble to the Constitution and the
Declaration of Independence to bolster their arguments.6 2
Although they did not rely expressly on article IV with its limitation
to interstate travelers, they did apply ideas of fundamental rights of
59.
We fully and unanimously recognize the sovereignty of each State, to legislate
exclusively on the subject of slavery which is tolerated within its limits; we con-
cede that Congress, under the present national compact, has no right to inter-
fere with any of the slave States, in relation to this momentous subject:
But we maintain that Congress has a ight, and is solemnly bound, to suppress
the domestic slave trade between the several States, and to abolish slavery in
those portions of our territory which the Constitution has placed under its ex-
clusive jurisdiction.
Declaration of Sentiments of the American Anti-Slavery Society, (proceedings of the Anti-Slavery
Convention, assembled at Philadephia, Dec. 4-6, 1833) reprinted in L. RUCHAMES, THE
ABOLITIONISTs 82 (1963).
60. "The right to enjoy liberty is inalienable. To invade it is to usurp the prerogative
ofJehovah. Every man has a right to his own body-to the products of his own labor-
to the protection of law-and to the common advantages of society." Id. at 80. This
natural rights claim made in 1833 paralleled Justice Washington's description in Corfield
of privileges and immunities of citizenship-"protection by the government, the enjoy-
ment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and
to pursue and obtain happiness and safety." See supra text accompanying note 34.
Although Garrison contributed to the Declaration of Sentiments, he did so before the
antislavery movement splintered. All branches continued to agree that slavery violated
natural law.
61. W. WIECEK, supra note 56, at 249-75; J. TENBROEK, supra note 56, at 94-115.
62. J. TENBROEK, supra note 56.
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citizenship developed within the context of that clause. The anti-
slavery constitutionalists marked out a path for using the doctrines
of substantive due process and of the natural law privileges and im-
munities of citizenship to further minority freedom. Although Chief
Justice Taney used the same doctrines to support slavery, he recog-
nized that the notions of due process and citizenship embodied sub-
stantive constitutional rights. This recognition would then enhance
the credibility of antislavery constitutionalist thought during discus-
sions of the constitutional amendments after the war.
During the antebellum period, the courts, like the general pop-
ulation, paid scant attention to antislavery constitutionalists. The
mainstream abolitionist position was a moral and philosophical po-
sition on citizenship, not a legal constitutional claim. Legally, a
slave was the personal property of his owner. Clearly an item of
property could not be considered a member of society. Most aboli-
tionists denounced this situation as a moral outrage, but acknowl-
edged that it was legally accurate. If slaves, though native born
persons, were not citizens, it followed that citizenship did not de-
pend on place of birth alone. What then determined citizenship and
what rights did citizenship entail? The naturalized alien could
demonstrate citizenship by a document obtained in a legal proceed-
ing. The native born person had no such document. Citizens were
entitled to some rights under the Constitution, but by 1857 the
Supreme Court had not yet settled what those rights were nor how
the citizenship of native born persons should be determined.
D. Dred Scott
Citizenship and its privileges and immunities were an important
focus of the Dred Scott decision. The Civil War Amendments consist-
ently invoked Dred Scott as the exemplar of what the amendments
were intended to overrule. Thus, it is necessary to examine that
case to understand these later enactments.
Dred Scott was born a slave. He resided for most of his life in
Missouri. He accompanied his master, Doctor Emerson, a surgeon
in the United States armed services, on a tour of duty in Illinois, a
state where slavery had been abolished. They later moved to an
army post in the upper Louisiana Territory, a United States territory
where slavery was prohibited by the terms of the Missouri Compro-
mise. After returning to Missouri with Scott, Dr. Emerson died.
Scott brought a petition for freedom against Emerson's widow in
state court, claiming that his previous residence in a free state and a
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free territory had made him a free man. The Missouri court, revers-
ing its own earlier precedents, held that Scott, having voluntarily
returned with his master to the slave state of Missouri after tempo-
rary residence elsewhere, was a slave under Missouri law. Subse-
quently, Mrs. Emerson moved to Massachusetts and remarried,
leaving the administration of her former husband's estate with her
brother, John Sanford of New York. Dred Scott then sued for his
freedom in federal circuit court, alleging jurisdiction on the basis of
diversity of citizenship. Sanford filed a plea in abatement, claiming
that the court had no jurisdiction because Scott could not be a citi-
zen for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. The circuit court sus-
tained a demurrer to the plea, thus taking jurisdiction of the case.
On the merits, however, the court directed a verdict for the defend-
ant. Scott appealed to the Supreme Court.63
The Supreme Court held that the judgment for defendant
should be reversed and the suit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Although each Justice wrote separately, Chief Justice Taney's opin-
ion was denominated the opinion of the Court. He set forth three
basic propositions: That a Negro was not a citizen for purposes of
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, that the free or slave status of a
black man was dependent on state law, and that the federal govern-
ment could not prohibit slavery in its territories.
Justices Curtis, Daniel, Wayne, and Taney were the only judges
who ruled on the preliminary jurisdictional question of whether
Scott was a citizen for diversity purposes.6' All four judges who
reached the jurisdictional issue agreed that United States citizenship
was a predicate for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction and for the
63. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). See generally D.
FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED Scorr CASE (1979); W. EHRLICH, THEY HAVE No RIGHTS
(1979). These studies exhaustively detail the background of the litigation. Adding to
the extensive discussion of Dred Scott already available requires some explanation: the
sole justification is that little attention has been paid to the impact of Taney's privileges
and immunities vision on the decision. Consequently, its impact on the later history of
the Civil War Amendments has been neglected as well.
64. 60 U.S. at 402-03 (Taney, CJ.); id. at 454-56 (Wayne, J.) (Wayne stated his entire
agreement with Taney); id. at 472-76 (Daniel, J.); id. at 565-67 (Curtis, J.). Justices Ca-
tron and McLean said that the defendant's response in the case after the demurrer to the
plea was sustained waived the objection to jurisdiction and prevented the issue from
coming before the Court. Id. at 518-19 (Catron,J.); id. at 530-31 (McLean,J.). Justices
Nelson, Grier, and Campbell avoided deciding whether the plea was before the Court,
arguing that the lower court's decision that Scott was a slave was correct. Therefore,
since relief was unavailable on substantive grounds, in their view it did not matter
whether relief was also unavailable for jurisdictional reasons. Id. at 458 (Nelson, J.); id.
at 469 (Grier, J.); id. at 493 (Campbell, J.).
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article IV privileges and immunities claim. 65 These Justices looked
first at naturalization as a source of citizenship. They agreed that
the power to naturalize was exclusively the province of the federal
government, but three said that this power applied solely to persons
of foreign birth.6 6 They disagreed on the status of persons born in
the United States. Justice Curtis contended that, since the power of
naturalization extended only to aliens, the states retained power to
determine which of their own native born inhabitants were citizens
of the state and thus of the United States.6 7 Curtis noted that free
Negroes were considered citizens by a number of states, including
various northern states, at the time of the adoption of the Constitu-
tion. Therefore, if Scott was a citizen by the laws of the state of his
birth, he was a citizen of the United States entitled to sue under
diversity jurisdiction. Since the plea in abatement did not disclose
the state of his birth or his status under its laws, there was nothing in
the pleadings inconsistent with his being a citizen and the plea was
therefore properly overruled.6 8
Curtis' dissent, rather than serving as a model of liberal senti-
ment, would have excluded free blacks from citizenship if, like Dred
Scott himself, they were born in a state that did not recognize them
as citizens. Even this limited recognition of citizenship for some
65. Id. at 403, 405 (Taney, C.J.); id. at 454 (Wayne, J.); id. at 478, 480-81 (Daniel, J.);
id. at 571, 580-81 (Curtis,J.). Curtis cited Gassies v. Ballon, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 761 (1832)
for the proposition that a citizen of the United States residing in a state is a citizen of
that state for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 571. Taney served as a lawyer in
that case and had argued that the allegations were insufficient to establish diversity be-
cause the plaintiff failed to allege specifically that he was a citizen of Louisiana. The
Supreme Court, per Marshall, C.J., held that allegation of citizenship in the U.S. and
residence in Louisiana is the equivalent of an allegation of state citizenship for purposes
of article III. Gassies, 31 U.S. at 761.
66. 60 U.S. at 416-17, 420 (Taney, C.J.); id. at 454 (Wayne, J.); id. at 481-82 (Daniel,
J.) (power to naturalize is exclusive in Congress and has been exercised only with re-
spect to free white aliens, but silent on issue of whether power extends to native born
persons); id. at 577-78 (Curtis, J.).
67. Id. at 577-82. Curtis confined the power to determine citizenship to the state of
the individual's birth. Id. at 585-86.
68. Id. at 588. Note that if the plea in abatement had stated that Scott was born a
slave and was never emancipated in that state, Curtis' reasoning requires a holding that
he is not a citizen. See id. at 585. Thus, Curtis made no general claim that free blacks
were citizens, nor did his views pose any threat to southern slaveholders. He found only
that the plea in abatement was defective, that any facts appearing after the plea to the
merits could not be used in determining the propriety of the plea in abatement, and that
if the Court had diversity jurisdiction it could find that Scott was free (although such a
finding would not be tantamount to finding he was a citizen because blacks could be
free, yet not be citizens of a state).
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blacks was made possible by giving only a narrow substance to the
benefits of citizenship.
Justice Curtis pointed out obliquely that accepting free blacks
as citizens under article IV, section 2 would not pose problems for
slave states because a state would not violate the terms of article IV
if it denied nonresident blacks the same privileges denied resident
free blacks. He did so by construing the meaning of privileges and
immunities narrowly:
[T]his clause of the Constitution does not confer on the
citizens of one State, in all other States, specific and enu-
merated privileges and immunities. They are entitled to
such as belong to citizenship, but not such as belong to
particular citizens attended by other qualifications. Privi-
leges and immunities which belong to citizens of a State, by
reason of the operation of causes other than mere citizen-
ship, are not conferred .... It rests with the States them-
selves so to frame their constitutions and laws as not to
attach a particular privilege or immunity to mere naked
citizenship.j ')
In other words, discrimination on the basis of race would not violate
article IV because it would not be a discrimination on the basis of
citizenship. 70
Justices Taney, Wayne, and Daniel insisted that states did not
have the power to determine citizenship for purposes of the federal
constitution. They argued that the policy underlying the prohibi-
tion on a state making citizens of aliens for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction and article IV claims applied equally well to making na-
tive born inhabitants citizens. They contended that citizenship of
native born inhabitants was determined by the Constitution. Be-
cause the document made no express statement on the issue, these
Justices argued that citizenship depended on the understanding of
the framers and ratifiers when the Constitution was adopted."
69. Id. at 583-84.
70. Southern states might still be upset with this position as it related to laws exclud-
ing immigration of free blacks. A state that permitted free blacks to reside within its
borders would be unable to deny admission to free black citizens of another state. Even
if state law imposed slavery on all blacks within its borders, the state would be exposed
to the argument that no state can exclude citizens of a sister state from entering and that
the free black who entered temporarily could claim article IV rights of whites since no
black residents would be citizens.
71. 60 U.S. at 405-407 (Taney, C.J.); id. at 454 (Wayne, J.); id. at 482-83 (Daniel, J.)
(Daniel suggested the possibility of a later change by Congress, noting that it had never
taken such action).
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Curtis had pointed out that Negroes in a few northern states
could vote in 1787 and thus participated in the adoption process.
Taney rejoined that citizenship was a uniform national concept, and
that the behavior of a few isolated states where few Negroes lived
did not determine the meaning of citizenship for the whole nation.
States could create rights within their boundaries for blacks, "[flor
•.. every State had the undoubted right to confer on whomsoever it
pleased the character of a citizen, and to endow him with all its
rights."-72 Indeed, states could do the same for an alien, but pos-
sessing rights of citizenship within a state did not make an individual
a citizen of a state for national constitutional purposes. After all,
only Congress had power to naturalize aliens.
The most important consideration to Taney was that slavery ex-
isted in every state of the Union at the date of the adoption of the
Constitution:
They had for more than a century before been regarded as
beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associ-
ate with the white race, either in social or political rela-
tions; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the
white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might
justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. 73
Taney pointed to colonial miscegenation laws in Maryland and Mas-
sachusetts as evidence of the degraded status of all Negroes,
whether free or slave, at the time of the Revolution. He acknowl-
edged that the principles of the Declaration of Independence were
inconsistent with slavery, and argued from this that the Negro race
could not have been considered part of the "people" embraced by
the Declaration. After pointing to constitutional provisions sup-
porting the institution of slavery, Taney claimed that free Negroes
"were identified in the public mind with the race to which they be-
longed, and regarded as part of the slave population rather than the
free.
In support of the proposition that free Negroes were not con-
sidered citizens, Taney discussed the discriminatory laws of the
northern states where slavery had been abolished. He cited Massa-
chusetts again for continuing its miscegenation laws in force and re-
ferred to the language of Connecticut's abolition statutes to
demonstrate that abolition in the North was enacted to benefit
72. Id. at 405.
73. Id. at 407.
74. Id. at 411.
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whites rather than to secure rights to Negroes. Even New Hamp-
shire, where blacks could vote, excluded blacks from the militia. Ta-
ney's history is persuasive that free Negroes were regarded as
inferior and subject to discrimination, but that did not compel his
conclusion that blacks were not citizens. Even second class citizens
are citizens. Women were subject to discrimination, yet no one
doubted their citizenship.
Taney's conclusion that Negroes were not citizens rested on the
consequences he attributed to citizenship. The lynchpin of his argu-
ment was the privileges and immunities clause. A citizen could sue
under diversity jurisdiction in federal court to receive the privileges
and immunities of citizens when in other states, and states could not
bar citizens of other states from entrance.75 Thus, if a Negro from
Massachusetts were a citizen for constitutional purposes, he would
be entitled to enter Maryland and to receive the privileges and im-
munities of a citizen there. Taney said this result was unthinkable:
(ilt cannot be believed that the large slaveholding States
regarded them [Negroes] as included in the word citizens,
or would have consented to a Constitution which might
compel them to receive them in that character from an-
other State. For if they were so received, and entitled to
the privileges and immunities of citizens, it would exempt
them from the operation of the special laws and from the
police regulations which they considered to be necessary
for their own safety. It would give to persons of the negro
race, who were recognized as citizens in any one State of
the Union, the right to enter every other State whenever
they pleased, singly or in companies, without pass or pass-
port, and without obstruction, to soujurn there as long as
they pleased, to go where they pleased at every hour of the
day or night without molestation, unless they committed
some violation of law for which a white man would be pun-
ished; and it would give them the full liberty of speech in
public and in private upon all subjects upon which its own
75. Taney was committed to the latter proposition by his dissent in the Passenger
Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 492 (Taney, C.J., dissenting). Taney's dissent would have
upheld a state law restricting foreign immigrants, but he noted in dicta that he would
have struck down restrictions on citizen movements:
For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed, we
are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United
States; and as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and
repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own
States.
Id. at 492.
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citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon political
affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went.
And all of this would be done in the face of the subject race
of the same color, both free and slaves, inevitably produc-
ing discontent and insubordination among them, and en-
dangering the peace and safety of the State.76
In other words, freedom of movement, freedom of speech, freedom
of assembly, and the right to bear arms were among the privileges
and immunities of citizens. Because of the nature of these privileges
and immunities, it was inconceivable to Taney that Negroes could
be citizens under the Constitution, for his home state of Maryland
had no compunction about prohibiting Negroes from immigrat-
ing, 77 requiring free Negroes to carry certificates attesting to their
free status, 78 restricting meetings of free Negroes, 79 and requiring
special licenses for Negroes to own weapons.8 0 Unlike the slave, the
free Negro in Maryland had state-granted rights-to sue, be sued,
and own property,-but these rights were weakened in practice by a
prohibition on black testimony against whites.8 ' Moreover, it was
generally believed that even these rights of free blacks existed only
so long as the white state legislature chose to acknowledge them,
and that the legislature was constitutionally free to abolish all such
rights and to re-enslave free blacks because they were not citizens.12
76. 60 U.S. at 416-17.
77. See Act of Mar. 14, 1832, ch. 323, § I, 1831 Md. Laws (codified at MD. CODE art.
66, §§ 44-51 (1860) (repealed 1865)).
78. See Act of Mar. 14, 1832, ch. 323, § 2, 1831 Md. Laws (codified at MD. CODE art.
66, § 50 (1860)) required free Negroes who left the state for more than 30 days to obtain
a permit from a court. Art. 66, § 33 required masters of vessels to require Negroes to
produce certificates of freedom plus certificates from the clerk of court where the vessel
cleared before receiving them on board. Further, slaves were required to have a pass in
order to travel more than 10 miles from home. Art. 66, § 16. Lack of a pass would
result in the slave being treated as a runaway. Unless a free Negro kept his certificate of
freedom, he was therefore at risk of being mistakenly arrested as a runaway slave.
79. Act of Mar. 14, 1832, ch. 323, § 7, 1831 Md. Laws (codified at MD. CODE art. 66,
§§ 58-65 (1860) (repealed 1865) prohibited religious meetings without a white person
present, and all "out door protracted negro meetings."
80. Act of Mar. 14, 1832, ch. 323, § 6, 1831 Md. Laws (codified at MD. CODE art. 66,
§ 73 (1860) (repealed 1865)).
81. See, e.g., Act ofJune 8, 1717, ch. 13, § 2.
82. For example, Maryland statutes provided that a free Negro who married a while
person became a slave for life. Act ofJune 8, 1717, ch. 13, § 5. Criminal laws through-
out the antebellum period of the nineteenth century permitted convicted free blacks in
certain contexts to be sold as slaves for a period of years or for life. The specific circum-
stances varied under successive laws. J. BRACKErr, '1im NEGRo IN MARYLAND 227-32
(1969 reprint). At a slaveholders' convention in 1859, ColonelJacobs proposed a bill to
require free Negroes to either leave the state or become slaves. His bill created a great
stir, but was never submitted to the legislature. Id. at 252-62. The assumed power to
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ChiefJustice Taney's privileges and immunities argument is not
simply a response to Justice Curtis' argument that the citizenship of
native born persons is determined by the state of their birth. Ac-
cording to Curtis, if a state did not consider its free blacks to be
citizens, the rights they were denied might still be rights available to
all its citizens. Discrimination against free black citizens of other
states might arguably then be based on "mere naked citizenship."
Thus, a black citizen of Massachusetts claiming the "privileges and
immunities of citizenship" in Maryland would have to be afforded
the rights of white citizens of that state. If Curtis' consequences
were all Taney intended to address by the privileges and immunities
hypotheticals in his opinion, the argument against black citizenship
would be incomplete. Acknowledging that all free blacks are citi-
zens of the United States would resolve this problem. Then dis-
crimination by Maryland would clearly be based on race rather than
citizenship and therefore be valid. Only the laws excluding free
blacks from immigration would still face constitutional problems.
Taney's discussion of privileges and immunities appears in his
discussion of whether free, native born blacks are citizens for pur-
poses of articles III and IV, set apart from his earlier conclusion that
citizenship is a constitutional category not subject to state manipula-
tion. It advances the argument that blacks are not citizens only if
the privileges and immunities clause is understood to require more
than just protection against disadvantages based on nonresidence.
In this respect, Taney agreed with the antislavery constitutionalist
rhetoric of some abolitionists that the citizenship recognized in arti-
cle IV imposed fundamental obligations upon the state. Unlike
those abolitionists, he understood, however, that the Constitution
did not intervene between the state and its own inhabitants-it pro-
vided only that what were moral obligations of the state to its own
citizens were legal obligations enforceable on behalf of citizens of
other states. Taney's greatest disagreement with those abolitionists
arose from his conclusion that free Negroes were not citizens.
Although Taney said the Constitution gave each citizen rights
enslave free Negroes is the basis for Taney's remarks that Negroes "had no rights or
privileges but such as those who held the power and the government might choose to
grant them," 60 U.S. at 405, and that "they had no rights which the white man was
bound to respect" for "the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his
[the white race'sl benefit." Id. at 406. Under the principles of Strader v. (;raham. 51
U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1851), a state might also reduce a white man to slavery, but no state
ever thought to do so. See also infra note 92. Perhaps Taney would have believed that
states would void such laws under their own constitutions or that the Court would invali-
date them, using principles of natural justice.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 44:939
outside his home state, in that it "placed him in every other State
upon a perfect equality with its own citizens as to rights of person
and rights of property, '813 he argued that a state that does not pro-
tect the person and property of some of its inhabitants is not treat-
ing them as citizens. If a citizen of a state migrates to another state,
Taney wrote, he is no longer a citizen of the first state, "[a[nd the
State in which he resides may then, unquestionably, determine his
status or condition, and place him among the class of persons who
are not recognized as citizens, but belong to an inferior and subject
race; and may deny him the privileges and immunities enjoyed by its
citizens."'8 4  In other words, "citizen of a state," for purposes of
standing to raise a claim under article III or IV of the Constitution,
referred to a national citizenship that was uniformly determined.
The article IV claim was to equality in privileges and immunities
with those a state afforded persons it (rather than the Constitution
or national government) deemed citizens. For Taney, the exclusion
of blacks from membership in American society was necessary to
expand the substance of the rights of people within it. 5
Taney probably did not expect his broad interpretation of the
83. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407.
84. Id. at 422 (emphasis in original). This is another route to the conclusion that
article IV imposes natural law on the states with respect to treatment of nonresidents.
Whether an individual was considered a member of society (i.e., a citizen of that society)
was indicated by the manner in which the society treated him. This makes the privileges
and immunities of citizenship a tautology. To the extent that a state denies any group of
its inhabitants the privileges and immunities of citizens, it has treated the members of
that group as noncitizens of that state. The rights of a nonresident, even if a member of
that group, must be measured under article IV, § 2 by the treatment given persons
whom a state considers to be its citizens.
Curtis, on the other hand, never satisfactorily explained how it could be determined
whether a state did recognize an individual as a citizen. The denigration of the privi-
leges and immunities of citizenship in his opinion intimates that a statement by the state
court or the legislature would suffice to determine citizenship regardless of how the
person was treated.
85. This proposition is reminiscent of Edmund S. Morgan's argument that the revo-
lutionary belief in republican equality in Virginia rested on slavery:
Racism thus absorbed in Virginia the fear and contempt that men in England,
whether Whig or Tory, monarchist or republican, felt for the inarticulate lower
classes. Racism made it possible for white Virginians to develop a devotion to
the equality that English republicans had declared to be the soul of liberty.
There were too few free poor on hand to matter. And by lumping Indians.
mulattoes, and Negroes in a single pariah class, Virginians had paved the way
for a similar lumping of small and large planters in a single master class.
E. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: TIIE ORDEAI. OF COLONIAI. VIR-
GINIA 386 (1975). For Taney, denying the citizenship of blacks was essential to produce
first class citizenship for others. If blacks were acknowledged citizens, laws throughout
the nation would violate natural law and the fundamental principles of citizenship. But
T'aney believed such laws were valid. They could be upheld without hypocrisy. Like the
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privileges and immunities clause to change radically the judicial role
in reviewing article IV claims. As a practical matter, only blacks had
been drastically denied the fundamental rights ensured by article
IV. After they were excluded from the reach of article IV, other
state laws would almost certainly comply with its vague commands
unless they discriminated against nonresidents. In essence, Taney
used natural law reasoning to preserve what he saw as the status
quo.
Taney's invocation of broad natural law rights was not limited
to his consideration of citizenship issues. He also used natural law
reasoning for his second proposition in Dred Scott, that the federal
government could not abolish slavery in the territories. Despite a
recognition of state power over slavery, the institution was a source
of constant strife in Congress. 6 In Dred Scott, the Court apparently
hoped to remove a source of friction in Congress by determining
that the slavery issue was beyond congressional power:
[An Act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United
States of his liberty or property, merely because he came
himself or brought his property into a particular Territory
of the United States, and who had committed no offense
against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of
due process of law.87
This passage was startling in at least three respects. First, it
Declaration of Independence, the privileges and immunities of citizenship, which re-
flected the same natural law, could be proclaimed for all without hypocrisy only by deny-
ing that "all" was ever intended to include Negroes.
86. Debates over the admission of new states had produced a number of com-
promises in which Congress insisted that some states be free while others could choose
to have slavery. Abolitionists sought to extend congressional power on several fronts-
to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia and all territories of the United States
pursuant to congressional power over such areas and to halt interstate traffic in slaves
pursuant to the commerce power. See Sumner, Duties of .1a.sachusetts at This Crisis, .4
Speech Delivered at the Republican Convention at Worcester, (Sept. 7, 1854). repinted in W.
PEASE & J. PEASE, THE ANTI-S.AVERY ARGUMENrT 440-45 (1965).
87. 60 U.S. at 450. Taney's argument was buttressed by his position that congres-
sional authority under article IV, § 3 to "make all needful rules and regulations respect-
ing the territory or other property belonging to the United States" applied only to
territory held when the Constitution was adopted and did not serve as a source of power
over territories (like the Louisiana Purchase) acquired after that date. Id. But see Hooven
& Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945) (article IV, § 3 applies to subsequently acquired
territories); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (190 1) (stating same proposition). Fehren-
bacher argues that Taney never expressly stated that the Missouri compromise violated
the fifth amendment, but invalidated it with an ambiguous suggestion that it was not
warranted by the Constitution, which could mean that the implied power to legislate in
territories acquired after the date of the Constitution should not be construed to extend
to abolition. 1). FEU1RENBACIIER, supra note 1, at 382.
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invalidated a federal statute for the first time since Marbury v.
Madison." Indeed, it was the first time in American history that the
Court held unconstitutional a federal statute that did not involve the
Court's own jurisdiction. Second, it applied the "due process"
clause of the fifth amendment to a substantive law rather than limit-
ing its application to procedures for law enforcement, as a majority
of state courts had done with state due process clauses."9 Third, it
suggested that the abolition of slavery was a denial of due process to
the slaveholder, although half of the states in the union had abol-
ished slavery. Moreover, the effect of the law in question was merely
to prevent a slaveholder from maintaining a slave as his property if
he entered the territory. After all, forfeiture of property for the vio-
lation of a law was scarcely a novel doctrine. Taney noted the argu-
ment that property in a slave differed from other property, but he
insisted the Constitution recognized slaves as property. Therefore
due process protected the ownership of slaves to the same degree
that it protected other property. 0
88. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
89. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Lau Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 460,
477-79 (1911). See generally Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in Those
Clauses in the Federal and State Constitution which Protect "'Life, Liberty and Properv, " 4 HARV.
L. REV. 365 (1891) (arguing that "liberty" was meant to be interpreted not in its
broadest sense to denote all civil rights, but, like the terms "life" and "property," to
denote one particular kind of civil right-personal liberty-of which the law is accus-
tomed to deprive persons by way of punishment); Williams, "Liberty" in the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: The Framers' Intentions, 53 U. COLO. L. REV.
117 (1981) (arguing that the framers intended a limited construction of "liberty"-ab-
sence of incarceration-in the fifth amendment but noting that the legislative history of
the fourteenth amendment might provide a basis for a broader view of procedurally
protected liberty). But see Siegan, Rehabilitating Lochner, 22 U.S.D. L. REv. 453 (1985)
(arguing that Lochner's extension of due process to include liberty of contract was not
antagonistic to the basic rationale of due process nor inconsistent with the framers'
meaning of due process). Justice Curtis had said in Murray v. Hoboken Land & Im-
provement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856) that due process was a restraint on the
legislature as well as the executive and the judiciary, but the case involved procedural
matters.
90. Lincoln used this part of the decision to argue that Dred Scott would advance
slavery in the North:
While the opinion of the Court, by ChiefJustice 'aney, in the Dred Scott case,
and the separate opinions of all the concurring Judges, expressly declare that
the Constitution of the United States neither permits Congress nor a 'errito-
rial Legislature to exclude slavery from any United States 'erritory, they all
omit to declare whether or not the same Constitution permits a State, or the
people of a State, to exclude it. . . . IWle have another nice little niche, which
we may, ere long, see filled with another Supreme Court decision, declaring
that the Constitution of the United States does not permit a State to exclude
slavery from its limits.
'hiE IJNCOi.N-I)OUjGLAS DEBATES OF 1858, at 19 (R. Johannsen ed. 1965)
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In the great controversy between slaveholders and abolitionists,
both sides claimed the due process clause as a moral basis for their
position. Abolitionists argued that Africans were persons who had
been immorally deprived of their liberty and their property in them-
selves without due process. 9' Abolition would merely rectify the
original due process violation. Slaveholders contended that slaves
were property, and that abolition would be a moral and legal viola-
tion of their property rights. Taney's opinion threw the weight of
the Court behind the slaveholder's position.92 He accepted the abo-
litionist position that natural law should be enforced throughout the
nation, while denying their premise that it applied to blacks. But by
the time Taney held the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, the
law had already been repealed by the Kansas-Nebraska Act in
91. See J. TENBROEK, supra note 56, at 136-48. The party platforms of both the Free
Soil and the Republican Parties prior to the Civil War maintained that the fifth amend-
ment compelled abolition in all lands under federal control.
92. Six Justices (Taney, Wayne, Catron, Daniel, Grier, and Campbell) held the act of
Congress invalid. Two Justices (McLean and Curtis) voted to uphold it. Justice Nelson's
opinion found the Missouri law controlling under Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.)
82 (1851), regardless of congressional power within the territory and therefore did not
reach the validity of the Act.
One of the fascinating sidelights to this case is the debate over whether different
aspects of Taney's opinion are holding or dicta. For example, if there was no diversity
jurisdiction because Scott was not a citizen, discussion of his status as slave or free would
appear to be dicta. Yet only three Justices (Taney, Wayne, and Daniel) specifically stated
that a free Negro was not a citizen. Justices Grier and Campbell agreed that dismissal
for want of jurisdiction was the appropriate result, but grounded this disposition on
finding on the merits that Scott was a slave and thus, could not be a citizen. In their
opinion, it was not necessary to determine the status of free Negroes as citizens under
diversity jurisdiction because Scott was not a free Negro. Neither Grier nor Campbell
offered any opinion on whether the plea in abatement was properly before the Court,
treating the order of dismissal for want of jurisdiction as an appropriate disposition if
Scott was determined to be a slave regardless of whether the initial jurisdictional issue
was before them.
Taney, Wayne, and Daniel, on the other hand, treated the plea as raising an issue
before the Court that could be determined on the pleadings, and therefore one which
should be decided before reaching the merits. Logically, their discussion of the act of
Congress and Scott's status as a slave under Missouri law was dicta. Thus, it may be
argued that only fourJustices (Grier, Campbell, Catron, and Nelson) held that Scott was
a slave. But if each Justice confined his opinion to the issue that was dispositive for him,
there would be no majority on any issue in the case. Thus, it was appropriate for Taney,
Wayne, and Daniel to reach the merits of Scott's status.
In turn, it may be argued that the three Justices who held free Negroes were not
citizens acted improperly in reaching that issue, since a majority of the Court could be
found for the proposition that Scott was a slave. Curtis, however, insisted that the plea
in abatement was at issue. Thus four Justices (Taney, Daniel, Wayne, and Curtis) said
that the jurisdictional issue must be addressed, while only two (Catron and McLean)
disagreed. Under these circumstances, they were acting properly in reaching the juris-
dictional question first and answering it.
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1854," 3 and the principle of popular sovereignty seemed to be carry-
ing the day. Thus, Taney used his natural law principle in an at-
tempt to freeze existing law and to prevent Congress from banning
slavery in the future. Because the due process clause bound only
the federal government, the northern states' abolition laws would
remain effective. This result was a curious inversion of the tradi-
tional notion that slavery was a creature of positive law because it
violated natural law.9 4 Thus Taney again pressed natural law into
service as an argument to prevent change.
The third proposition in Dred Scott, that a black person's status
as free or slave depended on the law of the state where he resided at
the time of suit, commanded the greatest support on the Court.
95
This theory was supported by the Court's earlier decision in Strader
v. Graham.96 Northern states could avoid the pestilence of slavery by
prohibiting its exercise when masters entered the state with their
slaves. In turn, southern states could avoid the spread of abolition
by reinstating slavery when master and servant returned. Local au-
tonomy seemed the only way for a free and a slave society to coex-
ist. 9 7 But such autonomy required acceptance of the proposition
that a state had power to enslave free men.
Dred Scott would have been a relatively uncontroversial decision
had the Court confined itself to reaffirming state power over slavery.
93. Kansas-Nebraska Act, ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277 (1854) (repealed 1933). Fehrenbacher
points out that the Missouri Compromise was expressly repealed by the statute only as
to Kansas and Nebraska, although the text was ambiguous on its application elsewhere.
Further, the Act did not affect the prohibitions on slavery in the territories that later
became Oregon and Minnesota. D. FEHRENBACHER, supra note I, at 177-88. Slavery had
little support there in any event, and therefore the federal statutes barring it added little
to the legal situation. Even if the territorial legislatures could not ban slavery, these
would be free states when added to the Union.
94. See R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975). Abolitionists argued that slavery could
be created only by positive law and that Congress had no power to legislate it because it
denied due process. Taney said that abolition is the creation of positive law and that
Congress had no power to legislate it because it denied slaveowners due process.
95. Seven Justices agreed on this point. Indeed, Justice Nelson originally prepared
an opinion for the Court based solely on this issue. When the decision ultimately came
out, Nelson submitted as his own separate opinion the opinion he had originally pre-
pared for the Court as a whole. SwIsHER, supra note 51, at 592-630. Dissenting Justices
Curtis and McLean depended on the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U..S. (16 Pet.) 1
(1842), that federal courts in diversity cases are bound by state statutes but can apply
federal common law in the absence of statute. Thus, Scott should be entitled to his
freedom in a diversity suit although a slave who could not get into federal court through
diversity jurisdiction would continue to be governed solely by state court decisions.
96. 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1850).
97. Fugitive slave laws remained a vexing problem, for article IV, § 2 prevented
northern states from declaring an escaped slave a free man.
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The insulation of slavery from attack by the federal government,
however, undermined a major plank of the Republican Party plat-
form. The political response was to condemn the portion of the
opinion that invalidated the Missouri Compromise as poorly rea-
soned dicta, not binding on future legislation."8 This tactic diverted
attention from the merits of the decision on citizenship. To the
black community, however, Taney's discussion of citizenship was
the most grievous injury. It excluded all blacks from the social com-
munity and by implication justified all laws that failed to protect
them or otherwise discriminated against them. The decision con-
firmed in legal terms what many people of all races recognized as a
social reality-that blacks were not recognized as members of the
American political community. Within a decade, however, member-
ship within that community would be constitutionally mandated.
Congress and the courts would then be forced to confront an issue
left unresolved by Dred Scott: What were the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizenship?
III. EDWARD GARRISON DRAPER: A LAWYER FOR LIBERIA
"qualified in all respects to be admitted to the Bar in Maryland, if he
was a free white citizen ""'
Taney's views on the citizenship of free Negroes accurately re-
flected the political climate of his home state of Maryland. While
northern blacks were free and southern blacks were predominantly
slaves, the black population in the border state of Maryland was al-
most equally divided between free and slave when Taney decided
Dred Scott. This division produced great tension. The state re-
sponded, as early as 1832, by adopting colonization in Africa as its
official policy."' The implicit-and sometimes express-assump-
tion behind that policy was that Negroes were not, and could never
98. See 1). FEHRENBACHER, supra note 1, at 417-43.
99. 9 MARYI.AND COLONIZATIONJOURNAL 89 (1857) [hereinafter cited as MD. Col..J.1.
100. Act of Mar. 12, 1832, ch. 281, 1831 Md. Laws; Act of Mar. 14, 1832. ch. 314,
1831 Md. Laws. The American Colonization Society, which helped'establish the colony
of Liberia, originated in private hands. It had received some grants from various states
including Maryland. In 1832 Maryland ceased its contributions to the national group in
order to focus on a single area, termed Maryland in Liberia, where an independent pol-
icy might be pursued. The Maryland Colonization Society was not a state agency, but it
was heavily funded by the state, which saw colonization as the answer to the threat of
slave revolts. See J. WRIGHT, IHE FREE NEGRO IN MARYLAND 1634-1860. at 261-75
(1917); see also J. H. B. LATrROBE, MARYLAND IN LIBERIA-A HISTORY OF THE COLONY
PLANTED BY THE MARYLAND STATE COILONIZATION SOCIETY (1885).
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be, full members of American society and that they should be en-
couraged to leave. Although it was possible for a free black to attain
limited economic success in Maryland, he would always remain
outside the dominant white community. Some insight into the im-
pact of this exclusion, and consequently into the meaning of citizen-
ship, can be gleaned from the lives of one man and his son.
Garrison Draper was a free black who lived with his wife, Char-
lotte Gilburg Draper,""' on Forrest Street in Old Town, Baltimore
before the Civil War.'0 2 Their only child, Edward, was born in Bal-
timore on January 1, 1834,113 fifteen years after Garrison began
business as a tobacconist and cigar maker.'0 4 Garrison was unusual,
even among free blacks, in both his livelihood and his other inter-
ests. His unique position greatly influenced the path chosen by his
son.
Although there were many free blacks in the slave state of Mary-
land, the prejudice reflected by the law meant that few became retail
shopkeepers and even fewer were successful.'" 5 Fearful that free
blacks would provide an outlet for stolen goods, the Maryland legis-
lature had prohibited the sale by any free Negro or mulatto of
any bacon, pork, beef, mutton, corn, wheat, tobacco, rye,
or oats, unless such free negro or mulatto shall, at the time
of such sale, produce a certificate from a justice of the
peace, or three respectable persons residing in the neigh-
borhood of said negro, of the county in which such negro
resides, that he or they have reason to believe and does
believe, that such free negro or mulatto came honestly and
bona fide into possession of any such article so offered for
sale .... t6
Despite the licensing requirement and the prejudice and suspicion it
reflected, Garrison Draper maintained a successful business for
nearly forty-five years. 107
101. G. BRAGG,JR., MEN OF MARYLAND 21 (1925) (Bragg mistakenly refers to Garrison
as "Jamison").
102. 2 MD. Coi..J. 243 (1844); 9 Mi. Cot..J. 383 (1859).
103. BRAGG, supra note 101.
104. WRIGHT, supra note 100, at 169-293. G. and R. Draper are listed as tobacconists
in the 1819 Baltimore City l)irectory. They were listed together at the same address
until 1831, when Ryland Draper moved to another part of town.
105. Id. at 168-89. Only 10 black retailers were listed in city directories for 1840 and
18 for 1850.
106. Act of Mar. 14, 1832, ch. 323, § 9, 1831 Md. Laws.
107. WRIGHT, supra note 100, at 169. G. Draper or Garrison Draper is listed as a
tobacconist in the Baltimore City )irectory from 1819 to 1864.
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Garrison Draper was an interesting individual with an in-
dependent and inquiring mind. The few letters of his that survive
reveal a much higher level of education than was usual among free
blacks."0 8 He was selected Secretary of the Society of Enquiry, an
organization he co-founded to learn about African colonization, and
he was invited to be a correspondent to the Maryland Colonization
Journal, the publication of the state-supported Maryland Coloniza-
tion Society. 09 This interest in colonization was unusual. Most
blacks, perceiving that the state's interest in a program of coloniza-
tion stemmed from the white community's distaste for free Negroes
in its midst, were virulently opposed.' 10 But Draper in an 1844 let-
ter to the editor of the Maryland Colonization Journal, asked for free
copies of the Journal so that he and the other members of the Society
of Enquiry could learn about colonization. From his studies, Draper
determined that the idea of colonization had something crucial to
offer American blacks. While Draper objected to enticing free Ne-
groes to Liberia with visions of riches and ease, he argued that there
was a true reason to encourage colonization:
Within the last twenty years I have given much thought to
the project of colonizing Africa with the free people of col-
our from the United States, and it appears to me that the
right course is not pursued to induce them to emigrate,
their fancy and senses are appealed to, and not their judg-
ment. They are persuaded that by going to Africa, they can
enjoy a life of ease and luxury, instead of labour and hard-
ships. The object appears, to persuade and coax them to
go. I think the solution of one or two questions would go
far towards settling the matter of our rights in this country.
What were the motives which induced the English, Scotch,
Irish, French, and other European nations to emigrate to
this country? Did they come of their own free will, and did
108. 2 MD. Co.. J. 242-44, 287-88, 290 (1844-1845). The census of 1860 stated that
21,699 of the 84,000 free blacks at the time could not read or write. J. BRACKF-r, supra
note 82, at 198 n.2 (1969). There was no public education for black children, and a
majority of those who received any education obtained it in Sunday schools. The illiter-
acy rate among slaves was much higher than among free blacks. Baltimore was the
center of the free black population and there were tkw schools, even Sunday schools. for
blacks outside Baltimore City. There was also hostility to Negro education, which often
forced cessation of schools outside the city. WRI;'T, supra note 100. at 202, 207.
Draper probably attended the African School conducted by Daniel Coker. Coker con-
ducted the school from 1812 to 1820, when he left Baltimore to go to l.iberia. See Gard-
ner, Ante-bellum Black Education in Baltimore, 1976 MD. Hisr. MAG. 360. 363.
109. 2 MD. Coi.. J. 242-44 (1844).
110. Id.
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they acquire according to the customs and usages of civi-
lized nations, legal possession of the territory? Then I
would ask, what was the condition and prospects of the
Africans on coming to this country? Did they come of their
own accord, and did they acquire legal possession of the
territory?. .
In a subsequent letter, Draper answered the questions pro-
pounded in his first one. Citing Ramsey's History of the United States,
he contended that European immigrants came voluntarily "not only
for the pecuniary advantage of agriculture or commerce, but also to
transmit the blessing of civil and religious liberty to their posterity."
Africans, on the other hand, were brought "without consulting their
own wishes." ' 1 2 The inference that Draper left to be drawn from
these remarks was that blacks must emigrate to find a country where
they could transmit liberty to their children.
Draper said that he would continue writing for the Journal, but
after these initial exchanges, the only published letter from him was
an inquiry concerning a rumor that emigrants to Liberia would be
required to pay back the expenses of founding the colony.' De-
spite the cessation of correspondence in the Journal, Garrison
Draper's interest in colonization continued unabated. Although he
did not go to Liberia, he was determined that his only child would
emigrate to obtain the civil and religious liberty that he lacked in
Maryland.
Garrison carefully prepared his son to play a leading role in Af-
rica. Recognizing the haphazard opportunities for education af-
forded blacks in Baltimore,' "4 Garrison sent his son to the public
school for blacks in Philadelphia." 5 The education Edward Draper
received there was sufficient to enable him to pass the entrance ex-
amination at Dartmouth College in 1851 in Greek, Latin, mathemat-
ics, English grammar and geography."' Indeed, he finished his first
year of college in the top third of his class." 7 There is no record of
111. Id. at 243.
112. Id. at 288 (citing I RAMSEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 223 (2d ed., rev. and
cor. 1818).
113. Id. at 290.
114. See Gardner, supra note 108.
115. 9 MD. COL.J. ix, 88 (1857). Philadelphia established separate public schools for
blacks in 1822. Gardner, supra note 108, at 361.
116. See Dartmouth College Catalog 1851-1852, at xxii (admission requirements).
Dartmouth had been open to black students since 1824. I L. RICHARDSON, HISTORY OF
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE 381 (1932).
117. On a grading scale of 1-5 with I as the highest score, Draper received a 1.7
average in his recitations and 1.8 for his examination during the freshman year. The
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his second year performance, but his enthusiasm for school seemed
to have waned. His grades in subsequent years went down, while
absences from recitations and chapel increased.' Nevertheless, he
graduated in 1855 "maintaining always, a very respectable standing,
socially, and in his class.""' His attitude toward the college may
have been revealed in a note he inscribed in a classmate's yearbook:
"Though we would both give three groans for, and bury in oblivion
that insignificant body of weak minded men, called the Faculty of
Dart. Coll, yet do not forget the class and especially Your Friend
Edward G. Draper."' 0
On graduation, Edward Draper faced the same problem as
many liberal arts graduates of today, compounded, of course, by his
status as a free black. He had studied the classics, mathematics,
rhetoric, philosophy, science, and history in the same required
courses as his fellow students, but these studies pointed to no par-
ticular profession.' Although he had spent four years in a state
where Negroes could vote, Edward clung to his father's vision of the
creation of a black society in which the entire nation would be free.
After considerable thought and discussion, Edward Draper decided
to become a lawyer and to practice that profession in Liberia.
Although Liberia had a number of lawyers, none was educated in
the profession; therefore, the opportunity for a trained lawyer
seemed great. 122
Obtaining a lawyer's training in Maryland, however, would not
be easy for a young black man. There were no law schools in the
examination mark was among the highest for the year. Record of Freshman Class of
1851-52 (Class Roll from Adams to Lee, I)artmouth College Archives).
118. His average for recitations in his junior year was 2. 1 with a very good 1.6 in the
examination, but senior marks of 2.72 in recitations suggest a rapid decline when Greek
and Latin were no longer the primary courses and science and philosophy replaced
them. Nevertheless, a number of his classmates received 3 or below. His absence rec-
ord was not remarkable among his colleagues, but at least differed sharply from his first
year. In 1851-1852 he missed three recitations and four days of chapel, two days being
excused. By 1854-1855 Draper had 26 absences from recitation (only 12 accompanied
by an excuse) and a stunning 33 absences from chapel (six excused). Class Rolls for
Dartmouth College 1851-52 (Freshman), 1853-54 (Junior) and 1854-1855 (Seniors)
(copy of front page of rolls from Dartmouth College Archives available from author).
119. 9 Min. Co.. J. 88 (1857). According to A. Briscoe Koger, Draper was the first
man of his race from Maryland to graduate from college. A. KOGER, T1tE MARYLAND
NEGRO 17 (1953).
120. Inscription in Silas Hardy's 1855 lithograph book (copy From Dartmouth College
Archives available from author).
121. See catalogs of courses of instruction at l)artmouth College for 1851-1855.
122. 9 MD. Cot. J. 88 (1857).
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state during this period. 23 Entrance to the profession was achieved
by "reading" law in the offices of a practicing attorney for at least
two years. 124, There were no other formal educational requirements
for admission, and most Maryland attorneys did not have a college
education. 25 Despite his educational advantages, Draper's race was
a major obstacle to "reading" law with an attorney. The statute reg-
ulating admission to the bar restricted admission to white males.' 26
This restriction, and the prejudice of which it was a part, would keep
most lawyers from offering Draper an apprenticeship. A black law
student in a lawyer's office could discourage potential clients and
could create difficulties for the lawyer in obtaining judicial or party
acceptance of documents the lawyer prepared. However, for
Charles Gilman, a retired attorney and a member of the Maryland
Colonization Society Board of Managers, these problems were no
longer relevant. He agreed to instruct Draper in the law and gave
the young man access to his library. 127
While reading law, Edward spent much of his time in the office
of Dr. James Hall, the editor of the Maryland Colonization Journal and
general agent of the Maryland Colonization Society. Dr. Hall de-
scribed Draper as a man "of an amiable disposition, very modest
and retiring, a good student, possessing a sound and discriminating
123. David Hoffman ran a one-man school of law from 1823 to the mid-1830s, but
discontinued it. Hoffman wrote that he discontinued teaching in 1836, but other evi-
dence indicates the school ceased operating in 1833. It was not reestablished until
1869. G. CAL.coTr, A His-roRY OF "rtE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 34-38, 68-69. 210-15
(1966); 1 E. CORDEL., UNIVERSITY OF MARYlAND 1807-1907, at 337-49 (1907).
124. The statute on bar admission required applicants to "have been a student of law
in any part of the United States, for at least two years previous to said application." Act
of Mar. 10, 1832, ch. 268 § 2, 1831 Md. Laws. A "student" studied in the office of an
individual lawyer. Thus, for example, John H. B. Latrobe studied law in the oflice of
Robert Goodloe Harper and, in turn, at least 17 men studied law in L.a'robe's office. J.
SEMMESJOHN H. B. IA-rROBE AND iSlIMES 1803-1891, at 100-10, 395-98 (1917). For
a discussion of the power of the legislature to prescribe bar admission requirements, see
Note, Attorney General v. Waldron--The Maryland Judiciary's Expansive Power to Reg-
ulate the Bar under the Separation of Powers Article: Intermediate Scrutiny under
Maryland's New Equal Protection "Clause," 41 MD. L. REv. 399 (1982).
125. R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANrIQUTY TO MODERN lIMES 177-87 (1953). As
late as 1883 only a minority of the students at the University of Maryland School of Law
had a college degree (25 of 53). The Law School ofthe I Inivers'iv of l.,larvond Catalog 1884,
at 5-6.
126. Act of Mar. 10, 1832, ch. 268, § 2, 1831 Md. Laws. The statute merely codified
practice, for no black was admitted to the bar in any state until 1844 when Macon B.
Allen was admitted to practice in Maine. W. LEONARD, BLACK lAWYERS 49 (1977).
127. 9 MD. CoL.. J. 383 (1859).
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mind."' 28 Tucked away in Gilman's library or Hall's office, the
young black student studied law and caused no stir, but he knew
that law in the books and law in practice were different experiences.
"Not having any opportunities for acquiring a knowledge of the rou-
tine of professional practice, the rules, habits and courtesy of the
Bar, in Baltimore, "129 Draper spent the last few months of his study
in the Boston office of Charles W. Storey, where he could attend
court like other law students.' 30
Draper finished his practical training and returned to Balti-
more. After marrying Jane Rebecca Jordan,"'l he was examined on
his knowledge of law by Superior Court Judge Z. Collins Lee. He
received a certificate stating that he was "qualified in all respects to
be admitted to the Bar in Maryland, if he was a free white citizen of
128. Id. at 384. During a portion of Draper's training, Hall was in Liberia. He re-
ported on the native uprising against the colonists of the Maryland Colonization Soci-
ety's colony in Africa known as Maryland in Liberia. This conflict forced the state-
supported colony to merge with the larger colony of Liberia, which had been created by
the American Colonization Society. The colonists hoped the merger would adequately
provide for their defense.
129. Id. at 88.
130. Id. at 383-84. Charles William Storey was a graduate of Harvard College and
Harvard Law School. Storey was admitted to the bar in 1840. He served as clerk to the
Massachusetts House of Representatives from 1844 to 1850 and was register of insol-
vency for Suffolk County and clerk of the Superior Criminal Court. I W. DAVIs, BENCH
AND BAR OF THE COMMONWEAt;uri OF MASSACIIusF'-rs 413 (1895). Charles Storev had
studied law in the office of George T. and Benjamin R. Curtis. George was one of the
counsel representing Dred Scott while his brother Benjamin became an associate.justice
of the Supreme Court and was one of the dissenting Justices in Dred Scott. In view of
Storey's connection to the Curtis brothers, the recent decision in Dred Scott was a likely
topic of conversation between Draper and Storey, no doubt reinforcing his interest in
colonization. Because Draper was born in Maryland. where the free Negro was under-
stood not to be a citizen, even Justice Curtis' dissent consigned him to the perpetual
limbo of the native born noncitizen.
Charles Storey's son, Moorfield, became one of the most prominent lawyers of his
time. From 1895-96 he was president of the American Bar Association, and from 1910-
29 he was president of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
J. ROGERS, AMERICAN BAR LEADERS 86-89 (1932).
131. BRAGG, supra note 101, at 21.
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this State."' 3 2 But he was neither white nor, after Dred Scott, a citi-
zen. Six days after securing his certificate, he and his wife left Balti-
more for Liberia on the M. C. Stevens.' 33
Draper and his wife, traveling as cabin passengers rather than,
as was customary for emigrants, steerage class,' 3 4 had an apparently
uneventful voyage. Correspondence from Draper reveals the nature
of the voyage and provides, indirectly, a tantalizing glimpse of the
writer. Nearing the African coast Draper wrote his parents:
I confess some disappointment with regard to the sea-it is
not a matter of such vast consequence as I had supposed to
make a sea voyage-the novelty is soon lost, for we have
the same routine to go over daily.
The thermometer is 83 degrees in the cabin, and I am
now writing dressed in linen clothes,-the first time that I
ever wore such garments in December. Our cabin fare is
good, having plenty of fresh provisions, and some things
which I know you have not, such as green corn, fresh toma-
toes, &c.-in fact, I live much better than I ever did
before.' 3 
5
After a further description of meals on board for both cabin and
steerage passengers, he continued,
We pass time in reading, the library furnishing a good sup-
ply of books. Have morning and evening prayers, and ser-
vice once on sabbath. Good order is observed by all, and it
is the general aim to promote each other's comfort. We
have not seen many curiosities during the voyage, passed
132. The Text of Judge Lee's letter read as follows:
STATE OF MARYLAND
City of Baltimore,
October 29, 1857
Upon the application of Charles Gilman, Esq. of the Baltimore Bar. I have examined
Edward G. Draper, a young man of color, who has been reading law under the direction
of Mr. Gilman, with the view of pursuing its practice in Liberia, Africa. And I have found
him most intelligent and well informed in his answers to the questions propounded by
me, and qualified in all respects to be admitted to the Bar in Maryland. if he was a free
white citizen of this State. Mr. Gilman, in whom I have the highest confidence, has also
testified to his good moral character.
This Certificate is therefore furnished to him by me, with a view to promote his
establishment and success in Liberia at the Bar there.
Z. COI.LINS LEE
Judge of Superior Court, Bait. Md.
9 Mo. Coi.. J. 89 (1857).
133. Id. at 81.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 133.
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three or four ships, have seen but few fish and have caught
none. 136
Draper's future in Liberia after this journey seemed promising.
Dr. Hall's son, G. W. Hall, a companion on this trip, wrote of
Draper in a letter to the corresponding secretary of the African Col-
onization Society:
The ship MC Stevens brought out, this voyage, a
young man from Baltimore, who is a regular graduate of
Dartmouth College, and is fully qualified, color excepted,
to practice at the Baltimore bar. His success is almost cer-
tain, as there is not another lawyer in Liberia, who was bred
to the profession; a second one might be equally success-
ful, and thus, this business would gradually pass out of the
hands of quacks, who now hold it without depending upon
their practice for support. 137
On arrival in Monrovia, Liberia, Draper wrote that he was pleased
with the place and its people, but he did note that he found the
people decidedly lazy. He and his wife, like many immigrants, be-
came ill with a fever, but reported they were convalescing well.' 38
Edward was too optimistic about his health. Within a year, on
December 18, 1858, Edward Garrison Draper died in Cape Palmas,
Liberia, of pulmonary consumption (tuberculosis). 139 "He would
not probably have made an orator or a very brilliant man," wrote
Dr. Hall, "but what is better, a useful, reliable and honest one."140
Edward Draper's death only two weeks before his twenty-fifth birth-
day was a tragic loss to his wife, his parents, and to his new country.
He had risked the perils of a transatlantic voyage, the exposure to
African diseases which affected all newcomers, and the dangerous
political situation of his new country, to be recognized as a citizen at
last.
IV. THE CIVIL WAR AMENDMENTS AND THE PROMISE OF EQUALITY
"Itjhe law which operates upon one man shall operate equally upon
136. Id. at 134.
137. American Colonization Society, 34 lm AFRICAN REPOSITORY 94 (1858) (letter
dated Dec. 16, 1857, from G.H. Hall to R.R. Gurley).
138. 9 MD. COL. J. 133 (1858). These portions of the letter were paraphrased in the
JOURNAi. rather than quoted because Hall, to whom Garrison Draper had shown his
son's letter, found them embedded in private or personal material "unsuitable for
publication."
139. Id. at 383.
140. Id. at 384.
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The cruel choice between home and citizenship to which
Draper was put should not have faced his successors. The Civil War
Amendments seemed to secure basic civil rights to blacks. Never-
theless, the debates surrounding the amendments and the accompa-
nying Civil Rights Act, and the language of the amendments
themselves, left unresolved the issue of what rights and privileges
the newly created citizens could claim. The post-Civil War genera-
tion adhered to Taney's proposition that citizenship carried with it
an entitlement to fundamental rights. Taney had limited the federal
role to protecting the fundamental rights of citizens from other
states, but even with this limitation, his position entailed a recogni-
tion that the phrase "privileges and immunities" referred to funda-
mental rights, whether implemented in state laws or not. Thus the
Constitution acknowledged at least a moral obligation to protect
those amorphous fundamental rights. If blacks were made citizens,
the state would be morally obligated to afford them fundamental
rights. But the distinction between a moral obligation and a legal
one was blurred in the debates. Fundamental rights were undefined
and had never been federally enforceable. So while the Civil War
Amendments reflected agreement on the proposition that blacks
were entitled to the fundamental rights of citizens, they did not re-
flect a similar agreement on the exact definition of those rights or
the mechanism for their enforcement.
After the Civil War the institution of slavery bore the blame for
every denial of fundamental rights found in America. Northerners
considered slavery harmful to the slaveowner as well as the slave.
The institution had corrupted southern society, leading to suppres-
sion of all dissent over the morality of slavery and eventually to re-
bellion against the Union itself. Slavery also led the southern states
to inflict their restrictive laws on northerners who entered slave
states. Thus, during the debate on the thirteenth amendment, Sen-
ator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts said:
Twenty million free men in the free States were practically
reduced to the condition of semi-citizens of the United
States; for the enjoyment of their rights, privileges and im-
munities as citizens depended upon a perpetual residence
north of Mason and Dixon's line. South of that line, the
141. CONG. G.OBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2459 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Stevens) (em-
phasis added).
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rights which I have mentioned [freedom of speech, of reli-
gion, and the right to peaceably assemble and petition for
redress of grievances], and many more which I might men-
tion could be enjoyed only when debased to the uses of
slavery. 142
Focusing on the institution of slavery in effect absolved reformers
from addressing the problems raised by more subtle and insidious
forms of prejudice. It was not necessary to define the fundamental
rights of citizens with any particularity to see that they were denied
to slaves.
The thirteenth and fourteenth amendments were intended to
end the denial of the fundamental rights of citizenship to blacks. To
effectuate this intention, the amendments' framers adopted the gen-
eral language of the Constitution regarding the privileges and im-
munities of citizenship. As a result, the amendments suffered from
the vagueness which had afflicted fundamental rights discussion
under the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2.
Rights could be defined-if at all-only in an infinite series of con-
crete cases. At the time, this vagueness was to some extent appeal-
ing. The adoption of general language concealed serious conflicts
between persons involved in the amendment adoption process. It
also hid the contradictory intentions often held by individual fram-
ers who wanted to "have their cake and eat it too"-to secure funda-
mental rights without discrimination, yet preserve state sovereignty.
The rebel states were to be reconstructed by heavy federal interven-
tion while the loyal states were to be beyond federal power-and
this was to be accomplished by a single uniform constitutional
command.
A. The Thirteenth Amendment
The thirteenth amendment, abolishing slavery, was widely
viewed as a cure for the ills of antebellum America. The debates
leading to the adoption of the amendment were not very illuminat-
ing on the precise mechanisms by which slavery's demise would se-
cure fundamental rights. For example, Senator Wilson and
Representatives John Kasson of Iowa and Green Smith of Kentucky
argued for the amendment by stressing the loss of free speech that
had occurred in the slave states.' 14' The abolition of slavery would
142. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 1202 (1864).
143. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (remarks of Sen. Wilson); CONG.
GLoBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Kasson). Id. at 237 (remarks
of Rep. Smith).
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presumably end prosecutions for abolitionist speech, but it was not
readily apparent how the amendment would secure freedom of
speech on other topics. The proponents of the amendment seem to
have uncritically assumed that the states would protect the basic
rights of their citizens and of citizens visiting from other states, if the
corrupting influence of slavery were removed.
The language of the thirteenth amendment received little atten-
tion. It was adapted from the Northwest Ordinance, which Thomas
Jefferson had drafted to provide a framework for governance of the
Northwest Territories after the Revolution.' 44 Opponents of the
thirteenth amendment made no objection to its phrasing, nor did
they seriously attempt to defend the institution of slavery.' 45 They
objected primarily to the violation of the basic federal principle that
each state should have power to determine its own domestic institu-
tions.' 46 They also contended that compensation was due for the
governmental taking of property in slaves,' 4 7 and pointed out the
social problems that would be created by immediate
emancipation.
The adoption of the thirteenth amendment in 1865 was a rejec-
tion of these arguments. Slavery was viewed as a threat to the entire
nation; therefore, no state should be permitted to establish it as a
domestic institution and Congress should be empowered to enforce
this prohibition. Slavery was so evil that slaveowners should be cas-
tigated rather than compensated. In the face of such injustice, only
immediate emancipation would suffice. Thus, two of the points of
Dred Scott (state power to determine the free or slave status of its
inhabitants and the lack of federal power to abolish slavery) were
repudiated by the amendment.
Despite this repudiation of the principles of Dred Scott, the im-
pact of the amendment on the citizenship of free blacks remained
ambiguous. Citizenship was not directly discussed in the debates.
The amendment altered a fundamental assumption of Taney's opin-
ion in Dred Scott by placing the Negro race beyond state power to
144. Article 6 of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. 2 THORPE, FEDERAL. AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 962.
145. The primary objections to the phrasing of the amendment came from radical
Republican Senator Charles Sumner, who sought to phrase the amendment as "[AIII
persons are equal before the law, so that no person can hold another as a slave ......
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess., 1482 (1864).
146. Id. at 2941-42 (remarks of Rep. Wood); see abo id. at 2982-83 (remarks of Rep.
Edgerton summarizing all the arguments of opponents).
147. id. at 1489 (remarks of Sen. Davis).
148. Id. at 2982-83 (remarks of Rep. Mallory).
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enslave, and thus removed a major ground for deciding that Ne-
groes were not citizens. Radical Republicans could now argue more
forcefully that Negroes, like all other citizens, were entitled to the
fundamental rights of citizens in a free society. But eliminating slav-
ery did not fully undercut Taney's rejection of the claim for Negro
citizenship, which had denied citizenship to free blacks as well as to
slaves. Furthermore, even if the thirteenth amendment was read to
mandate black citizenship, the power of the federal government to
prevent state restrictions on black citizens' rights was unclear. The
"fundamental rights" of white citizens had never been federally en-
forceable despite the political arguments (from radically different
perspectives) of both slaveowners and antislavery constitutionalists.
At best, there was some ambiguity in the cases on the rights of the
citizen of one state to claim fundamental rights when in another
state. The case law afforded citizens no protection against their own
state governments. Thus, the effect of the amendment as a limit on
state-imposed discrimination and as a source of federal power to
end discrimination was unclear.
Many southern states responded to the abolition of slavery by
enacting black codes, discriminating against blacks in basic rights
and forcing them to remain on the plantations. Congressional reac-
tion to the black codes evoked the first real debate over the scope of
the thirteenth amendment. This debate is by no means an accurate
guide to the intentions of the amendment's framers. Each side
sought to characterize the amendment to advance their immediate
goal: The support or defeat of a civil rights bill that prohibited ra-
cial discrimination in certain matters-a context not envisioned
when the amendment was drafted.
One view of the thirteenth amendment articulated in congres-
sional debates was rooted in Taney's Dred Scott opinion. Taney had
stated that free Negroes were not citizens of the United States and
that neither Congress nor the individual states could alter that sta-
tus. Only a constitutional amendment could confer citizenship on
blacks born within the United States. Under this view, the thir-
teenth amendment did not appear to affect the status of free blacks;
the abolition of slavery simply meant that all blacks would have the
same status that free blacks had prior to the Civil War. In a state
like Maryland, for instance, that would mean that all blacks could be
excluded from the vote and from jury service, and that they could be
discriminated against in the right to testify in court, to possess
weapons, to assemble publicly, to engage in certain trades and occu-
pations, and in liability to certain criminal punishments. In short,
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blacks would not be considered as citizens and would continue to be
subject to innumerable types of discrimination. Congressional
Democrats, including Senators ReverdyJohnson of Maryland,James
Nesmith of Oregon, and Peter Van Winkle of West Virginia, who
voted for the thirteenth amendment, and nominal Republicans like
Senator Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania, interpreted it in this re-
stricted fashion. "It was intended," said Senator Cowan, "to give to
the negro the privilege of the habeas corpus; that is, if anybody per-
sisted in the face of the constitutional amendment in holding him as
a slave, that he should have an appropriate remedy to be delivered.
That is all.'' Democrats, including both supporters and oppo-
nents of the thirteenth amendment, argued that the abolition of
slavery did not empower Congress to legislate against racial discrim-
ination. The views of the Democrats could be discounted perhaps,
for they were a small minority of Congress. Their position, how-
ever, was supported by President Andrew Johnson.
In stark contrast to the views of the Democrats and the Presi-
dent were the views of some radical Republicans, who contended
that the amendment of its own force forbade racial discrimination
with respect to contract rights and property ownership. When Dem-
ocratic Senator Thomas Hendricks argued that "no new rights are
conferred upon the freedman" by the thirteenth amendment,"50
Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois responded:
With the destruction of slavery necessarily follows the de-
struction of the incidents to slavery. When slavery was
abolished, slave codes in its support were abolished also.
Those laws that prevented the colored man going
from home, that did not allow him to buy or to sell, or to
make contracts; that did not allow him to own property;
that did not allow him to enforce rights; that did not allow
him to be educated, were all badges of servitude made in
the interest of slavery and as a part of slavery.' 5'
Subsequently, Trumbull said, "[A]ny statute which is not equal to
all, and which deprives any citizen of civil rights which are secured
to other citizens, is an unjust encroachment upon his liberty; and is,
in fact, a badge of servitude which, by the Constitution, is prohib-
ited."' 5 ' He cited both Campbell'" and Corfield1'5 4 as descriptive of
149. CONG. GiOB., 39th Cong., I st Sess. 499 (1866) 1hereinafter cited as 39 GI.oBE1.
See id. at 497 (remarks of Sen. Van Winkle), and id. at 505 (remarks of Sen. Johnson).
150. Id. at 318.
151. Id. at 322.
152. Id. at 474.
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the civil rights of citizens. In Trumbull's view, the prewar restric-
tions on free blacks did not prove that discrimination was separate
from slavery; instead, the restrictions on free blacks were part of the
heritage of slavery. Thus, Trumbull argued that the thirteenth
amendment abolished racial discrimination in all laws involving the
protection of life, liberty and property.1 55
Most Republicans argued that section two of the thirteenth
amendment was a source of power for legislation against racial dis-
crimination in civil rights. Representative Burton Cook of Illinois
argued that without the second section of the thirteenth
amendment,
no court could hold that any man in any State had a right to
hold another as his slave in the sense in which slaves had
been held before; but it is apparent that under other names
and in other forms a system of involuntary servitude might
be perpetuated over this unfortunate race. They might be
denied the right of freemen unless there was vested a
power in the Congress of the United States to enforce by
appropriate legislation their right to freedom.
... The first section would have prohibited forever the
mere fact of chattel slavery as it existed. When Congress
was clothed with power to enforce that provision by appro-
priate legislation, it meant two things. It meant, first, that
Congress shall have power to secure the rights of freemen
to those men who had been slaves. It meant, secondly, that
Congress should be the judge of what is necessary for the
purposes of securing to them those rights.' 56
Even Republicans who agreed with Trumbull on the scope of sec-
tion one recognized the likelihood that others, including state
courts, might read that section narrowly to do no more than forbid
the existence of slavery. They also placed their reliance on section
two of the amendment. For example, Representative James Wilson
of Iowa said, "A man who enjoys the civil rights mentioned in this
bill cannot be reduced to slavery. Anything which protects him in
153. 39 GLOBE, supra note 149, at 474 (citing Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535
(Md. 1797)).
154. 39 GLOBE, supra note 149, at 474 (citing Coriield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas 546
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230)).
155. 39 GLOBE, supra note 149, at 474; see aLto id. at 600-0 1 (remarks of Sen. Guthrie)
(taking an ambivalent position on the effect of amendment, but objecting to the civil
rights bill).
156. Id. at 1124.
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the possession of these rights insures him against reduction to slav-
ery. This settles the appropriateness of this measure, and that set-
tles its constitutionality."' 57
The defects of the thirteenth amendment as a vehicle for deal-
ing with racial discrimination were apparent. Its authority as the ba-
sis for the abolition of the black codes was uncertain. Although
there were good arguments in favor of its application to any racial
discrimination in civil rights, many had doubts about the reception
such arguments would receive in the courts.' 58 Even if the courts
were willing to defer to congressional power under section two of
the amendment, civil rights legislation could be repealed by a later
Congress. I'' Thus, Congress recognized the need for a new
amendment to the Constitution that would place the constitutional-
ity of federal legislative efforts to abolish racial discrimination be-
yond question and would secure those rights in the Constitution
itself. The proposed new amendment and the Civil Rights Act of
1866 were debated concurrently, and they must be viewed together
to understand what the framers of the fourteenth amendment be-
lieved they were doing.
B. The Rejected First Proposal for the Fourteenth Amendment
In February of 1866 ajoint committee of the House and Senate
proposed a new constitutional amendment:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each
State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
States, and to all persons in the several States equal protec-
tion in the rights of life, liberty, and property. "'
Congressman John Bingham of Ohio, in proposing this bill, said
that its language came from article IV, section 2 and from the fifth
amendment:
The proposition pending before the House is simply a
157. Id. at 1118.
158. A few Republican congressmen, like Henry Raymond of New York and John
Bingham of Ohio, believed that the thirteenth amendment was an inadequate constitu-
tional basis for prohibitions of racial discrimination. They voted against the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, but supported the fourteenth amendment to accomplish a similar result. Id.
at 2502 (remarks of Rep. Raymond); id. at 1291-92 (remarks of Rep. Bingham).
159. Id. at 1095 (remarks of' Rep. Hotchkiss).
160. Id. at 1034 (proposal of SelectJoint Committee on Reconstruction).
992 [VOL. 44:939
1985] TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
proposition to arm the Congress ... with the power to en-
force the bill of rights as it stands in the Constitution
today....
Gentlemen admit the force of the provisions in the bill
of rights, that the citizens of the United States shall be enti-
tled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States in the several States, and that no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law; but they say "We are opposed to its enforcement by
act of Congress under an amended Constitution, as
proposed. . .."161
Bingham's "bill of rights" apparently consisted of the privileges
and immunities clause of article IV, section 2 and the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. 62 He claimed that the Constitution
already declared "all men are equal in the rights of life and liberty
before the majesty of American law," thus reading the "due pro-
cess" clause of the fifth amendment as a command of equality.' 63
As to the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause itself,
Bingham apparently adopted the view that the clause referred to all
rights important to a free society, going beyond Washington and
Taney to see in it a recognition that the states had an obligation to
afford those rights to their own citizens as the antislavery constitu-
tionalists claimed.
Opponents of the proposed amendment, understanding the im-
pact that a broad interpretation of the phrase "privileges and immu-
nities" could have, protested that the amendment would convert the
privileges and immunities clause from a prohibition of discrimina-
tion against nonresidents into a general charter for federal legisla-
tion. Democratic Congressman Andrew Rogers of New Jersey
objected that, under the proposed amendment, all rights would be-
come federal. He referred to the listing of privileges and immuni-
ties made by Justice Bushrod Washington in Corfield v. Corvell.
Rogers noted that the list included the exercise of the franchise, and
he argued that the proposed amendment would enable Congress to
determine the qualifications for voting.14
Representative Robert Hale, a moderate Republican from New
161. Id. at 1088-89.
162. Almost a century later, Justice Black used Bingham's argument as authority for
the proposition that the fourteenth amendment was intended to apply the Bill of Rights
(amendments I-VIII) to the states. Adamson v. California. 332 U.S. 46, 97-123 (1947)
(appendix to dissent of Black, J.).
163. 39 GLOBE, supra note 149, at 1084-90, 1094.
164. Id. at 134-35 app.
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York, pointed out that the proposed amendment gave Congress
power to legislate on all privileges and immunities subject to the
condition that the federal legislation be uniform.' 65 Another mod-
erate Republican from New York, Giles Hotchkiss, objected that the
amendment appeared to authorize Congress to pass uniform laws
protecting life, liberty, and property in the states. He argued that
the destruction of state power over municipal legislation was inad-
visable.' 6 6 Bingham protested this construction, but Hotchkiss re-
plied that, at best, the language was unclear. He added that the
proposal was also defective because it only granted power to Con-
gress, and therefore Congress could refuse to prohibit discrimina-
tion and could repeal any law it had passed. Hotchkiss suggested
that the amendment should be changed to say that no state shall
discriminate against any class of citizens."57 Action on the commit-
tee's proposal was then postponed indefinitely and it was never
passed. In the Senate, Senator William Stewart of Nevada noted
that this proposed amendment did not accomplish its framers' in-
tention, but was a general grant of power.""8 The debates on this
early proposal and its ultimate rejection provide the basis for the
argument that the Thirty-Ninth Congress did not intend to shift
power to the federal government to enact the type of legislation that
was previously the exclusive province of the states.
C. The Civil Rights Act of 1866
Congress did want to end racial discrimination in state laws. It
initially attempted to do this by a statute based on the power of
Congress under the thirteenth amendment. The broad scope of the
statute was tempered with practical considerations. Congress rec-
ognized the continuing racial prejudice in the North as well as the
South and made no attempt to end discrimination in political rights;
nor did Congress propose direct rights of action regardless of state
165. Id. at 1063-64. Bingham responded that an amendment was necessary because
the Supreme Court, in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833), had found that
the federal government could not enforce the basic rights of cilizens. 39 GI.OBE supra
note 149, at 1089-90, 1094. In fact, Bingham misstated Barron. The issue there was not
whether Congress could enforce a constitutional guarantee against the states, but
whether there was such a guarantee. No question of congressional action was before the
Court in that case. The Court held that the first eight amendments did not apply to the
states. Bingham, however, complained, "'Gentlemen who oppose this amendment op-
pose the grant of power to enforce the bill of rights." Id. at 1090.
166. 39 Gn.oBF., supra note 149, at 1095 (Hotchkiss was worried about southerners
controlling Congress and passing laws governing all of the states).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1082.
994 [VOL. 44:939
1985] TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
law.' 69
The House took up the Civil Rights Act in March of 1866 in the
interim between its consideration of the rejected proposal for the
fourteenth amendment and consideration of new proposals for an
amendment. The Senate had already passed a bill providing
That all persons in the United States and not subject
to any foreign Power, excluding Indians not taxed, are
hereby declared to be citizens of the United States without
distinction of color and there shall be no discrimination in
civil rights or immunities among the inhabitants of any
State or Territory of the United States on account of race,
color or previous condition of slavery; but the inhabitants
of every race and color . . . shall have the same right to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evi-
dence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real
and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of person and prop-
erty, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains and
penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance,
regulation or custom to the contrary notwithstanding. 70
The House Judiciary Committee proposed to change all references
to "inhabitants" to refer to "citizens," and to add that all citizens
shall have the same right, for example, to make and enforce con-
tracts, "as is enjoyed by white citizens."'' The limitation of the bill
to citizens was designed to meet constitutional objections over the
power of Congress to require equal treatment of noncitizens. The
qualification that the "same right" be the right "enjoyed by white
citizens" was added to make clear that the law did not break down
all legal distinctions, but only prohibited discrimination on a racial
basis.172
Speaking for the committee, Representative Wilson explained
further that the language of "no discrimination in civil rights or im-
munities" did not apply to voting, jury service, or presence in
schools. In his view, civil rights were only the rights of personal
169. Interpretation of the Act to give a private right ol action has been a twentieth
century phenomenon. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See 6 C.
FAIRMAN, supra note 4, at 1207-1259 (1971).
170. S. 61, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. (1866). diutcsed in 39 (.OBE, supra note 149, at 606-
07.
171. 39 Gi.oBE, supra note 149, at 1115.
172. Id. at 157 app. (Rep. Wilson stated, "lIlt was thought by some persons that un-
less these qualifying words were incorporated in the bill, those rights might be extended
to all citizens, whether male or female, majors or minor.").
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security, personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy prop-
erty, including the rights of contract and access to courts essential to
secure property. Civil rights did not apply to the establishment,
support, or management of government. "Immunities" were
designed only to create equality in the exemptions from operations
of law. 1
7 3
Representative John Broomall of Pennsylvania argued that the
bill was necessary because
for thirty years prior to 1860 everybody knows that the
rights and immunities of citizens were habitually and sys-
tematically denied in certain States to the citizens of other
States: the right of speech, the right of transit, the right of
domicil, the right to sue, the writ of habeas corpus, and the
right of petition.171
Others articulated their own views on what rights the bill would
reach.' 7 5 Still other opponents sought to defeat the bill by con-
demning it as either supplanting state laws or enabling later direct
federal laws. This caused Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio to defend
the proposed Act:
Its whole effect is not to confer or regulate rights, but to
require that whatever of these enumerated rights and obli-
gations are imposed by State laws shall be for and upon all
citizens alike without distinctions based on race or former
condition in slavery.
... It must here be noted that the violations of citizens'
rights, which are reached and punished by this bill, are
those which are inflicted under "color of law," &c. The bill
does not reach mere private wrongs, but only those done
under color of State authority; and that authority must be
extended on account of the race or color.176
Although Wilson reiterated his position that the proposed law
173. Id. at 1117.
174. Id. at 1263.
175. For example, Democrat Columbus )elano of Ohio inquired whether the bill
gave blacks the right to be jurors, but did not seem reassured when Wilson replied that
it did not. Id. at 156-59 app. )elano objected to equality in testimony, inheritance, and
schools. Kerr of Indiana argued that the language of -civil rights and immunities" was
vague and might possibly apply to schools. Id. at 1270-71.
176. Id. at 1293-94. Congress was aware of private acts of racial violence in the South,
but such behavior was presumably cognizable under state law on assault. The federal
law was to operate only if the state refused, on a racial basis, to prosecute. Then such
acts might arguably be under color of state law. Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968),
may be good constitutional law, but it is not an accurate interpretation of the statute.
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did not apply to school laws, franchise laws, or jury laws, because
those were not rights of life, liberty, or property, 77 the bill was re-
turned to committee, which struck out the clause stating that there
should be no discrimination in civil rights and immunities. Wilson
explained that this was done to make clear that the franchise was not
covered by the bill. He contended that the deletion did not change
the effect of the bill because the other sections dealt with everything
that was a civil right or immunity. 7  As amended, the bill defined
citizenship of the United States without regard to color; specified
that all citizens have the same rights as white citizens to contract,
sue, testify, and acquire property, and to full and equal benefit of all
laws for the security of person and property; and that they shall be
subject to like punishment. The bill passed, but President Johnson
vetoed it.'
79
In the Senate, Trumbull responded to the veto message by af-
firming the constitutionality and limited scope of the Civil Rights
Act:
If an offense is committed against a colored person simply
because he is colored, in a State where the law affords him
the same protection as if he were white, this act neither has
nor was intended to have anything to do with his case, be-
cause he has adequate remedies in the State courts; but if
he is discriminated against under color of State laws be-
cause he is colored, then it becomes necessary to interfere
for his protection."t
In the House, Representative William Lawrence of Ohio argued
that the privileges and immunities clause of article IV gave Congress
power to protect the fundamental rights of citizens.'' He claimed
that fundamental rights of citizens are anterior to and independent
177. Apparently Wilson based congressional authority to pass the law in part on the
old antislavery constitutionalist thought, contending that the privileges and immunities
of citizens include the protections of the fifth amendment due process clause. Contrary
to Barron, Wilson thought all states were required to protect the citizen's life, liberty.
and property. He argued further that Congress had the power to enforce these rights.
Opponents had already emphatically denied this. Even Bingham had denied that the
Constitution gave Congress power to legislate to enforce fundamental rights in federal
courts. 39 GLOBE, supra note 149, at 1294.
178. Id. at 1366.
179. In his message vetoing the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, President Andrew Johnson
said, "It cannot, however, be justly claimed that, with a view to the enforcement of this
article of the Constitution, there is at present any necessity for the exercise of all the
powers which this bill confers." Id. at 1681.
180. Id. at 1758.
181. Id. at 1835-36.
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of the Constitution, but that article IV recognizes them and "by im-
plication affirms [them] to exist among citizens of the same
State." 8 2 Lawrence defined privileges and immunities as simply the
rights to life and personal security, and the right to acquire and en-
joy property. 113 Lawrence's view of congressional power under arti-
cle IV had been repudiated by the courts and was inconsistent with
the language and history of that clause. It was intelligible, however,
as an adoption of the views of Justices Washington and Taney that
significant rights accompanied citizenship, and of the antislavery
constitutionalists that those rights could be protected by the federal
government. Although the Civil Rights Bill protected the enumer-
ated privileges and immunities of citizens from racial discrimination
by the state, it did not apply to schools, voting, or jury selection.
Congress overrode Johnson's veto, and the Civil Rights Act of
1866 became law. It reflected the antislavery constitutionalist view
of the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizenship.' " Ac-
cording to its supporters, the power to pass the Civil Rights Act
came from the thirteenth amendment, which, by abolishing slavery,
meant that all persons were entitled to the privileges and immuni-
ties that "belong of right to citizens of all free governments. "185
Whether the provisions of the Act were broad enough to include all
such privileges and immunities, however, is questionable. 18 6 The
vagueness of the phrase "civil rights or immunities" had enabled
opponents to argue that it covered items such as voting, jury mem-
bership, and education. Silent members may have believed such
matters were civil rights, but recognized that a bill containing them
would not pass. Thus they were willing to eliminate the general lan-
guage of "no discrimination in civil rights or immunities" in favor of
the specific rights itemized. Other matters, such as access to inns,
common carriers, and places of public entertainment, as well as the
right to pursue a chosen occupation, were never raised. The Civil
Rights Act of 1866 had dealt with the most egregious examples of
182. Id. at 1835.
183. Lawrence asserted that rights may be destroyed only by prohibition or failure to
protect. A prohibition, he said, is a law which states that a race shall not have a particu-
lar right. A failure to protect, he explained, would he a law granting a specilic protection
for whites only. Id. at 1832-33.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 151-57.
186. Representative Wilson contended that it did, or at least that it covered all "civil
rights" and immunities, but he was trying to protect himself from any charge that he had
weakened the bill by eliminating references to "civil rights and immunities." 39 Gn.oBE,
supra note 149, at 1366.
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racial discrimination under state law, and the omission of compre-
hensive language in the statute made precise definition of the words
"'civil rights" or "immunities" irrelevant.
Congressmen frequently mentioned Bushrod Washington's
opinion in Corfield v. Coryell in connection with the Civil Rights
Act.' 87 Justice Washington in Corfield had listed protection by the
government, the right to institute and maintain actions in court, and
to hold and dispose of property, as fundamental privileges and im-
munities. The Civil Rights Act included these fundamental rights.
It conferred upon blacks the same rights as white citizens "to sue, be
parties and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and
convey real and personal property, and to the full and equal benefit
of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and prop-
erty."' 88 In some respects, the statute went beyond the examples of
privileges given in Corfield, requiring, for example, nondiscrimina-
tion in punishment under criminal law, 8 " and racial equality in the
right to make and enforce contracts.' 90
Other privileges and immunities discussed in Corfield, however,
were secured indirectly, if at all. Corfield mentioned the right to
"pass through or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade,
agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise," and the benefit of
habeas corpus.'" 1 These were not expressly mentioned in the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. The statutory declaration of citizenship may
have been understood to secure the right to travel and to change
residence through the comity clause of article IV and the nature of
the federal government.' 1 2 The right of habeas corpus was proba-
bly secured to the extent it was available to white citizens, because it
is a proceeding for the security of the person. The statute did not,
however, reach "professional pursuits." Freedom to pursue an oc-
cupation was within both the general and specific headings of privi-
leges of Corfield, yet it apparently did not receive protection by the
Act of 1866. If it had been raised, however, it would probably have
been considered a privilege. On the other hand, Congress clearly
187. See, e.g., supra note 155.
188. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch.31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866).
189. Id. Washington's list of privileges and immunities mentioned "exemption from
higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state." GCrfield, 6
F.Cas. at 552.
190. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. at 27. This was not expressly listed as a privi-
lege and immunity in Corfield although it fits easily within the general headings of the
right to acquire property and pursue and obtain happiness.
191. Corfield, 6 F.Cas. at 552.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
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dropped the general language of "civil rights and immunities" to
avoid any implication that the statute might apply to another privi-
lege mentioned by Washington in Corfield-the elective franchise.
In Corfield, Justice Washington left the listing of privileges and
immunities open-"these and many others which might be men-
tioned." Representative Broomall's list of rights and immunities
during the initial stages of debate on the Civil Rights Act empha-
sized rights not mentioned by Washington-the right of free speech
and the right to petition. 13 It was, of course, this open-textured
nature of privileges and immunities that led the House to omit it
from the statute in favor of a specific enumeration. In sum, con-
gressmen agreed that the matters specified by the statute were privi-
leges and immunities of citizenship, but reached no consensus on
the full coverage of that term.
D. The Fourteenth Amendment
After the passage of the Civil Rights Act, the House took up a
new bill proposing an amendment to the Constitution. This bill
contained the language of the present fourteenth amendment's sec-
tion one without the first sentence on citizenship to all persons born
or naturalized in the United States:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privilege or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or proprety without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws.'19
4
Thus, the form had been changed from a grant of power to secure
privileges and immunities to a prohibition on state abridgment of
them, with a power merely to enforce the prohibition. Unlike Bing-
ham's first proposed amendment, the privileges and immunities
were specified to be those of citizens of the United States. This
specification was not considered significant because no clear distinc-
tion had been articulated between the privileges and immunities of
citizens of a state and those of citizens of the United States. Speak-
ers discussed the new proposed amendment as though the privi-
leges and immunities of United States citizens that it mentioned
were identical to the privileges and immunities of the citizen of a
193. See supra text accompanying note 174.
194. 39 GI.OBE, supra note 149, at 2286.
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state referred to in article IV. The leading radical, Thaddeus Ste-
vens of Pennsylvania, while introducing the new proposal, said that
the provisions of section 1
are all asserted, in some form or other, in our DECLARA-
TION or organic law. But the Constitution limits only the
action of Congress, and is not a limitation on the States.
This amendment supplies that defect, and allows Congress
to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far that the
law which operates upon one man shall operate equally
upon all .... Some answer, "Your civil rights bill secures
the same things." That is partly true, but a law is repeala-
ble by a majority.'"
Some opponents of the amendment argued that its language
would allow too broad a federal power. Representative Benjamin
Boyer of Pennsylvania objected: "The first section embodies the
principles of the civil rights bill, and is intended to secure ultimately,
and to some extent indirectly, the political equality of the negro
race. It is objectionable also in its phraseology, being open to ambi-
guity and admitting of conflicting constructions.""' 6 Next, Samuel
Randall of Pennsylvania complained of the first section: "Grant this
power, insert it in the Constitution, and how soon will the privilege
of determining who must vote within the State be assumed by the
Federal power?"'" ' 7 Finally, Andrew Rogers of New Jersey thought
the privileges and immunities clause could be understood to involve
"all the rights we have under the laws of the country"-the right to
vote, to marry, to contract, to be a judge or a juror. 98
Supporters denied this construction, specifically focusing on
the thorny issue of voting rights. Bingham noted, "The amendment
does not give, as the second section shows, the power to Congress
of regulating suffrage in the several States.""' ' Others sadly admit-
ted that the people would surely reject any attempt to grant suffrage
to blacks.""'
Whatever their views of its scope, representatives on both sides
of the aisle agreed that the measure corresponded to the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. John Broomall of Pennyslvania noted that those
195. Id. at 2459.
196. Id. at 2467.
197. Id. at 2530.
198. Id. at 2538.
199. Id. at 2542.
200. Id. at 2505 (Rep. McKee): id. at 2532 (Rep. Banks), id. at 2539 (Rep. Farnsworth);
id. at 2462 (Rep. Garfield).
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who were to vote on the proposed constitutional amendment "voted
for this proposition in another shape, in the civil rights bill."
20
Henry Raymond said he voted against the civil rights bill because he
thought it unconstitutional, "[blut now it comes before us in the
form of an amendment to the Constitution, which proposes to give
Congress the power to attain this precise result," and he supported
the amendment. 202
The measure passed in the House and in May of 1866 the Sen-
ate took up consideration of the proposed amendment. When the
amendment was introduced, the committee chairman, Senator Wil-
liam Fessenden of Maine, was ill, and Senator Jacob Howard of
Michigan introduced the amendment giving "so far as I understand
[the] views and motives [of the committee which drafted the
amendment]." 0 3
Howard first addressed the privileges and immunities clause.
"[W]e may gather some intimation of what probably will be the
opinion of the judiciary by referring to a case adjudged many years
ago in one of the circuit courts of the United States by Judge Wash-
ington," he said, speaking of Corfield. " 4 Howard stated that this
case correctly characterized the privileges and immunities in the sec-
ond section of article IV. "To these privileges and immunities,
whatever they may be-for they are not and cannot be fully defined
in their entire extent and precise nature-to these should be added
the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the first eight amend-
ments of the Constitution .... ,,1o' Howard said that these rights
"are secured to the citizen solely as a citizen of the United States
and as a party in their courts. ' ' "6 He acknowledged that these
rights did not currently restrict state legislatures, nor did the Consti-
tution empower Congress to give them effect against the states.
"The great object of the first section of this amendment is, there-
fore, to restrain the power of the States and compel them at all times
to respect these great fundamental guarantees. ' ' -' 7
As to "equal protection" and "due process," Howard said:
This abolishes all class legislation in the States and
201. Id. at 2498.
202. Id. at 2513.
203. Id. at 2765.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 2766.
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does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of per-
sons to a code not applicable to another....
• ..But sir, the first section of the proposed amend-
ment does not give to either of these classes the right of
voting. The right of suffrage is not, in law, one of the privi-
leges or immunities thus secured by the Constitution. It is
merely the creature of law. 0 8
Howard was one of the very few speakers in either body who at-
tempted to make any elaboration on equal protection. 20 9 His com-
ments suggested it was tied to the privileges and immunities clause,
i.e., states must secure life, liberty, and property and perhaps other
conditions necessary for the pursuit of happiness by laws ("privi-
leges and immunities") which must be equal ("equal protection")
and imposed according to due process.
The rest of Howard's speech and the discussion that followed
focused on the other sections of the proposed amendment. Several
days later, Howard proposed the present first sentence of the
amendment dealing with citizenship. "All persons born or natural-
ized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they re-
side. 2 '0 This was the same language that had been inserted in the
Civil Rights Act. No one, however, suggested that the clause defin-
ing United States citizenship had any bearing on the content of the
privileges and immunities clause. Indeed, Republican Senator John
Henderson of Missouri, discussing the new clause on citizenship, re-
ferred to Taney's Dred Scott opinion. He said that Taney conceded
to members of the community "all the personal rights, privileges,
and immunities guaranteed to citizens of this 'new Govern-
ment.' "21' Taney had discussed the privileges of citizenship under
article IV in terms of their application to citizens of the United
208. Id.
209. In the House, Representative John Farnsworth of Illinois was one of the few
members who mentioned the equal protection clause. Farnsworth's comments empha-
sized that the due process clause and the privileges and immunities clause were taken
from existing provisions. "'There is but one clause in [section I of the proposed amend-
ment] which is not already in the Constitution, and it might as well in my opinion read,
'No State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.' " Like several other members of Congress, he assumed the privileges and immu-
nities of article IV were, or ought to be, applicable to the stales. Thus. everyone had a
right to those things fundamental to free government. But, "How can he have and enjoy
equal rights of 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness' without 'equal protection of
the laws?' " Id. at 2539.
210. U.S. CoNs-'. amend. XIV, § I.
211. 39 GLOBE, supra note 149, at 3032-33.
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States.2t2 Henderson's speech indicated agreement with Taney's
views on privileges and immunities of citizenship, but, of course,
condemned Taney for excluding Negroes from citizenship.
At the beginning of June, the Republicans held a closed party
caucus. They agreed on the language of the fourteenth amendment,
including some changes in sections two through four, and agreed to
stand behind the result without splintering on the merits of particu-
lar clauses or proposed alterations. This meant that proponents did
not engage in much later discussion on the meaning of particular
clauses. Howard's statement that "privileges and immunities" in-
clude the first eight amendments was never repeated. Indeed, after
the caucus, Republican Senator Luke Poland of Vermont said that
the privileges and immunities clause "secures nothing beyond what
was intended by the original provision of the Constitution, that 'the
citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens in the several States.' ",213 Senator John Henderson
of Missouri referred to the Freedman's Bureau Bill and the Civil
Rights Act as affording "[t]hose fundamental rights of person and
property which cannot be denied to any person without disgracing
the Government itself."'2 4 Democrats, such as Thomas Hendricks
of Indiana and ReverdyJohnson of Maryland, objected to the inser-
tion of privileges and immunities in the proposed fourteenth
amendment because, as Johnson said, "I do not understand what
will be the effect of that."'2 5 Nonetheless, the Senate passed the
amendment. The House then passed the Senate version, with virtu-
ally no debate other than protestations of sadness at the lack of a
guarantee for suffrage.2 t6
The debates leave no room for doubt that the privileges and
immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment referred to the
same concept as the privileges and immunities clause of article IV.
Every speaker who touched on the issue stated that the fourteenth
amendment clause was derived from article IV.217 Justice Bushrod
212. See supra text accompanying notes 5-98.
213. 39 GLOBE, supra note 149, at 2961.
214. Id. at 3035.
215. Id. at 3041. For the remarks of Sen. Hendricks, see id. at 3039.
216. For example, Representative GeorgeJulian of Indiana complained, "Without the
ballot in the hands of the freedmen, local law, reinforced by a public opinion more ram-
pant against them than ever before, will render the civil rights bill a dead letter, and in
the future, as it has been in the past, the national authority will be set at defiance." Id. at
3210.
217. See the references to article IV by Representatives Farnsworth, supra note 209;
Stevens, supra text accompanying note 195; Senators Howard, supra text accompanying
notes 204-05; Poland, supra text accompanying note 213; and Henderson, supra note 214
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Washington's description in Corfield of privileges and immunities
under article IV as the fundamental rights of citizens in a free soci-
ety was taken as applicable to the new clause in the fourteenth
amendment, with an exception for the franchise, which was viewed
as a political right not subject to either article IV or the fourteenth
amendment. Thus, the framers of the fourteenth amendment un-
derstood that they were placing a guarantee of "fundamental
rights" in the document. Hindsight shows the threat to federalism
from placing undefined fundamental rights in the Constitution, and
some contemporaries pointed it out as well.2t At the time, how-
ever, most framers apparently hoped to ensure such rights to blacks,
while preserving state sovereignty in its current form. The general
language they adopted masked the potential conflict between these
goals.
State and federal courts, construing the privileges and immuni-
ties of article IV, had never given it a precise definition. They had
and accompanying text. See also the remarks of amendment opponents, supra notes 196-
98 and 215 and accompanying text. In the House, Rep. Bingham had the last word on
his own proposal. "No state," he declared, "ever had the right, under the forms of law
or otherwise, to deny . . . the privileges and immunities of any citizen of the Republic,
although many of them have assumed and exercised the power, and that without rem-
edy." The notion of a right without a remedy suggests, at least, an appeal to "natural
rights." Bingham tied these rights to the "privileges and immunities" clause of article
IV, saying that such privileges include "among other privileges, the right to bear true
allegiance to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and to be protected in life,
liberty and property." He concluded, "That great want of the citizen and stranger. pro-
tection by national law from unconstitutional State enactments, is supplied by the first
section of this amendment. That is the extent that it hath, no more. ... 39 GLOBE,
supra note 149, at 2542-43.
218. See, e.g., remarks of Rep. Hale, 39 GLOBE, supra note 149, at 1065. In recent
times, Raoul Berger has argued that the problem was a limited one because the four-
teenth amendment merely constitutionalized the rights provided by the Civil Rights Act
of 1866. He contends that the 1866 statute defined all those matters that were consid-
ered fundamental privileges and immunities, and therefore that the privileges and im-
munities clause of the fourteenth amendment simply referred to those statutory rights.
R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 36 (1977). Of course the rights described in the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 were unanimously conceived of as part of the privileges and
immunities of citizenship, but as demonstrated, privileges and immunities were not lim-
ited to the enumerated civil rights. Each person discussing privileges and immunities
gave the phrase a slightly different content. See Sen. Wilson. supra text accompanying
note 142 (emphasizing free speech); Rep. Broomall, supra text accompanying note 174
(including speech, travel, domicile, suit, habeas, and right of petition); Rep. Wilson.
supra text accompanying note 179 (identifying them with the 1866 Act); Sen. Howard.
supra text accompanying notes 204-08 (adopting Corfield and adding the first eight
amendments); and amendment opponents commenting on vagueness. See Sens. John-
son and Hendricks, supra text accompanying note 215. Thus, Berger's limitation on the
clause fails as history even if it could be justified by some other criteria of interpretation.
See Comment, The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendnent: The Original
Intent, 79 Nw. U.I,. REV. 142 (1984).
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insisted on leaving it for a case-by-case determination, so that they
could find it applicable to any law when discrimination against non-
residents would threaten the functioning of the nation. They did
not want to foreclose decision on any law that had not been consid-
ered individually in a concrete case for this pupose. 219 Congress un-
derstood, as Howard said, that it would be similarly up to the courts
to construe the privileges and immunities clause of the new amend-
ment on a case-by-case basis. The courts would decide whether a
particular right was fundamental and therefore whether a law on
that matter must be equal as to all.220 Congress overrode objections
to the vagueness of the term "privileges and immunities" because
no one thought the insertion of the clause in the Constitution would
result in interference with laws they believed proper.
Experience with judicial decisions under article IV suggested
there was no cause for alarm. 22 Under article IV the privileges and
immunities guaranteed to a nonresident were defined primarily by
the laws applicable to residents of the state that he entered. In
Bushrod Washington's terms, privileges and immunities were the
fundamental rights of a citizen subject to "such restraints as the
Government may justly prescribe for the general good of the
whole."'2 22 Thus, their content was identified in the context of ex-
isting laws. Similarly, the rights of the black individual under the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 were defined by the state laws applicable to
white citizens. Instead of a vast expansion of rights, the framers of
the fourteenth amendment saw privileges and immunities as a limit-
ing concept. It selected only some of the existing laws of a state as
basic rights of citizenship that must be applied to all. Members of
the Republican majority asserted that states under their own consti-
tutions already afforded their citizens all fundamental privileges and
immunitites, except for those states which previously had slavery
and were then enacting black codes. z3
219. See, e.g., Connor v. Elliot, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591, 593 (1856) ("We do not deem it
needful to attempt to define the meaning of the word privileges in this clause of the
constitution. It is safer, and more in accordance with the duty of a judicial tribunal, to
leave its meaning to be determined, in each case, upon a view of the particular rights
asserted and denied therein.").
220. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
221. Resentment of the Court for its decision in Dred Scott can easily be exaggerated.
Nor did Dred Scott raise congressional fears about entrusting broad interpretive powers
to the Court. Furthermore, by 1866 a majority of the Court had been appointed by
Lincoln (Chase, Miller, Swayne, )avis, and Field). See generally S. KItrrLER, JUDICIAL
POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS (1968).
222. See supra text accompanying note 163.
223. See, e.g., 39 GLOBE, supra note 149, at 219 app. (remarks of Sen. Howe).
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The fear of vagueness in the term "civil rights and immunities,"
which led Congress to drop it in favor of a specific enumeration of
rights in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, produced less terror in the
case of the "privileges and immunities" clause in the fourteenth
amendment. Section two of the amendment provided strong textual
evidence that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States did not include political rights.224 A statement of principle
was more appropriate in a constitution than in a statute. To some
extent, the vagueness of the principle actually enhanced its accepta-
bility. It was impossible to oppose the fourteenth amendment in the
Thirty-Ninth Congress without appearing to oppose fundamental
rights. 2 5
The essential theme of the series of congressional debates was
that slavery was the root cause of all denials of fundamental rights in
a democratic society. Thus, the abolition of slavery and its incidents
by the thirteenth amendment, the Civil Rights Act, and the first sec-
tion of the fourteenth amendment, would automatically result in the
assurance of all that was fundamental without greatly altering the
federal structure.
The members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress did not want to cre-
ate a centralized government whose power would include the au-
thority to define the scope of a citizen's rights. They believed that
each state would adequately protect the interests of its own white
citizens, so that a prohibition on racial discrimination in the funda-
mental rights of the state legal system would adequately secure
those rights to blacks. The Civil Rights Act was designed to secure
racial equality in what Congress believed to be the most important
rights of a citizen in society, rights that the states themselves had
already, presumably, defined. The fourteenth amendment was to
224. See supra text accompanying note 199. Section two provides for reduction in the
basis of representation in Congress to the extent the right to vote is denied male inhabit-
ants of a state who are twenty-one years old and citizens of the United States. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
225. See id. at 2468-69 (remarks of Rep. Kelley) and id. at 256 app. (remarks of Rep.
Baker). This also explains the evidence offered by Professors Fairman and Morrison
against the incorporation of the first eight amendments. See Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949)
and Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Judicial Inter-
pretation, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140 (1949). Some rights, like freedom of the press, were se-
cured in almost every state constitution and would be considered fundamental rights
protected by the fourteenth amendment. On the other hand, state laws inconsistent
with other provisions of the Bill of Rights which were not part of the state's own consti-
tution would not be considered by the people of that state to be violations of fundamen-
tal rights.
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raise nondiscrimination in all these fundamental rights to the level
of a constitutional command. The congress that proposed the four-
teenth amendment, however, failed to define privileges or immuni-
ties and did not see that the distinction between the language of
article IV and that of the fourteenth amendment posed problems for
achieving the results they sought.
V. THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES AND THE DEMISE OF THE
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
"[lft turns.., what was meant for bread into a stone. "226
A. Debates on Civil Rights Legislation Before the
Slaughterhouse Decision
Problems with using the privileges and immunities language of
the fourteenth amendment to combat discrimination surfaced
quickly. The amendment had been ratified in 1868 with the clear
understanding that it did not affect voting rights because extension
of the franchise had threatened to weaken northern support. Dur-
ing the next two years, however, political fortunes shifted and
Republicans saw the Negro vote in northern and border states as
essential to maintaining their power. Thus, in 1870 the fifteenth
amendment was ratified in an effort to extend voting rights to
blacks.227 Congress then passed statutes in 1870228 and 1871229 to
secure the right to vote. Both these bills attempted to protect
against interference with the right to vote by organized violence, es-
pecially the activities of the Ku Klux Klan, but the continued out-
rages of the Klan led to a further enactment in 1871.230 The
debates over the Enforcement Act of 1871 involved heated discus-
sion of the proper interpretation of the fourteenth amendment.
226. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 129 (1873) (Swayne, J.,
dissenting).
227. See W. GILLETTE, THE RIGHT To VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIF-
TEENTH AMENDMENT (1965). Sen. Matthew Carpenter of Wisconsin was an active partici-
pant in the debates, supporting the amendment, but opposing the refusal to admit
secessionist states until they had ratified that amendment. Id. at 102; CONG. GLOBE, 41st
Cong., 2d Sess. 165 (1869).
228. Voting Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870). The 1870 statutes also
reenacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which could now be based upon the fourteenth
amendment. Ch. 114, § 18. Chapter 114, § 16 altered the act to extend rights other
than property to all persons rather than to citizens only. The right to hold property on
the same terms as white citizens continued to be limited to citizens.
229. Voting Rights Act of 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 13 (1871).
230. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
1008 [VOL. 44:939
1985] TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 1009
The legislation, as initially proposed, raised real fears that Con-
gress, in its attempts to protect black citizens, would usurp state sov-
ereignty. Congressional authority to pass such legislation required
application of the fourteenth amendment to situations beyond those
considered by its framers, and each side interpreted the new amend-
ment according to their desire to enact or block the proposed law.
Although the statements made in these debates are suspect if taken
as expressions of the original intent of those who drafted the
amendment, they demonstrate the possible interpretations of the
language and the concerns of the time.
The problems that had always plagued interpretation of "the
privileges and immunities of citizenship" cropped up again in the
language of the Voting Rights Act of 1870. The Act had made it a
criminal offense for two or more persons to conspire or go in dis-
guise upon the public highway or upon the premises of another with
intent to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen "with
intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any
right or privilege granted or secured to him by the Constitution or
laws of the United States." '13 ' Given this language, Representative
James Garfield of Ohio asked why additional legislation to deal with
the Klan was needed. 32 Representative Shellabarger replied that
the section was arguably worthless "because of its too great general-
ity and vagueness in the description of the particular act that shall
constitute the crime. ' 233 With such general language, it was also
possible that the section would be interpreted to apply only to vot-
ing rights because the rest of the statute was concerned only with
these rights.
To remedy these deficiencies, a new statute was proposed. The
first section was limited to acts under color of state law, and the
third dealt with circumstances in which the state was unable or un-
willing to enforce its law. But section two dealt with private conspir-
acies against private individuals. This section made it criminal for
two or more persons within the limits of any state to
band or conspire together to do any act in violation of the
rights, privileges, or immunities of another person, which,
being committed within a place under the sole and exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the United States, would, under any law
of the United States then in force, constitute the crime of
either murder, manslaughter, mayhem, robbery, assault
231. Voting Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, 141 (1870).
232. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 130 (1871).
233. Id. at 68 app.
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and battery, perjury, subornation of perjury, criminal ob-
struction of legal process or resistance of officers in dis-
charge of official duty, arson, or larceny .... 234
Shellabarger claimed that this provision was authorized by the four-
teenth amendment. "The making of them [persons born in the
United States] United States citizens and authorizing Congress by
appropriate law to protect that citizenship gave Congress power to
legislate directly for enforcement of such rights as are fundamental
elements of citizenship. '2 s5 Those fundamental rights, he asserted,
were those stated by Justice Washington in Corfield.
Both Republicans and Democrats were alarmed by Shel-
labarger's reasoning. Republicans were appalled by the Klan's ac-
tions and by the failure of state governments to convict Klansmen,
but many were equally startled by Shellabarger's suggestion of fed-
eral power to legislate to protect life, liberty, and property from pri-
vate injury.2s Democrat Michael Kerr of Indiana pointed to the
distinction between rights of state citizenship protected by article IV
and rights of United States citizenship protected by the fourteenth
amendment to indicate that the latter were very limited. He did not,
however, clearly develop this premise.23 7 Some speakers contended
that the amendment did not change the constitution.23" Farns-
worth, who had contended in the original debates on the fourteenth
234. Id. at 68-69 app.
235. Id. at 69 app.
236. Representative Farnsworth objected:
Thus then the question presents itself.., whether we shall obliterate State
lines and abolish State constitutions and State Legislatures, and centralize all
the power of these States of ours into one grand despotic central Government
at Washington, or, will we preserve the State Governments, wherein resides, as
I think, the chief protection of the rights of the citizen as well as the source of
the powers of the General Government.
CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., Ist Sess. at 117 app.
Representative Garfield spoke at length on the power of Congress under the four-
teenth amendment. He pointed to the rejection of Bingham's first proposal to demon-
strate that Congress was not given a general power to legislate where states had
previously been the source of legislation. He denied Shellabarger's construction of the
privileges and immunities clause, insisting that it gave power to Congress to act only in
the event of state violations. But Garfield did state that Congress had power to do jus-
tice where state laws were equal but "by a systematic maladministration of them, or a
neglect or refusal to enforce their provisions, a portion of the people are denied equal
protection . . . ." Id. at 149-54 app. Other Republicans aghast at the implications of
Shellabarger's rationale included Representatives Moore (id. at 112 app.), Hawley (id. at
382), and Willard (id. at 187 app.).
237. Id. at 47-48 app.
238. See id. at 86 app. (statement of Democrat Storm) and id. at 112 app. (statement of
Republican Moore).
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amendment that the equal protection clause was the only new provi-
sion, repeated that position, citing Representative Poland's remark
that the privileges and immunities clause essentially reiterated arti-
cle IV.2 39 Several speakers took the position that the clause in the
fourteenth amendment protected only against the same narrowly
defined forms of discrimination forbidden by article IV.
2 14
Even the specification that section two referred to acts in viola-
tion of the rights of a person "to which he is entitled under the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States" did not assuage the
opposition to the proposed statute, for many legislators saw it as an
assertion that the specified offenses were offenses against the Con-
stitution.2 4 ' In the face of these objections, the bill was redrafted to
specify that the criminal act was conspiracy "for the purpose, either
directly or indirectly, of depriving any person or any class of persons
of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immu-
nities under the laws."
242
Members of the House sought to make clear that the bill would
only reach the rights of citizens as defined by the states. 43 Never-
theless, some ambiguity remained in the amended bill. Radical
Republicans like Shellabarger could interpret it to apply to any in-
jury inflicted by two or more persons on the life, liberty, or property
239. Id. at 116 app.
240. Id.; see also id. at 48 app. (statement of Kerr); id. at 87 app. (statement of John
Storm of Pennsylvania); id. at 209 (statement ofJames Blair of Missouri); id. at 152 app.
(statement of Garfield).
241. See, e.g., id. at 114 app. (remarks of Farnsworth); id. at 188 app. (remarks of
Willard).
242. Id. at 477.
243. Representative Horatio Burchard of Illinois, supporting the amended bill, de-
nied that Washington's statements in Corfield of privileges and immunities were correct.
Those were the privileges of all men, not just of citizens. He noted that if Washington's
description applied to the privileges and immunities of United States citizenship. the
power to protect them "must have been conferred by the original Constitution. If the
General Government originally received no such power, this construction of the mean-
ing of those words must be erroneous, and no such power can be claimed' from their use
in the Ifourteenthl amendment." Id. at 314 app. Representative Poland also supported
Farnsworth's views (supra note 146) and voted for the bill, as amended:
The Constitution originally left to the State the administration of the local
law, both civil and criminal; all oflenses against person or property were to be
punished by the State authorities.
I do not agree that the fourteenth amendment or any amendment has
changed that, except to this extent; the last clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment provides that no State shall deny the equal protection of the laws to its
citizens.
Id. at 514.
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244of another individual for racial reasons, while others viewed it as
applying only to state acts, thereby simply protecting state officials
from pressure to deny equal treatment.245 In any event, the equal
protection clause, not the privileges and immunities clause, of the
fourteenth amendment was regarded as the constitutional source of
power for the statute.
The same issues of state sovereignty and federal power were
raised in the Senate. Senator Lyman Trumbull insisted that the
fourteenth amendment provision on "privileges and immunities"
did not change the Constitution. 246 "[T]his national Government
was not formed for the purpose of protecting the individual in his
rights of person and of property. "247 Senator Matthew Carpenter of
Wisconsin protested, "That is what I understand to be the very
change wrought by the fourteenth amendment. It is now put in that
aspect and does protect them." Trumbull rejoined, "Then it would
be an annihilation entirely of the States. Such is not the fourteenth
amendment. The States were, and are now, the depositaries of the
rights of the individual against encroachment." Carpenter inter-
vened, "And that Constitution forbids them to deny them, and au-
thorizes Congress to legislate so as to carry that prohibition into
execution." But Trumbull denied it:
If the Constitution had said that the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States embraced all the rights
of person and property belonging to an individual, then
244. Representative Shellabarger gave his understanding of the effect of these
changes:
The object of the amendment is, as interpreted by its friends who brought it
before the House, so far as I understand it, to confine the authority of this law
to the prevention of deprivations which shall attack the equality of rights of
American citizens; that any violation of the right, the animus and effect of which
is to strike down the citizen, to the end that he may not enjoy equality of rights
as contrasted with his and other citizens' rights, shall be within the scope of this
section.
Id. at 477 app.
245.
The bill thus amended will -
i. Afford further redress for violations under State authority of constitu-
tional rights.
2. Punish conspiracies to deny the equal protection of the laws through the
means and agencies by which such protection is afforded.
Id. at 315 app. (remarks of Rep. Burchard).
246. "The protection which the Government affords to American citizens under the
Constitution as it was originally formed is precisely the protection it affords to American
citizens . . . as it now exists. The fourteenth amendment has not extended the rights
and privileges of citizenship one iota." Id. at 576.
247. Id. at 577.
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the Senator would be right; but it says no such thing. In
my judgment, the fourteenth amendment has not changed
an iota of the Constitution, as it was originally framed, in
that respect.4
Trumbull then stated his view of the privileges and immunities
clause in terms that would be echoed by Justice Miller on the
Supreme Court within a few years:
I insist that the privileges and immunities belonging to the
citizen of the United States as such are of a national charac-
ter, and such as the nation is bound to protect, whether the
citizen be in foreign lands, or in any of the States of the
Union . . . . National citizenship is one thing, and State
citizenship another; and before this constitutional amend-
ment was adopted the same obligation, in my judgment,
rested upon the Government of the United States to pro-
tect citizens of the United States as now. 49
A number of other senators disputed Trumbull's reading of the
clause, insisting, like Carpenter, that it gave Congress the power to
protect all the fundamental rights of citizens. °
Confronted with these conflicting interpretations of the privi-
leges and immunities language, legislators relied instead on the
equal protection clause for enforcing power. The major evil Con-
gress hoped to remedy with the Enforcement Act of 1871 was state
inaction in the face of Ku Klux Klan outrages. Blacks were assaulted
and murdered, and their property was destroyed, while the state did
nothing to protect them. In this context, the prohibition against
state denial of equal protection of the laws offered a firmer basis for
federal legislation than did the privileges and immunities clause.
The focus was on state inaction, and the statute depended in large
measure on finding either such inaction or some interference with
the state's ability to act impartially before federal law was im-
posed.2 5' There was no need to define the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizenship, and the law did not invade the domain of
248. Id.
249. Id. )emocrats such as Bayard also supported this construction of the fourteenth
amendment (id. at 242 app.), but their opposition to that amendment meant that their
interpretation of it would be given little weight.
250. See, e.g., id. at 228 app. (remarks of Sen. Boreman); id. at 696-97 (remarks of Sen.
Edmunds).
251. See Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 13, 17 Stat. 12 (1871).
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municipal legislation except to assure that states fulfilled their obli-
gation to enforce equally their own laws protecting persons and
property.
The privileges and immunities clause was a more critical source
of potential federal power in connection with other legislation dur-
ing the Reconstruction era. Senator Charles Sumner made repeated
attempts to secure passage of a broad civil rights bill requiring
equality in inns, common carriers, theatres, schools, churches, and
cemeteries, proscribing racial discrimination in jury selection, and
striking the word "white" from all legislation. 52 The debates in
January of 1872 on Sumner's bill raised issues on the meaning of
the fourteenth amendment that faced the Supreme Court in cases it
heard that same month. Two questions were of particular impor-
tance: What rights were "privileges and immunities of citizenship"
under the new amendment; and, did the amendment give Congress
the authority to legislate affirmatively to ensure such rights?
Democratic Senator Allen Thurman of Ohio analyzed the con-
stitutional issues for the opposition. He argued that the equal pro-
tection clause did not apply to the subject matter of the bill. That
clause applied only to the laws protecting an individual's life, lib-
erty, or property."' Conceding that equal access to all places cre-
ated or regulated by law is a privilege of United States citizenship,
Thurman nevertheless objected to the proposed statute on the
grounds that it operated directly on individuals regardless of
whether state law provided a remedy for discrimination.54
252. His original proposal in 1870 was reported unfavorably by committee and in the
beginning of 1871 a renewed attempt was tabled. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., I st Sess. 21
(1871). Sumner tried again in December of 1871 to attach his bill as a rider to the
Amnesty Act. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 240-44 (1872).
253.
Whatever is created or regulated by law is a matter in which every citizen has
equal privileges..... The difference between privilege and protection is
clearly recognized in this 14thj amendment. It is privileges we are dealing
with now; it is not with protection. This is a bill to secure to everyone equal
privileges, not equal protection against injury or wrong or outrage or violence.
It is not to secure either life or liberty or property, because a man's life does
not depend on whether he can go into a theater or not; his liberty does not
depend on whether he can go into a theater or not; his property does not de-
pend on whether he can go into a theater or not . . ..
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 496 (1872).
254.
ITihis bill is only to secure privileges and immunities, and in respect to them
the constitution is plain that no State shall make or enforce any law to deprive
any citizen of them, and it is equally clear that you have no right to interfere
until the State has made or enforced such a law.
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Sumner and his supporters did not take issue with Thurman's
reading of equal protection, but Senator Oliver Morton of Indiana
replied to Thurman's reading of congressional power with respect
to privileges and immunities of United States citizenship:
If the things intended to be secured by this bill flow from
United States citizenship, if a man has them because he is a
citizen of the United States, from that fact and from that
principle of law, then it follows that the protection of those
privileges belongs to the Government of the United
States.,5
Thus, while Thurman insisted that federal power was limited to cor-
recting state denials, Morton contended that, if equality in privileges
afforded by the state was a right of United States citizenship, it could
be secured directly by federal legislation. In Morton's view, for ex-
ample, federal legislation could require state chartered businesses
to treat people equally. Thurman responded that if direct legisla-
tion on individuals was permitted under the privileges and immuni-
ties clause of the fourteenth amendment, Congress could supplant
all state laws:
What is that argument? It is that privileges, immunities,
life, liberty, property, and the protection of laws in the
United States are all taken in charge, and are under the
guarantee of the Constitution and the United States, and
that thus taken in charge and under its guarantee and pro-
tection, Congress has a right to legislate upon any subject
whatsoever, according to its own discretion, that relates to
the privileges, the immunities, the life, the property, or the
liberty of a citizen of the United States. . . . If this is the
case, then all local self-government is wiped out in this land
256
A few days later, Matthew Carpenter rose on the Senate floor to
give his views. Carpenter was respected as one of the leading con-
stitutional lawyers of his time. He proposed to amend Sumner's bill
in several particulars to avoid possible constitutional difficulties. -5 7
Id.
This of course was the holding of the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 1 (1883). with
respect to equal protection.
255. CON;. (;.oBF, 42 ('ong., 2d Sess. 524 (1877).
256. Id. at 527.
257. For example, he wanted to delete coverage of' churches for fear that requiring a
church to admit members of another race would interre with first amendnent guaran-
tees of religious freedom. Id. at 759-60. lie considered membership on a jury to involve
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He believed that the bill included some activities that were not privi-
leges and immunities of citizenship, 25' but his proposed amend-
ments still forbade race discrimination in any public inn, in any
place of public amusement for which a license from a legal authority
is required, and on any means of public carriage.
Carpenter disputed Thurman's view that the fourteenth amend-
ment did not give Congress authority to act directly on individual
denials of equal treatment in privileges or immunities. State denials
of such privileges, he argued, could theoretically be struck down on
appeal in federal courts. Therefore, in granting Congress the power
to enforce the amendment, the framers must have envisioned some
more affirmative power. In addition, he argued that the authority to
legislate affirmatively could be inferred from the distinction between
the language of the amendment and that of article IV. Assuming
that the privileges and immunities referred to were identical in both
provisions, Carpenter noted that article IV forbade only discrimina-
tion in favor of citizens of the state while the fourteenth amendment
secured privileges and immunities to every citizen. If, under the
amendment, no state can abridge the privileges and immunities of
any citizen of the United States, then the privileges of all citizens
must be the same. "[1I]f the State does not, by its legislation, put all
citizens upon a common footing, Congress may do so." '259 He ar-
gued that the privileges and immunities clause therefore struck
down racial barriers like Maryland's bar discrimination-"That
great amendment opened the bar to colored men. "260 If the object
of the amendment is equality before the law in privileges and immu-
nities,26' Congress is not confined to reiterating the constitutional
prohibition- but "must be considered as authorized to enforce, by
participation in the establishment and management of government and, like Representa-
tive Wilson in the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866, distinguished it from the
privileges and immunities of citizenship. He also considered facilities other than inns or
public carriers that did not receive a license from the state as beyond privileges and
immunities.
258. Id. Senator Lot Morrill of Maine went beyond Carpenter. He sought to avoid
the reach of the privileges and immunities clause to this bill by arguing that public ac-
commodations were not privileges of citizenship. He maintained that the privileges and
immunities of citizenship were limited to the rights stated in the Civil Rights Act of
1866-to contract, hold property, sue, etc-and did not extend "to the matters of edu-
cation, worship, amusement, recreation, entertainment, all of which enter so essentially
into the private life of the people, into the personal rights of the people, they belong
exclusively to the State, of which the Government of the United States has no right to
take cognizance." Id. at 5 app.
259. Id. at 762.
260. Id.
261. This reading of federal power resembles the judicial construction in U.S. v.
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affirmative legislation, the object intended to be secured by this
amendment." 26
2
Under Carpenter's interpretation of the fourteenth amend-
ment, equality in rights afforded by a state was not itself a privilege
or immunity of United States citizens, but a consequence of grant-
ing everyone the privileges and immunities of citizenship. To define
the rights themselves, Carpenter attempted to follow the model
used for interpretation of article IV in which privileges and immuni-
ties referred to natural law principles made concrete by existing
state law. Article IV did not require a state to treat its own citizens
equally; it simply required a state to treat citizens of other states
equally with citizens of the state. Carpenter reasoned that since the
fourteenth amendment made no distinction between citizens of dif-
ferent states, every citizen of the United States was entitled to
whatever privilege or immunity a state afforded to any of its citizens.
In other words, article IV was like a collective, most favored nation
clause in which one group (citizens of other states) were entitled to
whatever privileges a state gave to a particular defined group (its
own citizens). Similarly, the fourteenth amendment was like a most
favored nation clause for the individual. Whenever a state gave any
individual a right that was a concrete application of the general nat-
ural law principles underlying privileges and immunities, that state-
created right became a privilege of all citizens of the United
States.263
The "right" could be defined in a manner that would render it
inapplicable to most persons without affecting its status as a privi-
lege of citizenship. For example, the state could provide a specific
set of rules for enforcement of mining claims. That privilege would
be available to all, but only persons who owned the particular re-
source could take advantage of it. Similarly, a state could license
attorneys on a showing that they had specific training and legal
knowledge. Even if the practice of law is a privilege or immunity, it
could be conditioned in numerous ways. Only conditions that were
Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) regarding the power of Congress under the equal protection
clause to reach private interference with fourteenth amendment rights.
262. Id. Carpenter, like virtually all supporters of this public accommodations act,
assumed that inns, common carriers, and theatres were required by common law or
statute in every state to serve all citizens.
263. This analysis was sparked by a brief conversation with Professor William Nelson
of New York University, who is writing an historical study on the fourteenth amendment.
Interview with William Nelson, N.Y.U. Professor Nelson bears no responsibility for the
application made here in the text.
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unrelated to the legitimate interests of the state could be inappro-
priate elements of the definition of privilege. For Carpenter, race
was the quintessential irrelevant condition. Thus, Carpenter's
speech indicated that the privileges and immunities clause boiled
down to a prohibition on racial discrimination in laws implementing
fundamental rights.
Reliance on natural law fundamental rights reasoning derived
from article IV raised the specter of Justice Taney's view of that
clause in Dred Scott. Taney had reasoned that article IV secured fun-
damental rights to out-of-state citizens even if a state denied them to
its own citizens. As applied to the fourteenth amendment, that rea-
soning would result in congressional power to legislate to imple-
ment fundamental rights. The civil rights bill debated in 1872
seemed to be based on this view. The widespread statutory and
common law protection for access to public accommodations led
Carpenter and others to treat such access as a privilege of citizen-
ship regardless of the law in any particular state. In response to
such reasoning, Thurman contended that if Congress could assure
individuals their privileges and immunities by providing a federal
cause of action, Congress could supplant all local laws. Construed
broadly with reference to natural law, sections one and five of the
fourteenth amendment together would thus produce the same re-
sult as Bingham's original proposal for the fourteenth amend-
ment-a proposal which was rejected out of fear that it would allow
Congress to usurp state power.264
Congress did not pass the legislation on public accommoda-
tions in 1872, but the debates on federal legislative power during
that session had their effect on the Supreme Court's construction of
the Constitution. They revealed the potential scope of the four-
teenth amendment to restructure political authority and, in
Trumbell's arguments, outlined the contours of a restrictive
interpretation.
B. Arguments of Counsel in the First Cases Interpreting
the Fourteenth Amendment
During the same period in which Matthew Carpenter debated
the amendment's meaning on the floor of the Senate in his role as a
senator from Wisconsin, he argued two cases involving that amend-
ment before the Supreme Court as an attorney. -" 5 On January 11,
264. See supra pages 992-94.
265. It seems strange today that a legislator would argue before the Supreme Court
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1872, Carpenter appeared before the Court on behalf of the Cres-
cent City Livestock Corporation and the state of Louisiana to defend
the constitutionality of an ordinance that gave the corporation a mo-
nopoly on the ownership of a New Orleans slaughterhouse. Former
Supreme Court Justice John A. Campbell argued against Carpenter
in the Slaughterhouse Cases. Campbell acknowledged the power of the
state legislature to regulate occupations when the regulation ap-
plied generally, but he contended that monopolies were special
privileges and thus deprivations of the privilege and immunity of
pursuing an occupation on terms applicable to everyone.266
The defendants' briefs in The Slaughterhouse Cases insisted that
restrictions imposed for the public benefit on property ownership
and on the practice of an occupation did not abridge the privileges
and immunities of citizens; that the legislature rather than the Court
should determine the nature of such public benefits; and that the
only effect of the fourteenth amendment was to proscribe racial dis-
crimination in fundamental rights.26 Defendants' briefs stated that
a broad reading of the privileges and immunities clause would block
all exercises of the police power over the conduct of business.
Thomas Durant wrote a brief contending that
to extend the interpretation of the amendment to the
length which the plaintiffs in error demand would break
down the whole system of confederated State government,
centralize the beautiful and harmonious system we enjoy
into a consolidated and unlimited government, and render
the Constitution of the United States, now the object of our
love and veneration, as odious and insupportable as its en-
emies would wish to make it.2
Defendants insisted that although the fourteenth amendment's priv-
ileges and immunities clause included the privileges and immunities
protected by article IV, the amendment should be construed in light
of its history as "limited to the investiture of blacks with all the
during congressional sessions, but it was common practice throughout the nineteenth
century. Daniel Webster is perhaps the most familiar example of the legislator as
Supreme Court advocate. See generally THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER (vol. 1 1982, Vol.
11 1983, A. Konefsky & A. King eds.; vol. III forthcoming, A. King ed.).
266. 6 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 734-63.
267. Id. at 587-614, 717-32 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds.) (Brief for Defendant by
Charles Allen and Thomas Durant, and Brief for Defendant on Reargument by Thomas
Durant).
268. Id. at 732.
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rights and immunities of whites, whatever these may be, and to pro-
tect them in their lives, liberties and properties just as whites are
protected.12 69 "The closing portion of the first section of the four-
teenth amendment can have no meaning except as to persons of
African descent, for in no state were any citizens ever subjected to
any of the injuries, outrages and disabilities denounced by the
amendment. '
2 70
Carpenter's arguments for a "narrow" reading of the privileges
and immunities clause may be reconciled, with some difficulty, with
his senatorial position as an advocate of broad construction of the
same clause. His co-counsel's brief used the same language on the
need to interpret the clause narrowly in order to avoid centralized
government that his opponents invoked on the floor of the Senate.
In the Senate, Carpenter pressed for a generous reading of congres-
sional power under section five of the fourteenth amendment; how-
ever, he also argued that fundamental privileges could be
conditioned, so long as the condition was not imposed arbitrarily,
that is, on the basis of race. In the Court, Carpenter sought to re-
strict judicial power to employ section one of the amendment to in-
validate state and local laws by construing the clause to require only
racial equality in privileges granted. In both forums, then, he tied
construction of the amendment to its purpose in preventing racial
discrimination.
One week later, on January 18, 1872, Carpenter was back
before the Court to argue another case involving the fourteenth
amendment.27 ' Myra Bradwell had been denied admission to the
Illinois bar because of her gender. Carpenter was retained as her
counsel, and now he argued that the privileges and immunities
clause went beyond race to strike down gender barriers. He made
no mention of the equal protection clause, apparently because he
regarded it as applicable only to laws protecting the individual from
the infliction of injury to life, liberty, or property by other individu-
als.2 72 He relied solely on privileges and immunities:
269. Id.
270. Id. at 728.
271. C. FAIRMAN, supra note 4, at 1341, 1365 (1971). Carpenter argued Slaughterhouse
on January 11, 1872, and Bradwell on January 18. Slaughterhouse was reargued the follow-
ing term, but Bradwell was not.
272. The equal protection clause received very little attention in debates. The refer-
ence to "equality" certainly forbade racial discrimination, but the prohibition applied
only to the "protection of the laws." This did not mean that no law could discriminate,
for proponents had been clear that section one of the fourteenth amendment did not
apply to suffrage. Although Senator Howard said of the clause, "ITihis abolishes all
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[A] State Legislature could not, in enumerating the qualifi-
cations [for admission to the bar], require the candidate to
be a white citizen. I presume it will be admitted that such
an act would be void. The only provision in the Constitu-
tion of the United States which secures to colored male citi-
zens the privilege of admission to the bar, or the pursuit of
the other ordinary avocations of life is the provision that
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges and immunities of the citizens."...
Why may a colored citizen be admitted to the Bar? Be-
cause he is a citizen, and that is one of the avocations open
to every citizen, and no State can abridge his right to pur-
sue it. Certainly no other reason can be given.2 7 3
class legislation in the states and does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of
persons to a code not applicable to another," he qualified the statement immediately by
asserting it did not apply to voting. "The right of suffrage is not, in law, one of the
privileges and immunities thus secured by the Constitution. It is merely the creature of
law." 39 GLOBE, supra note 149, at 2766. This suggests that Howard understood the
"protection of the laws" to refer only to the "fundamental rights" secured by the privi-
leges and immunities clause. Under this reading, it would first be necessary to establish
that admission to the bar was a privilege or immunity of citizenship before a court could
find that gender restrictions violated the fourteenth amendment. See R. BERGER, Gov-
ERNMENT By JUDICIARY (1977); J. TENBROEK, supra note 56.
An alternative reading of equal protection would confine it to criminal penalties.
See Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as Political Compromise - Section One in the Joint Commit-
tee on Reconstruction, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 933 (1984). The law cannot punish an individual
(deprive her of life, liberty, or property) unless it applies to all persons who behave in
that fashion. Denial of admission to the bar is not a punishment. The refusal to permit
one person to appear in court on behalf of another does not deprive the former of life,
freedom of movement, or property. Even if punishment could be invoked, it would be
for unauthorized practice of law. A court would probably determine that such a criminal
penalty was equal to all despite the preliminary inequality of the gender bar to admis-
sion. Under this reading of the clause, Myra Bradwell would lose.
A third possible construction of "protection of the laws" is that it refers to the pro-
tection of the individual from harms caused by others - i.e., statutory and common law
protection from private individuals who interfered with another's life, liberty, or prop-
erty must protect blacks as well as whites. The equality is in the persons protected
rather than in the persons regulated. Myra Bradwell did not seek the protection of the
law, she sought to be protected from the law.
There are other possible interpretations of equal protection with a broader scope.
See, e.g., 2 W. CROSSKY, POLITICS AND TIlE CONSTITUTION, 1083-1118 (1953) (equal pro-
tection is the right to be equally protected from acts of the state or acts of private indi-
viduals, but equality is between persons and not applicable to lines drawn on the basis of
conduct). The words were given a larger significance in the congressional debates after
the Slaughterhouse Cases had destroyed the usefulness of "privileges and immunities" as a
protection against racial discrimination. The point is that Carpenter, seeking to win his
client's case, must have considered one of the narrower versions of the clause accurate.
Otherwise, he would have used the clause in his argument.
273. Bradwell v, Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (for argument of Carpenter,
see 21 LEd. 443 at 444).
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Although the briefs for his client in The Slaughterhouse Cases re-
stricted the clause to prohibiting racial discrimination, Carpenter
sought in Bradwell to extend its application to gender discrimination:
I maintain that the 14th Amendment opens to every citizen
of the United States, male or female, black or white, mar-
ried or single, the honorable professions as well as the ser-
vile employments of life; and that no citizen can be
excluded from any one of them. Intelligence, integrity and
honor are the only qualifications that can be prescribed as
conditions precedent to an entry upon any honorable pur-
suit or profitable avocation, and all the privileges and im-
munities which I vindicate to a colored citizen, I vindicate
to our mothers, our sisters and our daughters.
2 74
Matthew Carpenter was one of the leading lawyers of his time,
but even he must have had some problems presenting in the same
month the positions which he took in Bradwell, Slaughterhouse, and
the floor debates on civil rights legislation. If "intelligence, integ-
rity and honor are the only qualifications that can be prescribed as
conditions precedent to an entry upon any honorable pursuit or
profitable avocation," a monopoly on ownership of a slaughter-
house is hard to justify. The attempt in his co-counsel's brief in
Slaughterhouse to prevent the privileges and immunities clause of the
fourteenth amendment from destroying federalism by limiting it to
a nondiscrimination provision was undercut in Bradwell. If gender
as well as race was an impermissible basis for discrimination, then
any arbitrary classification might be subject to challenge in the
courts and to congressional legislation. Further, the invocation of
deference to legislative judgment used to limit the exercise of fed-
eral judicial power under the privileges and immunities clause in
Slaughterhouse could be used to expand federal legislative power
under that same clause. If the nondiscrimination principle arose
from a requirement that all citizens of the United States receive the
same privileges and immunities, Congress might have power to de-
termine their content.
C. The Slaughterhouse Cases Opinion
Although everyone who spoke in Congress during the framing
of the fourteenth amendment, as well as counsel on both sides in
274. 21 L.Ed. at 444. Carpenter devoted most of his argument to showing that wo-
men could properly be denied the ballot. This seems exceedingly strange until it is
recalled that he was the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee and presented its report
on the Right of Women to Vote. See CONG. Gi.oBE, 42d Cong.. 2d Sess. 582 (1872).
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The Slaughterhouse Cases, assumed that the privileges and immunities
of United States citizens protected in the fourteenth amendment en-
compassed the same fundamental rights secured from discrimina-
tion against nonresidents by the privileges and immunities clause of
article IV, the Court on its own rejected this construction.
Justice Miller noted that the fourteenth amendment specified
two types of citizenship-state and national.2 75 Article IV protected
the privileges and immunities of state citizenship while the four-
teenth amendment protected those of national citizenship. The
privileges of state citizenship, said Miller, were the fundamental
rights which all men have in a free society, while the privileges of
national citizenship are limited to those rights arising out of a citi-
zen's special relationship to the federal government.
The separate content of the two citizenships could have been
reconciled by finding fundamental rights in relation to government
that were components of both state and federal citizenship and not-
ing a few specific relationships that applied only to one or the
other. 76 The Court rejected this reading by arguing that the
profound consequences of assuming that the fourteenth amend-
ment forbids abridgment of fundamental rights by the states were
not intended by Congress or the ratifying states.
In effect, Miller, in his Slaughterhouse opinion for the Court, ac-
cepted both the slaughterhouse counsels' view that the amendment
was intended solely to overturn racially discriminatory laws, and the
view of the butchers' counsel that the privileges and immunities
clause was not limited to racial discrimination and required Con-
gress and the Court to exercise judgment on whether it has been
violated. There were two ways out of the dilemma this posed. One
had been suggested by Justice Bradley in his opinion below as a cir-
cuit court justice in The Slaughterhouse Cases:
It is possible that those who framed the article were not
themselves aware of the far reaching character of its terms.
They may have had in mind but one particular phase of
social and political wrong which they desired to redress.
Yet, if the amendment, as framed and expressed, does in
fact bear a broader meaning, and does extend its protect-
ing shield over those who were never thought of when it
was conceived and put in form, and does reach social evils
275. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73-74 (1873).
276. For example, rights of interstate travel and protection in foreign relations are
solely federal matters, while rights to publicly owned resources relate to state
citizenship.
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which were never before prohibited by constitutional en-
actment, it is to be presumed that the American people, in
giving it their imprimatur, understood what they were do-
ing, and meant to decree what has in fact been decreed.277
In other words, although Congress, in proposing the fourteenth
amendment, did not anticipate transferring power over the privi-
leges of citizenship from state to federal hands, the language it
adopted produced this result.
Miller took another route, reversing Bradley's presumption:
The argument, we admit, is not always the most conclusive
which is drawn from the consequences urged against the
adoption of a particular construction of an instrument. But
when, as in the case before us, these consequences are so
serious, so far reaching and pervading, so great a departure
from the structure and spirit of our institutions; where the
effect is to fetter and degrade the State governments by
subjecting them to the control of Congress, in the exercise
of powers heretofore universally conceded to them of the
most ordinary and fundamental character; when in fact it
radically changes the whole theory of the relations of state
and Federal governments to each other and of both these
governments to the people; the argument has a force that
is irresistible, in the absence of language which expresses
such a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt.2 78
Miller concluded that the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States could be confined to those "which owe their exist-
ence to the Federal government, its national character, its Constitu-
tion, or its laws. ' ' 7 ' But the supremacy clause already prohibited
states from depriving persons of those rights. In other words, the
privileges and immunities clause did not alter the existing law. State
regulations of property rights and business activities were not cov-
ered by the clause, and therefore it did not apply to the New
Orleans monopoly. This construction of the privileges and immuni-
ties clause was not original. Senator Trumbull, debating with Sena-
tor Carpenter over the Ku Klux Klan Act in April of 1871, had set
forth the same proposition. 2 " The construction was linguistically
possible, and it preserved the original relationship between the
277. Livestock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City L.ive-Stock Landing &
Slaughterhouse Co., 15 F.Cas. 649, 652 (1). La. 1870) (No. 8408).
278. 83 U.S. at 78.
279. Id. at 79.
280. CONG. GLOBE,. 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 577 (1871).
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states and the federal government unless a state violated due pro-
cess or equal protection. Miller went on to find that the Louisiana
statute did not violate either clause.
The majority opinion in The Slaughterhouse Cases in effect de-
stroyed the "privileges and immunities" clause as a significant
source of protection to the rights of blacks. It left them only the
more limited safeguards of due process and equal protection. Mrs.
Bradwell lost her suit in an opinion delivered the same day because
her argument was based solely on privileges and immunities. Ad-
mission to the bar was not a privilege or immunity of citizens of the
United States, but only a privilege of state citizenship.' The effect
of this limit was quickly recognized.
D. Reaction to the Opinion: Passage of the Public Accommodations Act
After the decision in The Slaughterhouse Cases, the public accom-
modations bill again came before Congress for consideration. Rep-
resentative James Beck of Kentucky, an opponent of the bill in the
House, seized on Slaughterhouse to demonstrate that the bill did not
deal with rights protected by the fourteenth amendment.2" In re-
sponse, for the first time, a few congressmen switched their ground
of authority for the proposed statute from the privileges and immu-
nities clause to the equal protection clause. Robert B. Elliott, a
black congressman from South Carolina, was the first to contend
that a denial of a "privilege" was a denial of equal protection.2 "
Representative William Lawrence elaborated. "Protection," he
said, "must not be understood in any restricted sense, but must in-
clude every benefit derived from laws."1284 Most participants in the
debate, however, continued to speak of of the bill with little preci-
sion as to its specific constitutional basis.
The Senate considered the bill in the spring of 1874.215 In a
blunderbuss approach, Senator Frederick Frelinghuysen of New
Jersey cited all the Civil War Amendments-thirteenth through fif-
teenth-as sources of power for the bill. He used language from
Slaughterhouse to argue that equal protection was a privilege of
281. The Slaughterhouse dissenters, with the exception of Chief Justice Chase, con-
curred in Bradwel, joining in Justice Bradley's well-known opinion on the proper place
of women.
282. CONG. REc., 43d Cong., Ist Sess. 342 (1873).
283. Id. at 404.
284. Id. at 412.
285. The bill's original supporter, Sen. Charles Sumner, had meanwhile died.
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United States citizenship. 286 Senator Oliver Morton of Indiana
agreed with the position of Elliott and Lawrence that equal protec-
tion meant equal benefit of the laws, but he pressed the bill as a
vindication of the rights of citizens. 2s7 Opponents continued to per-
ceive the basic argument of the bill's supporters as resting on privi-
leges and immunities.288 Carpenter explained that he could not
support the bill because the jury provision was beyond congres-
sional power. 28 9 But despite these arguments and uncertainties, the
bill passed the Senate.
In the House, supporters still clung to the bill as a means of
vindicating the rights of black citizens.290 Raging arguments over
integrated schools and miscegenation resulted in deletion of the ref-
erence to schools.29 l Since the Senate and House versions con-
flicted, the Senate had to consider the issue once more. This time
Senator Carpenter delivered a lengthy speech anticipating the
Supreme Court invalidation of the statute. He stated that Congress
had some power under the commerce clause, but that the bill was
not adapted to the reach of that power. Holding to his original view
of equal protection, he said, "It is manifest that [the equal protec-
tion clause] . . .has no application to this subject, especially to the
jury clause of this bill. 2 ' 2 Despite his position in earlier debates
and his argument in Bradwell and Slaughterhouse, Carpenter now ac-
cepted as controlling the Court's narrow reading of the privileges
and immunities clause. He conceded that the clause did not apply
to public accommodations or jury service. Thus, Carpenter argued
that the principles from Slaughterhouse left Congress without power
to enact the bill.
The Senate passed the bill over Carpenter's objections.
Throughout the debate, different supporters at one time or another
effectively canvassed every possible constitutional basis of power.
Sumner had started with the thirteenth amendment;293 others re-
ferred to inherent rights of citizens, to equality, to specific protec-
tions of citizenship and the privileges and immunities of citizenship,
286. CONG. REC., 43d Cong., Ist Sess. 3454 (1873).
287. Id. at 358-60 app.
288. Id. at 4156 (remarks of Sen. Cooper); id. at 4163 (remarks of Sen. Kelly), id. at
361-62 app. (remarks of Sen. Hamilton).
289. Id. at 4166.
290. CONG. REc., 43d Cong., 2d Sess. 945 (1875) (remarks of Rep. Lynch); id. at 939
(remarks of Rep. Butler).
291. Id. at 1010 (reading of deletions and reissued bill).
292. CONG. REC., 43d Cong., 2d Sess. 1861 (1875).
293. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 728 (1872).
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and finally, after Slaughterhouse, to the equal protection clause. 294
Supporters clearly believed that racial discrimination in public ac-
commodations violated the civil rights of a citizen and that such an
outrage should be outlawed. But the constitutional arguments were
weak. Equal protection offered a way to overcome the holding in
The Slaughterhouse Cases, but only a few Republicans seized upon it.
The problem of state action plagued any attempt to rely on that
clause to support the new bill. Most congressmen continued to talk
vaguely of equality as a right of citizens, even as they realized that
the decision in Slaughterhouse was an almost direct response to the
earlier debates that had raised that notion.
E. Further Cases on the Theme
The next group of significant Supreme Court decisions on the
fourteenth amendment continued the themes of The Slaughterhouse
Cases. While dicta hinted at a special concern for racial discrimina-
tion, the Court read the amendment's privileges and immunities
clause narrowly to avoid expansion of federal power. Two decisions
in 1876 dealt with the federal legislation adopted to cope with Klan
activities. In United States v. Reese,295 municipal election inspectors in
Kentucky were indicted for refusing to receive the vote of a Negro.
The indictment was under the 1870 federal statute that punished
persons who wrongfully prevented an individual from voting.2 96
The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it pun-
ished any wrongful interference with voting and was not limited to
interference on racial grounds. Although Congress could constitu-
tionally have reached the factual situation presented by the case, the
statute as drafted was so broad as to be beyond congressional au-
thority. Justice Hunt dissented. He agreed with the majority on
constitutional doctrine, but argued that the statute should be read
to apply only to cases of racial discrimination.-
In United States v. Cruikshank,"2'1 a unanimous Cour' discharged
defendants who had been indicted under section 6 of the 1870 stat-
ute on numerous counts of conspiring to deprive citizens of rights
294. See supra text accompanying notes 283-87.
295. 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 214 (1876).
296. Voting Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
297. 92 U.S. at 238-56. Section 2 of the Act specified the duty of state officials to give
persons the equal opportunity to perform the prerequisites of voting without regard to
race. Hunt contended that the phrase "as aforesaid" in sections 3 and 4 of the Act
referred to the racial discrimination element of section 2, but the majority disagreed
with Hunt's statutory interpretation.
298. 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 542 (1876). Justice Clifford concurred in a separate opinion.
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or privileges secured under the Constitution or laws of the United
States. The Court dismissed counts charging conspiracy to interfere
with the citizens' rights to peaceably assemble, to bear arms for law-
ful purposes, and not to be deprived of life and liberty without due
process. Chief Justice Waite stated that the freedom of assembly
guaranteed by the first amendment and the right to bear arms in the
second amendment did not apply to the states. In other words, the
fourteenth amendment did not incorporate the first eight amend-
ments of the Constitution and apply them to the states.299 Further,
violation of these rights by private citizens was purely a matter of
state law and not a matter of federal concern. 30 0 The Cruikshank de-
cision reinforced the limited reading of the privileges and immuni-
ties clause of Slaughterhouse, made clear that the clause did not
299. See Palmer, The Parameters of Constitutional Reconstruction: Slaughterhouse, Cruikshank,
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 739. Palmer argues that Miller's opin-
ion in Slaughterhouse favored interpreting the privileges and immunities clause as incor-
porating the Bill of Rights, and points to Cruikshank as a repudiation of Miller's
reasoning. He notes that Miller had stated, "The right to peaceably assemble and peti-
tion for redress of grievances, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, are rights of the
citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution." 83 U.S. at 79. But Miller's listing of
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States included matters relevant
to the federal government alone, e.g., "to demand the care and protection of the Fed-
eral government over his life, liberty and property when on the high seas or within the
jurisdiction of a foreign government." Id. There can be no inference that the prohibi-
tion of the fourteenth amendment against a state denying the privileges and immunities
of citizenship meant that states now must also afford such care and protection to citizens
abroad. That right surely remained only one against the federal government. Similarly,
the rights of assembly and habeas corpus that applied against the federal government
may simply have been mentioned as examples of privileges of citizenship without alter-
ing their character from restrictions of federal power to restrictions of state power. This
reading of Miller's opinion is supported by the comment ofJustice Field in dissent that
[ilf this inhibition Ithe privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment] has no reference to privileges and immunities of this character
[fundamental rights), but only refers, as held by the majority of the court in their
opinion, to such privileges and immunities as were before its adoption specifi-
cally designated in the Constitution or necessarily implied as belonging to citi-
zens of the United States, it was a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing
Id. at 96 (emphasis supplied). Further, Miller joined in Cruikshank. The silence of the
Slaughterhouse dissenters, Justices Field, Bradley, and Swayne, on this issue suggests that
they felt themselves bound by Slaughterhouse and Bradwell. If they had relied solely on
vagueness grounds, they presumably would have joined Justice Clifford's concurrence.
300. Several other counts were dismissed for failure to state that the deprivation of
the specific right, such as voting, was based on race, although each of these counts noted
that the victims were in fact "persons of color." Four counts did specifically say that the
deprivations were "for the reason that they . . . were . . .not white citizens," but the
Court found those particular counts failed to specify the rights violated and were thus
impermissibly vague.
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incorporate any of the Bill of Rights against the states, and sug-
gested a willingness on the part of the Court to strain to avoid appli-
cation of the enforcement acts.
The opinion of the Court in these two cases left open the possi-
bility that Congress could proscribe racial discrimination by state
officials and possibly prohibit some conspiracies by private persons
to prevent assertion of rights because of race. Yet the tenor of the
opinions, narrowly construing both the statute and indictments
under it, bespoke an unwillingness to support the rights of blacks at
the expense of state sovereignty. It was apparent that the Court was
treading very carefully with respect to the power of Congress under
the new amendments.
VI. JUDICIAL REACTION TO THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES: CULLYI V.
BALTIMORE & OHIo RAILROAD AND IN RE TAYLOR
"[T]he 14th Amendment has no application. ,so'
Lower courts, taking their cue from the Slaughterhouse decision,
tended to take a restrictive view of the changes wrought by the four-
teenth amendment. 30 2 Some courts held that the Civil Rights Act of
1875 permitted separate but equal treatment in public accommoda-
tions3°3 while others held the Act itself unconstitutional. 3 4  The
privileges and immunities clause had been the centerpiece of sec-
tion one of the fourteenth amendment. When the Court rendered it
ineffective, there was no rush to replace it. Maryland provided an
illustration of this reaction.
301. In re Taylor, 48 Md. 28, 33 (1877).
302. See Lurie, The Fourteenth Amendment: Use and Application in Selected State Court Civil
Liberties Cases, 1870-1890-A Preliminary Assessment, 28 AM.J. L. HIsT. 295 (1984). Lurie's
study of state court cases involving religion and public school education and racial dis-
crmination in the North, Midwest, and Far West indicates that both advocates and state
courts did not consider the amendment to have incorporated the establishment clause,
nor was it used as a legal weapon against racial discrimination. "More frequently, law-
yers cited the amendment in support of their claim for segregation, and most frequently
the judges ignored the new enactment altogether." Id. at 312 (emphasis added).
303. Charge to the Grand Jury-The Civil Rights Act, 30 F. Cas. 999, 1000
(C.C.W.D.N.C. 1875) (No. 18,258) ("From the preamble and all the provisions of the
[amendment], it is obvious that the civil rights bill neither directly nor indirectly confers,
nor was intended to confer, any rights or privileges of social equality among men."). See
generally Riegel, The Persistent Career of Jim Crow: Lower Federal Courts and the 'Separate but
Equal' Doctrine, 1865-1896, 28 AM. J. L. HIST. 17 (1984) (a study indicating that lower
federal courts, from Reconstruction onward, were consistent in decreeing "Jim Crow"
segregation to be constitutional and consistent with the laws of the land).
304. Charge to the Grand Jury-The Civil Rights Act, 30 F. Cas. 1005 (C.C.W.D.
Tenn. 1875) (No. 18,260). See also Riegel, supra note 303, at 33 n. 70.
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Late in 1876 the issue of the constitutionality of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 came before a federal district court in Maryland. The
judge considering the Act, Judge William Fell Giles, was a respected
Republican who could be expected to be sympathetic to the Act
based on his earlier civil rights decisions. He had twice previously
ruled in favor of black plaintiffs from out of state who challenged
discriminatory actions of the Baltimore City Passenger Railroad
Company. In the first case, Thompson v. Baltimore City Passenger Rail-
way, 30 5 the railway company had required blacks to stand on an un-
covered platform outside the covered portion of the railway car.
Judge Giles held that a black citizen of New York could maintain an
action for refusal to allow him to be seated inside the car. The city
passenger railway then established separate cars-limiting blacks to
those cars marked as permitting colored passengers. In the second
case, Field v. Baltimore City Passenger Railway,"' Giles held that a black
citizen of Virginia could recover for denial of the right to ride in an
unmarked car when white passengers were allowed to ride in the
marked car. In both cases, the nonresidents sued under diversity
jurisdiction for breach of the duty of a common carrier to accept all
passengers, subject to reasonable regulations. In federal courts
under diversity jurisdiction, the right of an individual not to be dis-
criminated against by a common carrier was a matter of federal com-
mon law if no state statute governed the matter. "1 7 Giles concluded
305. 23 F.Cas. 1023 (D.C. Md. 1870) (No. 13,941). The text of the case is not re-
ported, but judge Giles discusses his holding in that case in Cull, v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
6 F.Cas. 946, 947 (D.C. Md. 1876) (No. 3,466). See infra text accompanying notes 8 and
9. Giles delivered his opinion sustaining the cause of action without even hearing argu-
ment from Anderson Thompson's counsel, Archibald Stirling, because "his convictions
were very clear." Giles' opinion holding the discrimination to be a violation of the rail-
road's duty as a common carrier was quoted in the Baltimore Am. & Commercial Adver-
tiser, Apr. 30, 1870, at 2, col. 6. Counsel agreed on damages of $10. Stirling noting that
the suit was brought to determine the law and not to make money. Id.; see also Baltimore
Sun, Apr. 30, 1870, at 1, col. 6.
306. 9 F.Cas. II (D.C. Md. 1871) (No. 4763). The text of this case is not reported,
but Judge Giles discusses his holding in the case in Cully v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 6 F.
Cas. at 947. See Baltimore Sun, Nov. 10, at p. 4, col. 2, & Nov. 14, at p. 4, col. 4, 1871;
Baltimore Am. & Commercial Advertiser, Nov. 13, 1871, at p. 4, col. 2. Giles sat with
Judge Hugh Bond in this case, and the rulings werejoint. Brackett said that the decision
resulted in the integration of municipal transit. See J. BRACKErIr, NOTES ON THE PRO-
GRESS OF THE COI.OREID PEOPLE OF MARYLAND SINCE IIE WAR 64 (1890); see also W. PAtUL,
THE SHADOW OF EQUALIrv: THlE NEGRO IN BAI:nMORE 1864-1911, at 101-02 (1972) (un-
published Ph.D. thesis).
307. In Cully, 6 F.Cas. at 946, 947,judge Giles describes his holding in the two earlier
cases, but with a somewhat faulty memory live years later. He thought Thompson was
from Virginia and Field from New Jersey.
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that federal common law required equal treatment (although sepa-
rate accommodations might be permitted if truly equal).
These two decisions expanded the rights of black citizens and
resulted in the integration of local transport in Baltimore. But when
faced with a case in which no diversity existed, Giles had to look at
the power of the federal government to forbid discrimination by
common carriers. He was forced to follow the clear line of cases
that precluded use of the privileges and immunities clause to force a
state to redefine a state-granted right or privilege to include blacks.
In doing so, he found the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to be
unconstitutional.
In Cully v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad,3 °8 Maryland plaintiffs sued
a Maryland railroad for forcing them to ride in separate and inferior
accommodations. Giles distinguished the earlier cases because no
federal common law issue was presented in a suit in which there was
no diversity of citizenship. He then cited Slaughterhouse, Reese, and
Cruikshank for the proposition that travel rights on the railroad were
a privilege of state citizenship rather than a privilege of citizens of
the United States:
The act of Congress of March 1, 1875, under which this
action is brought, so far as it seeks to inflict penalties for
the violation of any or all rights which belong to citizens of
a state, and not to citizens of the United States as such, was
the exercise of a power not authorized by any provision of
the constitution of the United States, and as the privilege to
use for local travel any public conveyance is not a right aris-
ing under the constitution of the United States, there can
be no recovery .... "'
Although Maryland had been a slave state, both Archibald Stir-
ling, Jr., the U.S. Attorney involved in Fields and Cully, and Judge
Giles were fervent Republicans. The Fields and Thompson cases
showed their eagerness to void discrimination in common carriers,
yet neither Stirling in his argument in Cully, nor Giles in his decision
invoked the equal protection clause to support the Civil Rights Act
of 1875. Like Matt Carpenter in the Senate, they understood the
privileges and immunities clause to lie at the core of the fourteenth
amendment. With its demise in Slaughterhouse, they believed that
federal power was limited to securing racial equality in voting
308. Id. at 946.
309. Id. at 948.
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(under the fifteenth amendment), and in laws protecting life, liberty,
and property (under the equal protection clause).
Following these civil rights cases came another attempt to use
the fourteenth amendment to advance black rights. The case arose
in state court when a black attorney from Massachusetts, Charles S.
Taylor, sought to practice law in Maryland. 3 ° Although Matt Car-
penter had assumed in his arguments before both the Court and the
Senate that the fourteenth amendment prohibited states from deny-
ing admission to the bar on racial grounds, the Slaughterhouse,
Bradwell, Cruikshank and Cully decisions raised substantial doubts.
Taylor was determined to test the issue. He moved to Maryland,
where he was admitted without difficulty to the federal bar on mo-
tion of Archibald Stirling, Jr.3 11 Federal litigation, however, pro-
vided scant sustenance for an attorney in 1877. Taylor therefore
petitioned for admission to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Taylor argued that admission to the bar was a privilege of state
citizenship under article IV and that it was "one of that class of privi-
leges that a State legislature [could not] abridge on account of race
or color." 3 12 He cited The Slaughterhouse Cases for the proposition
that "[w]hile [the fourteenth amendment] confers no new privilege
upon the citizen generally, it prohibits the State from enforcing any
law that discriminates against the negro (race) as a class." 3 1 3 This
argument apparently referred to Justice Miller's discussion in The
Slaughterhouse Cases of the equal protection clause:
The existence of laws in the States where the newly emanci-
pated negroes resided, which discriminated with gross in-
justice and hardship against them as a class, was the evil to
be remedied by this clause, and by it such laws are
forbidden ...
. . . We doubt very much whether any action of a state not
directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a
class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come
within the purview of this provision.:"
The problem with Taylor's use of this discussion of equal protection
310. In re Taylor, 48 Md. 28 (1877).
311. A. KOGER. TIHE NEGRO LAWYER IN MARYIAND 2-3 (1948). Although Koger said
that Taylor was the first Negro lawyer to be accepted by a court within the confines of
Maryland, id. at 3, Walter Leonard found that the honor went to James Harris Wolff,
who was admitted to practice in the U.S. circuit court in Maryland soon after his gradua-
tion from Harvard Law School in 1875. W. I.EONARD, BI.ACK LAWYERS 293 (1977).
312. 48 Md. at 29.
313. Id.
314. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1875).
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to support his admission to the bar was that Justice Miller did not
define the scope of the clause, and the Supreme Court had not yet
expanded the definition of equal protection beyond protection of
life, liberty, and property to reach "privileges" under state law. It
was clear that laws affecting life, liberty, and property "discrimi-
nated with gross injustice and hardship" and that a state could be
barred, as it was by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, from discrimination
in enforcement of contract and property rights. But whether the
clause went further, to reach discrimination in other matters, had
not been specifically addressed. Taylor, of course, asserted that "the
privileges and immunities which belong to a citizen of a State as
such, cannot be abridged on account of race or color," ' 5 but the
cases cited did not support this proposition. Although Taylor as-
serted his right to equal treatment, his argument repeatedly stressed
that admission to the bar was a privilege of citizenship. His argu-
ment was never specifically anchored in the equal protection clause.
The Maryland Court of Appeals denied Taylor's petition. The
court noted that article IV did not apply because Taylor was now a
resident of Maryland. Citing Slaughterhouse, the court noted that the
privileges of state as opposed to national citizenship "rest for their
security and protection where they have heretofore rested; for they
are not embraced by this paragraph [the privileges and immunities
clause] of the Amendment. "316 Citing Bradwell, the court said that
admission to the bar was a privilege of state and not national citizen-
ship. "In our opinion these decisions are conclusive of the present
case. They determine that the 14th Amendment has no
application. 3 17
Like the federal district court in Cully, the Maryand Court of
Appeals in Taylor did not even discuss the application of the equal
protection clause. Like Matt Carpenter, the court assumed that
equality in privileges under law was covered only by the privileges
and immunities clause and was distinguishable from equal protec-
tion of the law. Thus The Slaughterhouse Cases had destroyed the basis
for challenge to discrimination in laws that did not involve personal
security, movement, or property. Barred from the practice of law by
the court's decision upholding the statutory racial exclusion, Taylor
soon returned to Massachusetts.3t81
315. 48 Md. at 29, citing, inter alia, Corfield and the privileges and immunities clause of
article IV.
316. 48 Md. at 32.
317. Id. at 33.
318. A. KOGER, supra note 311, at 3.
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VII. THE BROADENING OF EQUAL PROTECTION: STRAUDER V. WEST
VIRGINIA, AND IN RE WILSON
"the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them
distinctively as colored" ' 19
Defeat in the courts apparently left citizens who desired the
elimination of racial barriers to the practice of law no option but to
pursue their goal through the legislative process. Although blacks
constituted the voting core of the state's Republican Party, the
Republicans were unable to secure political power. Thus, an at-
tempt in 1878 to eliminate the racial criteria for bar membership
failed in the state legislature3 20 Maryland never did ratify the fif-
teenth amendment, and an inveterate prejudice against black partic-
ipation in government processes was reflected in the state's
continued exclusion of blacks from juries and from the legal
profession.
While legislative efforts at the state level foundered, evolution
in federal case law made a favorable judicial decision more likely. In
1880, a Supreme Court decision opened a new path for black partic-
ipation in the legal system. The earlier cases under the fourteenth
amendment had focused on preserving federalism, leaving responsi-
bility with the states for protecting individuals' basic rights. The
lower courts had reacted to the gutting of the privileges and immu-
nities clause by assuming that it substantially destroyed the amend-
ment's impact in prohibiting racial discrimination. The Supreme
Court, however, never intended to nullify the Civil War Amend-
ments. The majority of the Justices on the Supreme Court were
Republicans appointed by Lincoln or Grant. In their earlier opin-
ions they consistently noted that the purpose of the fourteenth
amendment was to assure civil equality for blacks. Further, those
who had been dissenters in Slaughterhouse continued to believe that
the amendment should apply to a broad area of government behav-
ior, even though the decision had foreclosed any significant use of
the privileges and immunities clause.
The equal protection clause provided common ground to rec-
oncile these views without disturbing the limits imposed on the priv-
ileges and immunities clause. The occasion for decision was
presented in Strauder v. West Virginia,"2' in which the Court held that
a statute excluding nonwhites from juries "amounts to a denial of
319. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).
320. M. CALLCOTr, THE NEGRO IN MARYLAND POLITICS 1870-1912, at 63 (1969).
321. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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the equal protection of the laws to a colored man when he is put on
trial for an alleged offense against the state."3 ' Dissenting Justices
Field and Clifford (the only Democrats on the Court) protested that
the equality of protection intended by the fourteenth amendment
"does not require that all persons shall be permitted to participate
in the government of the State and the administration of its laws, to
hold its offices, or to be clothed with any public trusts. '32 3 They
could also have noted the careful exclusion of the right to sit on
juries during the debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1866.324
The majority responded that the purpose of the entire amend-
ment was to require that all persons stand equal before the law, and
"in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment
was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against
them by law because of their color."13 5 Justice Strong, writing for
the majority, asserted that the amendment contained a necessary
implication of "the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation
against them distinctively as colored-exemption from legal dis-
criminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the se-
curity of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and
discriminations which are steps toward reducing them to the condi-
tion of a subject race. ' ' 3 "6 This liberal understanding of the mean-
ing of "protection" of the laws reopened the courts as an avenue to
challenge the racial bar to legal practice. Nevertheless, Strong's
sweeping language in the opinion was dicta. The issue before him
dealt with the right to equal protection within the context of a crimi-
nal trial, and therefore clearly involved rights of life and liberty.
Strong's opinion also contained narrower language:
[The fourteenth amendment's] language is prohibitory; but
every prohibition implies the existence of rights and immu-
nities, prominent among which is an immunity from ine-
quality of legal protection, either for life, liberty, or property.
Any state action that denies this immunity to a colored man
3127is in conflict with the Constitution.
322. Id. at 310.
323. Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 367 (1879) (Justices Field and Clifford dissenting
in an opinion also applicable to Strauder. See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 312).
324. See supra notes 169-93 and accompanying text.
325. 100 U.S. at 307. In these cases, which involved total exclusion of blacks from the
jury, no question of whether segregation would constitute discrimination was presented.
326. Id. at 308.
327. Id. at 310 (emphasis supplied). When the issue of black jurors was raised during
debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866, congressmen focused on the right of a black
person to be a juror. A majority perceived participation in making law, like voting, to be
a political right not part of the basic privileges of citizenship. Strauder changed the focus
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The Court in Strauder did not intimate that the federal govern-
ment could now define citizens' rights for the states through affirma-
tive federal legislation; it merely used the fourteenth amendment as
authority for judicial prohibition of discriminatory state laws. This
distinction was made clear in 1883 by The Civil Rights Cases.32' There
the Supreme Court narrowly construed congressional power under
the fourteenth amendment despite the involvement of black rights.
The Court held section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitu-
tional, as District Judge Giles had done in Cully seven years earlier.
Unlike Giles' opinion, however, the Supreme Court's opinion was
based on the doctrine of state action, hinting that federal laws that
were directed at racial discrimination by the state, in contrast to fed-
eral laws that supplanted state laws, would be upheld. 29
In Maryland, The Civil Rights Cases had little practical impact be-
cause the statute in question had been unenforceable there since
Cully, but the cases did raise questions on how far the Court would
go in protecting blacks against discrimination. The state action doc-
trine of The Civil Rights Cases still kept the federal government from
direct legislation against individuals, continuing the trend from
Slaughterhouse and Cruikshank. On the other hand, Justice Bradley's
majority opinion said that the fourteenth amendment would be vio-
lated by any state legislation
to the right of a criminal defendant to a jury free from bias in its composition. The
change in perspective made clear how the individual's liberty was affected unequally.
Indeed, it is strange that Field did not agree with the majority, for in Ho Ah Kow v.
Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6,546), on circuit he had seen that an
ordinance requiring prisoners to have their hair cut to a uniform length of one inch was
a violation of equal protection as applied to Chinese, for whom the wearing of a queue
(a long single braid of hair) was important. Field insisted in his Ex parte Virginia dissent
on the distinction between civil rights protected by the fourteenth amendment and polit-
ical rights "such as arise from the form of government and its administration" which he
said were not protected. 100 U.S. at 368-69.
328. 109 U.S. 1 (1883).
329.
[I]n all those cases where the Constitution seeks to protect the rights of the
citizen against discriminative and unjust laws of the State by prohibiting such
laws, it is not individual offences, but abrogation and denial of rights, which it
denounces, and for which it clothes Congress with power to provide a remedy.
This abrogation and denial of rights, for which the States alone were or could
be responsible, was the great seminal and fundamental wrong which was in-
tended to be remedied. And the remedy to be provided must necessarily be
predicated upon that wrong. It must assume that in the cases provided for, the
evil or wrong actually committed rests upon some State law or State authority
for its excuse and perpetration.
Id. at 17-18.
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denying to any person, or class of persons, the right to pur-
sue any peaceful avocations allowed to others ... The
Fourteenth Amendment extends its protection to races and
classes, and prohibits any state legislation which has the ef-
fect of denying to any race or class, or to any individual, the
equal protection of the laws.330
The impetus added by Strauder to the political struggle for re-
peal of the racial exclusion from bar admission was not deflected by
The Civil Rights Cases. In editorials in February and March of 1884
commenting on the most recent legislative attempt to repeal the ex-
clusion, even the Democratic Baltimore Sun stated that the racial ex-
clusion was wrong. 3"' The bill to permit black lawyers in state
courts passed the Maryland Senate but failed in the General
Assembly. 3 2
The failure of these legislative efforts sent pressure for reform
back to the judicial system. The leader in this effort was Reverend
Harvey Johnson, the pastor of the Union Baptist Church. Despite
Taylor and the invalidation of the 1875 Civil Rights Act by both the
Maryland federal court and the United States Supreme Court, 3
Reverend Johnson believed that the law could be a vehicle to
achieve racial justice.
Johnson's first attempt to use the courts to achieve racial equal-
ity arose from an incident that occurred in his pastoral role. When
four women church members were compelled to move to second
class accommodations on a boat during a church outing, Johnson
arranged for them to bring suit and obtained Archibald Stirling, Jr.,
and Alexander Hobbs as their attorneys. In 1885, District Judge
Morris in The Steamer Sue 33 5 followed the earlier opinions of Judge
Giles in Field and Thompson. He held that although the steamer Sue
could provide separate accommodations for the races, it had no
330. Id. at 23-24. Bradley was thus able to shift from his privileges and immunities
argument in Slaughterhouse to the equal protection clause to deal with the same concern
of restrictions on employment.
331. Baltimore Sun, Feb. 7, 1884, at 2, col. I, and Mar. 12, 1884, at 2. col. 4.
332. J. BRACKE'Tr, supra note 306, at 72-73 (1890).
333. In re Taylor, 48 Md. 28 (1877); Cully v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 6 F. cas. 946 (D.C.
Md. 1876) (No. 3466); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. I (1883).
334. E. FREEMAN, HARVEYJOIINSON AN) EVERETr WARING 17-18 (1968) (unpublished
M.A. thesis at George Washington University). Stirling had participated in the litigation
which led to the integration of the city transit system in 1871 and in the unsuccessful suit
against the railroads under the Civil Rights Act of 1875.
335. 22 F. 843 (D. Md. 1885).
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common law right to provide inferior accommodations. The plain-
tiffs were awarded $100 each for the conduct of the steamer's of-
ficers. In another incident, in the spring of 1885, Johnson and
another minister were arrested in Virginia because they went into
the cabin on the white person's side of a ferryboat. Although a mag-
istrate found them not guilty of any offense against the law, they
were made to pay the costs of their arrest.33 6 It seems likely that
these experiences led Johnson to renew the effort to obtain bar
membership for black lawyers.
Reverend Johnson hired attorney Alexander Hobbs to bring
another test case on bar admission. 337 The biggest problem was to
find a proper plaintiff. The racial exclusion in the statute and the
decision in Taylor had effectively discouraged blacks in Maryland
from devoting years of their life to the study of law. Even if they
desired to make such a foolhardy attempt, no white lawyer would be
likely to waste his time teaching a person who could never go into
practice. Further, black lawyers trained in other states had little in-
centive to come to Maryland in view of the need for costly and possi-
bly fruitless litigation to secure the right to start practice.
Nevertheless, after a diligent search, Johnson and Hobbs discovered
Charles S. Wilson.
Wilson had been admitted to the Massachusetts bar where he
practiced for three years, but he decided to forego the opportunity
to practice there and came to Maryland in 1883 to teach secondary
school at Sunnybrook in Baltimore County. 38 Wilson apparently
had no burning desire to return to the practice of law, but Hobbs
and Johnson persuaded him to serve as plaintiff in the test case. At
their request, he applied for admission to the Supreme Bench of
Baltimore City.3 3s ' At that time, the Baltimore Sun reported that many
leaders of the bar thought that the practice of law should be open to
blacks. Colonel Charles Marshall and Bernard Carter, two leaders
at the bar who had taught at the School of Law of the University of
Maryland, both stated they would have no objection to black admis-
sion; Mayor Ferdinand Latrobe thought admission proper and
336. E. FREEMAN, supra note 334, at 17; W. ALEXANDER, THE BROTHERHOOD OF Li-
ERTY 9-10 (1891).
337. W. HAWKINS, HARVEY JOHNSON'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE LIFE OF BALTIMORE 7-8
(1922).
338. Baltimore Sun, Feb. 16, 1885, at 2, col. 2. Wilson was a graduate of Amherst
College. He passed the bar in 1880 and practiced in Massachusetts for almost three
years. See W. DAVIS, BENCH AND BAR OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHusETTs 538
(1974).
339. E. FREEMAN, supra note 334, at 21.
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Judge Charles Phelps of the Baltimore Supreme Bench called the
exclusion "a relic of barbarism. 34 °
At the initial hearing, Judges Brown and Fisher said they
thought the racial exclusion was wrong, but they felt themselves
bound to uphold it by the Court of Appeals decision in Taylor. At-
torney Hobbs urged that later Supreme Court cases overruled Tay-
lor and was consequently granted a hearing.34 ' The Sun anticipated
that the Court would uphold the exclusion and continued to urge
legislative change4
At oral argument, Hobbs cited the decisions of the Supreme
Court in Strauder and its companion cases on racial exclusion injury
selection for the proposition that racial discrimination violated the
equal protection clause. Expanding the reach of Strauder, he pointed
to a California federal circuit court decision in 1880, which applied
the Strauder language to invalidate a California constitutional prohi-
bition on the employment of Chinese. 43 "This right to choose
one's calling is an essential part of that liberty which is the object of
the government to protect, and a calling, when chosen, is a man's
property and right.-3 44 He even invoked Justice Bradley's reference
to pursuit of an avocation in The Civil Rights Cases.3 45
In a unanimous decision on March 19, 1885, the Supreme
Bench held that the racial exclusion in the 1832 Act was a denial of
equal protection under the fourteenth amendment.3 4' The judges
grumbled that it was unfortunate that they had to overturn the deci-
sion of the state's highest court in Taylor, but they found that
Strauder's reliance on "equal protection" compelled this result.
They noted that Taylor had relied on "privileges and immunities"
and had made no reference to equal protection; further, the Court
340. Baltimore Sun, Feb. 10, 1885, at 1, col. 7.
341. Id., Feb. 9, 1885, at 2, col. 4.
342. Id.
343. Baltimore Sun (Supp.), Feb. 16, 1885, at 2, col. 2. Hobbs referred to In re
Tiburcio Parrott, I F. 481 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880).
344. 1 F. at 510 (quoting The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 116 (Bradley,
J., dissenting)). Sawyer also cited Justice Field's opinion while on circuit in Ho Ah Kow
v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6,546) in which he said, "IHiostile and
discriminating legislation by a state against persons of any class, sect, creed or nation, in
whatever form it may be expressed, is forbidden by the fourteenth amendment. . . . No
charges or burdens shall be laid upon him which are not equally borne by others." I F.
at 510-11 (emphasis in original) (quoting 12 F.Cas. at 256). Thesc quotes displayed the
continuing vitality of Field and Bradley's view of the breadth of privileges and immuni-
ties transferred into equal protection language.
345. 109 U.S. at 23-24. Hobbs' argument is in the Baltimore Sun, Feb. 16, 1885, at 2,
col. 2.
346. Baltimore Sun, Mar. 20, 1885, at 1, col. 4.
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of Appeals had considered the statute in a vacuum. The Baltimore
Supreme Bench reasoned that if blacks could not be discriminated
against in jury selection, they also could not be discriminated
against in the opportunity to become judges because judges se-
lected juries, controlled trials, and made rulings on facts as well as
law. Strauder, the court ruled, "is equally applicable to a law which
removes from the negro race all chance of participation in other
branches of the administration of the law quite as essential to their
security. '3 47 Admission to the bar was a state constitutional prereq-
uisite to eligibility for a judicial position. That provision was in itself
constitutional and would become invalid only if the statutory exclu-
sion were given effect. In a conflict in which either a state statute or
a state constitutional provision would be held invalid, the statute
rather than the constitution had to be struck down. Therefore, the
court held blacks must be eligible for admission to the practice of
law.
The decision, although potentially far-reaching, was at least
momentarily a hollow one, because the court ultimately found Wil-
son not qualified to practice law. 48 Moreover, the narrow opinion
of the supreme bench left open the possible legality of a constitu-
tional amendment that would permit judges to be drawn from the
general population, thus freeing the statutory exclusion of blacks
from the bar from its unconstitutional effect. Such an amendment,
however, would undoubtedly have been strenuously opposed by the
legal profession and would have required far greater popular sup-
port than a statutory change. The legislature was already leaning
toward repeal of the statutory exclusion, and therefore such a
change would have been politically impossible. Further, dicta in the
supreme bench opinion suggested that the court might adopt the
broad language of the Strauder majority and strike down the racial
exclusion anyway. 4 1 Indeed, one year later in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
347. Id.
348. See A. KOGER, supra note 311, at 5.
349. After its analysis of the impact of the relationship between the statutory bar and
the state constitutional requirement that judges be lawyers, the court said that the prin-
ciples of Strauder "conclusively settle this case, not only upon the grounds already stated
[relationship of jurors to judges and lawyers 1, but upon others also." The court then
read Strauder to protect not only the defendant's right to an unbiased jury, but also the
right of the black man not to be excluded on the basis of race from thatjury. It relied on
the broadest language of Strauder to conclude that
to exclude them would be to discriminate against them as citizens in the enjoy-
ment of their own rights, because it would be unfriendly legislation against
them distinctly as colored and because it would be a discrimination which
would be a step towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race.
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the United States Supreme Court applied the equal protection
clause to invalidate the exclusion of Chinese from operating laun-
dries.350 The abstract right of blacks to become lawyers in Maryland
was thus finally secure. There remained the concrete problem of
demonstrating fitness for the practice of law.
VIII. THE ADMISSION OF EVERETT WARING
When public sentiment demands a separation of the passengers [ac-
cording to race], it must be gratified to some extent. "351
Buoyed by the invalidation of the racial bar to attorneys, but
also burdened financially because he personally paid all the costs of
the suit, Reverend Johnson sought the support of other black minis-
ters to form the Mutual United Brotherhood of Liberty inJune 1885
to advance the interests of blacks.3 5 Seeking a black lawyer to ad-
vance the cause of black civil rights, Johnson persuaded Everett J.
Waring, a graduate of Howard Law School, to come to Baltimore.
Waring was born in Ohio in 1859. When he graduated from
the Columbus, Ohio, Negro high school where his father was princi-
pal, he was appointed assistant principal. Later, he succeeded his
father as principal of the Negro schools in Columbus. In 1882 he
also edited a small paper there, but later that year he moved to
Washington, D.C., where he had obtained a job as examiner of pen-
sions.3 53 While working in the District, Waring attended Howard
Law School, graduating in 1885. As a result of the decision in Wil-
son's case, the field was open for a black lawyer in Baltimore, and
Waring moved to Maryland. On October 10, 1885, Waring was ad-
mitted to the Supreme Bench of Baltimore on motion of Assistant
State's Attorney Edgar H. Gans. 5 4 Soon Joseph Seldon Davis, an-
other graduate of Howard Law School, was also admitted to the
practice of law before the Baltimore Supreme Bench. 55 Waring
In re Wilson, as recounted in Baltimore Sun, Mar. 20, 1985. at 1, col. 4.
Therefore, the Baltimore Supreme Bench said that to debar a man from a profession
because of his race "tends to degrade and stigmatize the whole class by depriving them
of a privilege which all other citizens possess and of the equal protection of the law."
Id.
350. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
351. McGuinn v. Forbes, 37 F. 639, 639-41 (1889).
352. W. HAWKINS, supra note 337, at 9; W. AI.EXANDER, supra note 336, at7.
353. E. FREEMAN, supra note 334, at 27-28.
354. A. KOGER, supra note 311, at 5; TEST BOOK, SUPERIOR COURT, 1880-1895, at 205
(available at the Court museum, Clarence Mitchell, Jr., Courthouse, Baltimore. Md.).
355. TEST BOOK, SUPERIOR COURT, 1880-1895, at 205. Davis was admitted March 1,
1886.
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and Davis became co-counsel for the Brotherhood of Liberty.3 5 6
Despite the decision of the Baltimore Supreme Bench, there re-
mained some question whether the Maryland Court of Appeals
would reverse its decision in Taylor. Waring's first case and a similar
one following it suggested that the courts were not overly receptive
to discrimination claims. Waring represented a young black woman
who sought to force the father to pay for the support of her illegiti-
mate child. The state statute under which suit was brought was
criminal in form, but the penalty for fathering an illegitimate child
was merely to pay the child's mother or the child's custodian an "ad-
equate" sum for maintenance. The statute, however, applied only
to children of white women. Despite Waring's invocation of the
equal protection clause, the Baltimore Supreme Bench denied re-
lief.357 A second challenge to the same statute brought by another
lawyer reached the Court of Appeals in 1887. In Plunkard v. State,3 58
a man appealed from a conviction for fathering an illegitimate child
by a white woman. The defendant claimed the statute was unconsti-
tutional because it applied only when the mother was white. The
Court of Appeals upheld the statute, after noting that the procrea-
tion of illegitimate children was not a privilege or immunity of citi-
zenship.3 5"' The court said that the statute did not confer any
benefit on white women because payment went to them as custodi-
ans of the children and not as mothers. The court then found no
discrimination against the child because the child would be main-
tained by the public if not supported by the father. 3" ° Finally, the
Court of Appeals said that the statute did not deny equal protection
to defendant fathers because the statute did not distinguish between
fathers of different races. 3 ' The lone dissenter, Judge Stone, saw
clearly that the law had a racial basis. 3 6'2 The majority's refusal to
find a violation of the equal protection clause here suggested the
356. The Brotherhood, emboldened by its success in securing admission for Waring
and Davis, concentrated its efforts on improving public education fbr blacks. They per-
suaded the City Council to extend the program for black high schools to the full four
years and to hire black teachers for the black schools. Prejudice was still high, however,
and the latter gain was achieved only by accepting the condition that black teachers and
white teachers would not be employed at the same schools. J. BRACKE-rr, supra note 306,
at 88-90.
357. E. FREEMAN, supra note 334, at 29-30.
358. 67 Md. 364 (1887).
359. Id. at 370.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 370-71.
362. Id. at 372.
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possibility they would continue to uphold statutory discriminations,
even in admission to the bar.
The possibility of unfavorable judicial action on bar admission
was, however, precluded at last by legislation. In 1888, John Pren-
tiss Poe, the dean of the School of Law of the University of Mary-
land, presented the Maryland General Assembly with a codification
of Maryland laws, as they had requested. The codification removed
the reference to race in the recently challenged statutes on bastardy
and in the statute on bar admission. 63 The new code was passed
without any comment on this action, and in that same year Waring
was admitted to the Court of Appeals practice.364
Waring's admission to the bar and the success of the Brother-
hood of Liberty in securing their initial demands gave hope for
greater equality in other matters. These hopes were soon dashed.
Waring had few victories in litigation against discrimination.3 6 5
Reverend Robert McGuinn, a black minister from Annapolis,
purchased a ticket in 1887 on the steamer Mason Weems for travel to
Virginia. He sat down for supper at a table. The white passengers
refused to come to dinner when they saw McGuinn seated there.
The captain asked him to move to another table and attempted to
move his chair, but McGuinn refused to budge. The captain then
363. Poe was far from being a champion of black rights. As a leading legal advisor to
the regular Democratic Party in later years, he drafted an amendment to the state consti-
tution which, by imposing literacy test for voting (with a grandfather clause), was aimed
at effectively disenfranchising blacks. See generall, M. CALLCOT-r, supra note 320, at 114-
25 (1969). His legal reasons for removing the references to race in the 1888 code were
not stated, but perhaps he viewed Strauder and 'ick Ji'o as dispositive of racial bars. Note
that the statutes at issue in these cases had created racial barriers to receiving any bene-
fits. Thus, their elimination did not suggest any qualms about the provision of separate
facilities, a common practice in the public schools.
364. See M. CALLCOTr, supra note 320, at 79, E. FREEMAN supra note 334, at 34. Waring
was admitted on April 17, 1888 to the Court of Appeals. C. SAMS, BENCH AND BAR OF
MARYLAND 431 (1901).
365. See E. FREEMAN, supra note 334, at 76-77. In addition to Waring's unsuccessful
challenge to the racially discriminatory features of the state bastardy law. Waring unsuc-
cessfully defended a black man, Ernest Forbes. who was convicted and hung for raping a
white woman (another black man subsequently confessed to the crime on his death bed);
he lost a suit claiming an insurance company discriminated against blacks by charging
them more than whites (the company defended on the basis that blacks had higher mor-
tality rates); and he was involved in the unsuccessful appeal in Reverend Johnson's suit
against the ferry company which sought his arrest. Id. at 28-32. He also lost in court in
his defense of black laborers on Navassa Island in the Caribbean who had killed some
white men in a fray arising out of the desperate conditions there, although some of the
defendants were ultimately given clemency. Id. at 46-54. Waring appeared before the
Supreme Court of the United States to argue an issue of jurisdiction in the Navassa case,
thus becoming one of the first black attorneys to argue before the Court. Jones v. U.S..
137 U.S. 202 (1890).
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asked the white passengers to take the other table. One of the pas-
sengers later assaulted McGuinn, and threats were made to throw
the minister overboard. The captain testified that he told the pas-
sengers to leave McGuinn alone, but, fearing for his safety, Rever-
end McGuinn left the vessel before it arrived at his destination. 66
McGuinn hired Waring to sue the captain and owners of the ship for
damages arising from mistreatment based on race. Judge Morris,
the author of the opinion in The Steamer Sue , dismissed the com-
plaint, showing the hollowness of the promise of equality raised by
that case. Citing The Steamer Sue, Morris said that when persons pay
first class fare, the carrier must make "a bona fide effort" to furnish
the same accommodations regardless of race.367 Nevertheless, Mor-
ris continued,
When public sentiment demands a separation of the pas-
sengers, it must be gratified to some extent. While this
sentiment prevails among the traveling public, although
unreasonable and foolish, it cannot be said that the carrier
must be compelled to sacrifice his business to combat it.
Within reasonable limits the carrier must be allowed to
manage his own affairs.
Although this case involved federal common law rather than the
Constitution, the acceptance by a Republican judge of segregation,
and even "some discomfort and humiliation," as within the reason-
able limits of equal treatment required by law was an omen of Plessy
v. Ferguson,36 ' and the long night of separate and unequal that
followed.
The framers of the fourteenth amendment had not directly con-
fronted the problem of segregation. Equality under the equal pro-
tection clause meant identity of rights with a white person, but the
rights included referred only to protection from injury inflicted by
one individual on the person or property of another individual.
Equality in other respects was to be ensured to all citizens by the
privileges and immunities clause. Unfortunately, the intended
366. See McGuinn v. Forbes, 37 F. 639, 639-41 (1889).
367. Id. at 641.
368. Id. Segregation in transport had already received the sanction of Justice Clifford,
concurring in Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 500-01 (1887). The Brotherhood of Liberty
saw DeCuir as the worst decision to that date. BROTIIERIIOOD OF IIBERTN, JUSTICE AND
JURISPRUDENCE 191-203 (1889). Nevertheless, most civil rights suits sought simply
equality in treatment within a framework of segregation. Riegel, supra note 303. at 17.
McGuinn helped point the way to separate but unequal.
369. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Indeed Pless-y cited AIrGuinn and The Steamer Sue as sup-
port for the decision of the Supreme Court. 163 U.S. at 548.
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sweep of the privileges and immunities clause was never sufficiently
defined to force proponents of the amendment to consider its im-
pact on segregative practices. The article IV heritage of the clause
contained some support for reasoning that equality in privileges or
immunities did not in all cases require an identity of rights. But the
specific privileges on which the framers had focused were those
spelled out by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and separate but equal
made no sense with respect to those rights of contract, property,
and legal process. During the debates, school segregation was gen-
erally thought to be acceptable under the fourteenth amendment.
But public education was in its infancy and many congressmen
probably did not consider it to be a privilege or immunity of citizen-
ship. The Slaughterhouse Cases had cut short development of the con-
cept of privileges and immunities. When Strauder returned the
Court to a path requiring equality in state laws, there was no fully
adequate definition of the equality envisioned. Ultimately, that vi-
sion focused on upholding the patterns of life that had achieved
general acceptance in the community. The acceptance of separate
facilities under federal common law led to its acceptance under the
Constitution as well.
Waring's admission to the bar reflected the expanded meaning
of the "protection" of the laws. This expansion was the court's re-
sponse to the problem of maintaining the intended broad coverage
of the fourteenth amendment while preserving the federal structure
threatened by the arguments based on privileges and immunities.
But Waring's subsequent legal career foreshadowed the contraction
of the notion of "equality" which would take place in McGuinn and
Plessy. Not only would segregation continue, but segregation with
plainly unequal facilities would be permitted. Mere admission to
the bar did not open the way for the representation by black attor-
neys of all members of society, when social prejudice confined them
to a predominantly black clientele whose resources were limited. 7 "
Thus, early black lawyers like Waring were forced to pursue other
activities to strengthen their own economic position and that of the
370. Judge Bond stated in a letter concerning the creation of a law school at Morgan
College that the few black lawyers were not supported by blacks and "they can hardly be
called successful practitioners." Baltimore Am., Dec. 16, 1890, at 8, col. 1. Waring re-
sponded that the five black lawyers were all "supported by the colored people" and
made a good living. Harry Cummings said essentially the same thing. R. A. McGuinn,
however, agreed with Bond "that the colored people do not support their legal repre-
sentatives as they ought," and also noted that whites did not support black lawyers. Id.,
Dec. 17, 1890, at 6, cols. 1-2.
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black community.3 7' Most of those early efforts ended in failure. 72
But these failures, like the failure of those before Waring who
sought to become lawyers, were only the first steps of a struggle that
ultimately changed society. Black lawyers from Maryland played a
crucial role in stopping efforts in the state to disenfranchise
blacks, 73 in blocking residential segregation laws,374 in opening the
graduate schools to blacks,3 75 and, finally, in striking down segrega-
tion. 376 When the sad reality of the inequality of "separate but
equal" was finally acknowledged by the Court in 1954, the ex-
panded notion of "protection," which had opened the bar to black
lawyers, was available to extend the new understanding of equality
to every activity of the state.
371. B. THOMAS, THE BALTIMORE BLACK COMMUNITY 1865-1910, at 231, 283 (1974)
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, George Wasington University).
372. W. PAUL, supra note 306, at 369-80; E. FREEMAN, supra note 334, at 75-89 (dis-
cussing the failure of the Lexington Savings Bank, which Waring headed, his trial for
embezzlement, his vindication by a not guilty verdict and his subsequent move to
Philadelphia).
373. Harry Cummings, a graduate of the University of Maryland School of Law, who
became the first black elected official in the state in 1890 when he was elected to the
Baltimore City Council, was one of the leaders of the Maryland Suffrage League. M.
CALLCOTr, supra note 320, at 122.
374. W. Ashbie Hawkins, excluded from the University of Marvland School of Law at
the end of his first year because the school decided to end its policy of integration,
graduated from Howard Law School and successfully represented black plaintiffs chal-
lenging residential segregation. See State v. Gurry, 121 Md. 534, 88 A. 546 (1913);Jack-
son v. Maryland, 132 Md. 311, 103 A. 910 (1918). See also Power, Apartheid Baltimore Style:
The Residential Segregation Ordinances of 1910-1913, 42 MD. L. REv. 289 (1983).
375. Thurgood Marshall, a graduate of Howard Law School who had been prevented
from attending the University of Maryland School of Law by its policy of discrimination,
acted as local counsel in the successful suit to end discrimination there. Marvland v.
Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 A. 590 (1936). See R. KLUGER, SIMPLEJUSTICE 186-94 (1976).
376. Marshall led the group of attorneys in the litigation that culminated in Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See R. KLUGER, supra note 375.
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